Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (MSPB) final decision affirming his removal from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but filed his complaint in the district court one day after the statutory deadline prescribed in 5 U.S.C. Section 7703(b)(2). The district court dismissed his complaint as untimely. The district court held in the alternative that Plaintiff had not presented facts to warrant equitable tolling.   The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the alternative ground that Robinson failed to show that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The court explained that in light of the combined weight of intervening United States Supreme Court authority and the decisions of the other circuits interpreting section 7703(b)(2) as a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule since King, the court now holds that section 7703(b)(2)’s thirty-day filing deadline is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule. As such, the record shows that Plaintiff chose to mail his complaint by standard mail four days before the statutory filing deadline and assumed the risk his complaint would arrive late. On these facts, Plaintiff’s decision to use standard mail is a 14 “garden variety claim of excusable neglect” insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. View "Adam Robinson v. DHS Office of Inspector General" on Justia Law

Methane is considered the most dangerous gas in underground mining; in sufficient concentrations, methane can ignite and cause a potentially catastrophic explosion. To protect worker safety, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regulations thus require miners to deenergize equipment and cease work when they detect certain methane concentrations. But during the methane inundation at the Francisco mine the miners did not stop work. They instead continued operating an energized drill, trying to stop the flow of methane. MSHA issued two orders citing the mine operator, Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC, for violating the applicable safety regulations and designated those violations as unwarrantable failures. It also individually cited the mine’s manager as Peabody’s agent. An administrative law judge and then the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission agreed with MSHA that Peabody violated MSHA safety regulations, that those violations constituted unwarrantable failures, that mine manager was individually liable, and that civil penalties were appropriate. Peabody and the manager petitioned for review in this court.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that MSHA safety regulations unambiguously prohibited Peabody’s operation of an energized drill in a high-methane environment, and substantial evidence supports the Commission’s unwarrantable failure and individual liability determinations. Further, as the Commission recognized, by permitting miners to work with energized equipment, the manager risked incurring the very hazard section 75.323(c)(2) is intended to address, i.e., potential ignition [in a] high-methane environment. View "Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Three former officers of a local affiliate of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (“AFGE”) filed a lawsuit alleging that AFGE unlawfully retaliated against them for speech protected under Section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Specifically, the former officers challenge AFGE’s imposition of a trusteeship on the local union and their removal from office. The district court granted summary judgment to AFGE as to two officers and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on the merits for AFGE as to the third officer.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish a prima facie free speech claim under Section 101(a)(2), then, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in speech protected by LMRDA; (2) she was subject to an adverse action; and (3) that action is causally linked to the protected speech. If the non-movant, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, “fails to make a sufficient showing to establish an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” a court must enter summary judgment against it. Here, the court wrote that Appellants failed to make the requisite showing, and consequently summary judgment was appropriate on their free speech claims. View "Alexander Bastani v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

Appellant complaint, filed in 2021, repeated the claims she had made against the defendants in her 2018 complaint. The district court dismissed her 2018 complaint because the D.C. statutory limitations period had run. In both of her complaints Appellant alleged that in 2004, when she was 14 years old and a student at a KIPP charter school in the District of Columbia, one of her teachers began having sexual relations with her. She further alleged that this man continued to abuse her after she enrolled in another school and that they began living together in Maryland. She claimed that she ended her relationship with him in 2009. At issue is whether, as the district court ruled, res judicata barred Appellant’s second action.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the District of Columbia’s Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act went into effect on May 3, 2019. The new and expanded limitations period extends to “the date the victim attains the age of 40 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later.” Here, the court held that the district court did not decide whether the old or the new D.C. statute of limitations applied to several of Appellant’s claims. The court wrote that the district court also concluded that its interpretation of the new Act depended on constitutional avoidance, which the DC Circuit determined to be inapplicable. View "Shanique Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting Corporation" on Justia Law

Longmont United Hospital (Longmont) petitioned for a review of the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), concluding that Longmont violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, AFL-CIO (Union). Longmont does not dispute that it refused to bargain with the Union. Instead, it challenges the representation election whereby a group of registered nurses at Longmont elected the Union as its exclusive collective bargaining representative.   The DC Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. The court reasoned that Longmont has not shown a basis to disturb the Hearing Officer’s credibility findings. Further, the court held that the Board correctly declined to relitigate issues in the enforcement proceeding that had been decided in the representation proceeding. The Board did not adjudicate the General Counsel’s request for compensatory relief, and, as a result, any challenge to the fact or measure of compensatory damages is premature. View "Longmont United Hospital v. NLRB" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the denial of a motion for a default judgment. End Citizens United (“ECU”) sued the Federal Election Commission alleging the Commission unlawfully dismissed its administrative complaint. Although the Commission failed to enter an appearance or otherwise defend the lawsuit, the district court denied ECU’s motion based on the Commission’s after-the-fact explanation for its dismissal. The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by relying on the non-contemporaneous explanation in light of well-established circuit precedent requiring the Commission to provide a timely explanation of its reason for dismissing an administrative complaint.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to it with instructions to return the case to the Commission. The court explained that here the Commission has not defended its decision in court, much less the reasoning in the Dickerson/Cooksey statement. Moreover, the Commission’s composition has apparently changed since its dismissal of ECU’s administrative complaint so that different “agency personnel” would consider the matter on remand. In any event, the Supreme Court has contemplated that “a reviewing court . . . will set aside” Commission action taken contrary to law and “remand the case,” even though the Commission might later “reach the same result exercising its discretionary powers lawfully.” View "End Citizens United PAC v. FEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with six intelligence agencies for any records about the unmasking of members of President Trump’s campaign and transition team. Plaintiff sought to uncover what he alleges was inappropriate intelligence surveillance for political purposes. Declining to produce any records, the Agencies issued so-called Glomar responses, explaining that even the existence or nonexistence of such records was exempted from FOIA. The district court granted summary judgment for the Agencies, concluding that FOIA exempted the information Plaintiff requested and that the Agencies had no obligation to search for responsive records before invoking Glomar.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an agency properly issues a Glomar response when its affidavits plausibly describe the justifications for issuing such a response, and these justifications are not substantially called into question by contrary record evidence. Because the Glomar procedure protects information about even the existence of certain records, an agency need not search for responsive records before invoking it. Here, the Agencies have properly invoked Glomar on the grounds that the information Plaintiff seeks is protected by FOIA Exemptions One and Three, and nothing in the record suggests the Agencies acted in bad faith in issuing their responses. View "Gene Schaerr v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his criminal convictions for forty-two counts of prescribing a controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a) and two counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957. Appellant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. He contends that each of his actual patients included in the indictment, despite the fact that they were ultimately pill-seekers addicted to oxycodone, had real ailments to which he properly responded in good faith, and the government did not prove otherwise. He also argues that the two undercover DEA agents presented real MRIs with real injuries, leading Appellant to believe he was treating them appropriately.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentencing. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the court affirmed the district court on its Napue and expert testimony rulings. However, the court reversed the district court on its Brady decision and remand this case for a new trial due to the government’s suppression of the favorable and material Pryor Reports and CCN Report. The court explained that although the Brady error is dispositive of this appeal, the remand will open the possibility of a new trial, and Appellant’s remaining arguments as to the evidentiary questions in the case are likely to arise again on retrial. View "USA v. Ivan Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2005, after a jury convicted Appellant of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)), the district court, relying on the Armed Career Criminal Act, sentenced Appellant to 18 years imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. The Supreme Court’s Johnson decision came down in 2015. Within a year Appellant brought a Section 2255 habeas petition, seeking to have his sentence vacated or corrected. The district court used the preponderance of evidence standard in determining that Appellant failed to show that it was more likely than not that his sentence relied on the residual clause.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing in the record indicates whether Appellant’s sentence rested on the residual clause, or on the elements clause, or both. The government’s sentencing memorandum, the presentence report, and the court’s statements indicate only that Appellant’s prior convictions were violent felonies and therefore subjected him to the sentencing enhancement. Further, Appellant contended that after his sentencing, there were cases suggesting that a crime with a mens rea of recklessness would not qualify as a violent felony. The aggravated assault statutes punish attempts to cause or causing “bodily injury purposely” or with “extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such” injury. The New Jersey statutes thus required not mere reckless conduct but extreme recklessness. The circuit courts considering “extreme” or “depraved heart” recklessness, as in the New Jersey statutes, have concluded that elevated recklessness satisfied the elements clause. View "USA v. Matthew West" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC has been trying to build its eponymous Mountain Valley Pipeline through West Virginia and Virginia. In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission first issued a certificate approving the project. To build an interstate natural gas pipeline, a company often needs additional federal permits from agencies other than the Commission. Mountain Valley needed approvals from the Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, Army Corps of Engineers, and Fish and Wildlife Service. While Mountain Valley initially obtained each of those additional permits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated all of them over time. The Commission responded with a series of follow-up orders. As Mountain Valley reacquired permits from the other agencies, the Commission extended the deadline for completing construction and authorized work to resume. Several environmental groups petitioned for a review of the Commission’s orders allowing the project to proceed.   The DC Circuit denied most of their claims and concluded that one is moot. But the court agreed with one of the claims: that the Commission inadequately explained its decision not to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement addressing unexpectedly severe erosion and sedimentation along the pipeline’s right-of-way. While the court granted the petitions for review in part on that ground, it did not vacate the Commission’s orders allowing work on the project to resume. Instead, the court remanded the orders without vacatur to enable the Commission either to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement or to better explain why one is unnecessary. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law