Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant claimed the IRS owes him a whistleblower award under subsection 7623(b)(1), and he argued that the Treasury regulation on which the IRS relied to decide otherwise contravenes the text of the statute. Appellant submitted information to the IRS that he thought showed that a condominium development group evaded taxes through its treatment of golf-club-membership deposits. The IRS deemed the information Appellant submitted sufficiently specific and credible to warrant opening an examination but later concluded that the membership deposits were correctly reported. Through its own further investigation, however, the IRS discovered an unrelated problem. The IRS eventually ordered the development group to pay a large adjustment relating to its treatment of that debt, but it denied Lissack’s claim for a percentage of those proceeds. When Appellant sought a review of that decision, the Tax Court granted summary judgment to the IRS. Appellant appealed, and the IRS primarily argued that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review its award denial.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction and that the challenged provisions of the rule are consistent with the tax whistleblower statute. The court wrote that the Tax Court correctly concluded that “the record provides more than enough evidence to confirm that petitioner is not eligible for a mandatory award” and ruled in favor of the IRS as a matter of law. The Tax Court credited information in the administrative record showing that “none of the adjustments had anything to do with the membership deposits issue.” View "Michael Lissack v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Appellant sent information to the Whistleblower Office of the Internal Revenue Service that he believed showed a company was underpaying taxes by taking unjustified deductions and using improper pricing practices. Section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code entitles whistleblowers to a percentage of the proceeds the IRS collects based on whistleblower information identifying underpayment of taxes or violations of internal revenue law. Appellant claimed he is entitled to a mandatory whistleblower award under Section 7623. The Whistleblower Office accordingly denied Appellant’s application for an award. The Tax Court entered summary judgment in favor of the IRS.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tax Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on Appellant’s challenge to the Whistleblower Office’s determination. The court wrote that Appellant admits that his submission “did not explicitly reference” the tax issues that led to adjustments, and the administrative record supports the revenue agent’s statements that those tax issues were not related to the issues Appellant identified. The record also shows substantial independent information gathering by the revenue agent. The Whistleblower Definitions Rule allows the IRS to treat a portion of an examination into unrelated tax issues as a separate administrative action, and Appellant does not show that the agency incorrectly applied that rule here. View "Luis Villa-Arce v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Vice President of Program and Community of the Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation. She received largely positive feedback during her tenure, but less than two years after she was hired, the CEO of the Foundation fired her for purported interpersonal and communication-related issues. Plaintiff, who is African-American, believes these stated reasons were pretext to mask discriminatory animus. Plaintiff and the Foundation signed a severance agreement, under which Plaintiff agreed to release employment-related claims against the Foundation and its employees, and which contained a mutual non-disparagement clause. But roughly a month after Plaintiff was fired, the CEO told another leader in the non-profit space that Plaintiff was let go because she was “toxic,” created a “negative environment.” Plaintiff sued the Foundation and its CEO for breaching the severance agreement, for doing so in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and for defaming her. The district court dismissed all three claims.   The DC Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing all three claims. As to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, the non-disparagement clause could reasonably be interpreted to preclude the Foundation from disparaging Plaintiff, and dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is therefore inappropriate. As to her Section 1981 claim, the court found that she has plausibly alleged a prima facie case that the Foundation, through the CEO, breached the severance agreement due to racial animus. And lastly, the CEO’s statements are not protected by the common interest privilege, which requires a showing of good faith on the part of the speaker. View "Terri Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Foundation" on Justia Law

Heritage Action for America appeals the denial of its post-judgment motion to intervene as of right, in Campaign Legal Center’s challenge to the Federal Election Commission’s failure to act on its administrative complaint. The district court found the motion was untimely because prior to judgment, it became clear Heritage Action’s interests would not be protected and delay in considering the complaint would prejudice Campaign Legal to the detriment of Congress’ enforcement scheme.   The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention and dismissed the merits appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that Heritage Action had not yet received the Commission’s response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed 41 months after the administrative complaint, but the record supports the district court’s findings upon applying the test in Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, 142 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2022). Further, Heritage Action was not a party to the default judgment in Campaign Legal’s lawsuit against the Commission and would not be prevented from arguing that Section 30109(a)(8)(C)’s prerequisites have not been met. View "Campaign Legal Center v. FEC" on Justia Law

The Alaska Gasline Development Corporation sought authorization to build and operate a system of natural gas facilities. After the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted that authorization, the Center for Biological Diversity and the Sierra Club (collectively, “CBD”) petitioned the DC Circuit for review.The DC Circuit dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part. The court explained that in approving the Alaska Liquid Natural Gas Project, the Commission complied with the NGA, NEPA, and the APA. CBD failed to provide any reason for the court to disturb the Commission’s reasonable determinations. Further, the court explained that the Commission properly assessed the cumulative impacts on beluga whales. CBD may disagree with the Commission’s policy choice to approve the Project, but the Commission comported with its regulatory obligations. To the extent the issues raised in the petition for review were not exhausted, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction View "Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) prescribe safety standards for pipelines on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation. Two oil and gas associations, GPA Midstream and the American Petroleum Institute, petitioned for review of a safety standard requiring their members to install remote-controlled or automatic shut-off valves in some types of new or replaced gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. Petitioners challenged the standard as it applies to “gathering” pipelines used to collect raw gas or crude oil from a well. They argued the PHMSA unlawfully failed to disclose the economic basis for regulating gathering pipelines when it proposed the standard and also failed to make a reasoned determination that regulating these pipelines was appropriate.   The DC Circuit granted the petition. The court explained that the PHMSA said nothing about the practicability or the costs and benefits of the standard for gathering pipelines until promulgating the final rule, even though the law required it to address those subjects when publishing the proposed rule for public comment and peer review. The PHMSA also ultimately failed to make a reasoned determination that the benefits of regulating gathering pipelines would exceed the costs and that doing so would be practicable, as required by law. View "GPA Midstream Association v. DOT" on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Appellee with wire fraud and obstructing an official proceeding. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense. The district court granted the motion, and the Government appealed to contest the dismissal of the section 1343 (wire fraud) count. Before the District Court, Appellee moved to suppress certain evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued in this case and requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  The Government does not appeal the dismissal of the section 1512(c)(2) (obstructing an official proceeding) count.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. The court dismissed Appellee’s cross-appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing. The court explained that regardless of whether Appellee lied to “obtain” future salary or “maintain” his existing salary, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal because the indictment fails to allege that the State Department was deprived of something more than Appellee’s honesty. The court wrote that the wire fraud statute, as interpreted through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, does not support an indictment on the facts proffered by the Government in this case. Moreover, the court explained that Appellee is the prevailing party in this case. As such, he has no right to seek review of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing. View "USA v. Paul Guertin" on Justia Law

The Government removed Appellant from the United States. Back in his home country, Appellant filed a habeas petition, arguing that his removal was unlawful. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. It concluded that habeas proceedings are available only to those in government custody. Because Appellant did not file his petition until he was back home and out of custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Appellant appealed to the DC Circuit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an alien may seek judicial review of an expedited removal order in “habeas corpus proceedings.” And habeas corpus proceedings are available only to those in custody. Here, Appellant was not in custody. So the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition. Further, the court noted that it cannot adopt an extreme-circumstances exception because it has no statutory basis. The court wrote that creating exceptions to jurisdictional rules is a job for Congress, not the courts. View "I.M. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

The United States seized oil cargo it claims belongs to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Appellants attached the oil in order to satisfy money judgments they hold against Iran. The district court upheld the United States' claim of sovereign immunity and quashed the attachments.
The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held (1) federal sovereign immunity prevents the attachment and garnishment of oil proceeds in a bank account of the United States and (2) the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) does not waive that immunity. The court explained that the TRIA does not expressly mention the United States, its sovereign immunity, or its susceptibility to suit under the statute. Because the TRIA has nothing express to say about federal sovereign immunity, the notwithstanding clause cannot aid Appellants. Because sovereign immunity prevents Appellants from taking further steps to seize the proceeds from the United States’ sale of the contested oil, the court wrote it has no occasion to reach the alternative grounds for affirmance raised by the Government. View "Steven Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued its “final determination to regulate perchlorate in drinking water” under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Drinking Water: Regulatory Determination on Perchlorate. That determination started a clock under the Safe Drinking Water Act requiring EPA to propose regulations within twenty-four months and promulgate regulations within eighteen months of the proposal. But EPA never promulgated perchlorate regulations. Instead, nine years later, the agency purported to withdraw its regulatory determination. Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) petitioned for review of this action, arguing that EPA lacks the authority to withdraw a regulatory determination under the Act and that, even if EPA possesses such authority, it acted arbitrarily and capriciously by doing so. EPA, joined by Intervenor American Water Works Association, defends its action.   The DC Circuit granted NRDC’s petition, vacated EPA’s withdrawal of its regulatory determination, and remand to the agency for further proceedings. The court held the Safe Drinking Water Act does not permit EPA to withdraw a regulatory determination. The court explained that first, and most fundamentally, EPA’s interpretation of what Congress intended in the statute cannot overcome the statute’s directive that the agency “shall” regulate. And second, the history EPA cites is not inconsistent with the court’s interpretation. The 1996 amendments undoubtedly gave the agency more discretion in determining which contaminants to consider for regulation and whether to regulate them in the first instance. But they also balanced that discretion with a mandatory scheme requiring EPA to regulate after it determines to do so. View "NRDC v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law