Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency established federal standards for coal ash disposal facilities. Under the governing statute, a state, instead of submitting to federal oversight of coal ash facilities within its borders, can develop its own permitting program and seek EPA’s approval of the state program as consistent with federal standards. Oklahoma chose that path and obtained EPA’s approval of its permitting program. Plaintiffs, a trio of environmental groups, then brought this action contesting EPA’s approval. They challenged the adequacy of Oklahoma’s permitting program on several grounds. The district court granted summary judgment to EPA on most of the claims, and Plaintiffs appealed.   The DC Circuit did not reach the merits because the court concluded that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring them. Thus, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to EPA and remanded for dismissal of the relevant claims. The court explained that Plaintiffs failed to show why compelling EPA to publish guidelines for public participation in state permitting programs would redress alleged injuries to their members from deficiencies in Oklahoma’s program. Thus they lack standing to bring the citizen-suit claim.   Further, the court wrote that Plaintiffs have made no effort to demonstrate, for instance, likely satisfaction of the condition that there be “appropriations specifically provided in appropriations Act to carry out a [federal permitting] program in a nonparticipating state.” Moreover, the court explained that Plaintiffs failed to establish their standing to bring that claim because they fail to demonstrate imminent injury in connection with it. View "Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration hired Archer Western Contractors to build air traffic structures for an airport in Las Vegas. Archer challenged the FAA’s resolution of three contract disputes.   On the first dispute, the FAA said that Archer waited too long to challenge the FAA’s failure to provide an equitable adjustment for a modification to the contract. For the second dispute, the FAA said that Archer’s claim regarding contract modifications’ “cumulative impact” was also untimely. As for the third dispute, the FAA found that Archer had failed to install proper rectangular air ducts.   The DC Circuit granted Petitioners’ petition in part and denied it in part. The court vacated the FAA’s order only as to its dismissal of Archer’s first claim for failure to provide an equitable adjustment. The other challenged aspects of the FAA’s order are not arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the FAA erred in dismissing as untimely Archer’s failure-to-provide-an-equitable-adjustment claim. The court agreed with the FAA on the other two issues.   The court explained that it is reviewing a failure-to-provide-an-equitable-adjustment claim. And that claim was timely filed only one year and four months after it accrued — well within the two-year window for Archer to file a claim. However, Archer needed to separately allege a claim for cumulative impact within two years of that claim’s accrual. Instead, the ODRA did not receive notice of Archer’s cumulative impact until well past the contract’s two-year limit for filing a claim. The FAA was therefore correct to dismiss Archer’s cumulative-impact claim as untimely. View "Archer Western Contractors. LLC v. U.S. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) modified its regulations governing the maximum hours that commercial motor vehicle operators may drive or operate within a certain timeframe. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a labor union representing commercial truck drivers, and three national nonprofit organizations petitioned for review. They argued that the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious for failing to grapple with the safety and driver health consequences of changes to record-keeping rules for short-haul commercial vehicle drivers and break requirements for long-haul drivers.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the modifications to the hours-of-service rules were sufficiently explained and grounded in the administrative record. The court explained that the Administration not only directly tackled the issue of driver health but also reasonably explained why the health benefits estimated in the 2011 Rule would continue under the modified 30-minute break rule. That met the APA’s requirements. View "Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMCSA" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted on several counts related to his involvement in the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the United States’ diplomatic outpost in Benghazi, Libya. He was sentenced to 22 years of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. He now appealed his convictions under several theories, seeking acquittal or at least a new trial. The government cross-appealed, arguing the district court’s 22-year sentence is substantively unreasonably low.   The DC Circuit reversed Appellant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held for the government finding that Appellant has failed to show that he was convicted on legally insufficient evidence, that he was prejudiced by any erroneous evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, or that he was substantially prejudiced by the prosecution’s closing arguments. On the other hand, Appellant’s sentence is substantively unreasonably low in light of the gravity of his crimes of terrorism. The district court’s decision to disregard the conduct for which Appellant was acquitted cannot account for its dramatic downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation. View "USA v. Ahmed Abukhatallah" on Justia Law

Appellant shipped a package containing chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl from China to Peru. Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts relating to the importation of controlled substances and listed chemicals into the United States. He raised a single challenge on appeal: he contends that there is no importation into the United States when a package stops temporarily in United States territory en route to a foreign destination without ever clearing United States customs.   The DC Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Appellant’s plea agreement contains an appeal waiver that expressly bars him from raising the argument he now seeks to press on appeal. In the circumstances of this case, the appeal waiver is enforceable. The court explained that hat an appeal waiver generally meets the requirement that it be “knowing” when “the defendant is aware of and understands the risks involved” and “his choice is made with eyes open.”   Here, Appellant does not—and could not—claim to have misunderstood the relevant risks. The court further wrote that Appellant made the decision to forgo the uncertainty of filing a motion to dismiss and to instead accept the government’s plea offer. The agreement he signed memorialized the benefits and costs of that decision. He obtained the benefit of the government’s dropping three additional counts against him. In exchange, he waived his right to raise certain objections to his counts of conviction in any appeal, thereby securing a benefit for the government, too. View "In re: Sealed Case (PUBLIC OPINION)" on Justia Law

At the culmination of a five-month rulemaking, the Department of Agriculture announced a final rule designed to protect show horses from abuse. As required by the Federal Register Act, the agency transmitted the signed rule to the Office of the Federal Register, which made it available for public inspection. But on the day President Trump took the oath of office, his Chief of Staff directed executive agencies to withdraw all pending rules.    The Humane Society filed suit along with four of its members challenging the rule’s withdrawal. It principally claims that the Department unlawfully repealed the rule without notice and comment or the reasoned decision-making that the Administrative Procedure Act requires. The district court dismissed, agreeing with the government that a rule becomes final only upon Federal Register publication. The question, in this case, is whether an agency must provide notice and an opportunity for comment when withdrawing a rule that has been filed for public inspection but not yet published in the Federal Register.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing The Humane Society’s suit against the United States Department of Agriculture. The court held that because a rule made available for public inspection prescribes law with legal consequences for regulated parties, the APA requires the agency to undertake notice and comment before repealing it. View "Humane Society of the United States v. AGRI" on Justia Law

Acting under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) the Department of Commerce has maintained a so-called Entity List to restrict designated foreign parties from receiving United States exports.   Plaintiff, Changji Esquel Textile Co, operates a spinning mill in Xinjiang. The United States has determined that China abuses the human rights of Uyghurs and other religious or ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including imprisonment and forced labor. Changji and its parent company filed a lawsuit alleging that the Department, in adding Changji to the Entity List, violated ECRA and its implementing regulations, the APA, and the Due Process Clause. They moved for a preliminary injunction on the theory that the alleged ECRA and regulatory violations were ultra vires. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on this claim.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to prevail on an ultra vires claim, Plaintiff must establish three things: “(i) the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather than express; (ii) there is no alternative procedure for review of the statutory claim; and (iii) the agency plainly acts in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the statute that is clear and mandatory.   The court explained that the canons invoked by Plaintiffs can resolve statutory ambiguity in close cases, but they do not allow the court to discern any clear and mandatory prohibition on adding entities to the List for human-rights abuses, particularly given the breadth of section 4813(a)(16) and the deference owed to the Executive Branch in matters of foreign affairs. View "Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. v. Gina Raimondo" on Justia Law

In the district court, Appellants brought suit against the Internal Revenue Service for its responses to the Appellants’ twelve Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to the IRS on all issues. Appellants appealed the district court’s order awarding summary judgment to the IRS, as well as seven opinions and orders supporting the order.   Appellants set forth three procedural arguments averring that the IRS is barred from asserting a Glomar Response to Requests 1–5: (1) collateral estoppel; (2) judicial estoppel; and (3) the official acknowledgment doctrine.  Appellants argued that the IRS benefitted from its argument to the Fifth Circuit that no informant existed, resulting in favorable evidentiary and statute of limitations rulings, and thus the IRS cannot now change its position that no informant exists.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that the IRS’s Glomar Response to the existence of whistleblower documents, as requested by the Appellants in FOIA Requests 1–5, does not bear on its prior position in the Fifth Circuit cases regarding the existence of a whistleblower. Since the IRS’s positions are not inconsistent, the IRS is not judicially estopped from its Glomar Response.  Further, the court held that the official acknowledgment doctrine does not apply to Appellants’ argument because the IRS did not officially acknowledge in any prior proceeding that it did, or did not, possess records pertaining to potential informants, the subject of Requests 1–5. View "Thomas Montgomery v. IRS" on Justia Law

Electricity grids are natural monopolies. To prevent utilities such as grid operators from abusing their market power, Congress has given the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the responsibility to ensure that rates and rules under its jurisdiction are “just and reasonable[.]” 16 U.S.C. Section  824d(a).   The Public Service Corporation of Colorado is a grid owner and subsidiary of petitioner Xcel Energy Services, Inc. (collectively, “PS Colorado”).  PS Colorado filed an application with the Commission to change how it processes power plant requests to interconnect—that is, to plug in—to its grid. The Commission denied PS Colorado’s request. It held that the proposal risked unduly preferring the company’s own power plants over would-be entrants to its grid.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court held that the Commission reasonably explained its rejection of PS Colorado’s proposal. There was nothing arbitrary or capricious about its decision to bar a vertically integrated grid operator from adopting a rule that could favor its own generators and so cement its dominant market position. The Commission’s holding is consonant with decades of agency policy reflected in orders upheld by the Supreme Court and our court. The Commission also reasonably applied a different rule to a vertically integrated grid operator than it did to independent grid operators because vertically integrated operators have distinct competitive incentives. View "Xcel Energy Services Inc. v FERC" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) issued a final rule that implemented The Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (“PAMA” or “Act”), definition of “applicable laboratory” (“2016 Rule”). The American Clinical Laboratory Association (“ACLA”) filed a lawsuit challenging the 2016 Rule as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) on the basis that it depresses Medicare reimbursement rates by excluding most hospital laboratories from PAMA’s reporting requirements. ACLA contended that because hospital laboratories tend to charge higher prices than standalone laboratories, their exclusion from reporting obligations results in an artificially low weighted median.   On remand, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court declined to reach the merits of ACLA’s APA challenge to the 2016 Rule, based on its determination that the Secretary had issued a new rule (“2018 Rule”) that superseded the 2016 Rule and mooted ACLA’s lawsuit.   The DC Circuit concluded that the case is not moot. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and reached the merits of ACLA’s APA claim. The court explained that the 2016 Rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.” The court wrote that PAMA provides that an applicable laboratory “means a laboratory that” receives “a majority” of its Medicare revenues from the Physician Fee Schedule or Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule. Thus, hospital laboratories that provide outreach services may, in some instances, constitute “applicable laboratories” under PAMA. View "American Clinical Laboratory Association v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law