Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sprint Corporation and T-Mobile USA, Inc., both wireless carriers, operated programs that sold customer location information (CLI) to third-party aggregators, who then resold the data to other service providers. Although the carriers’ contracts required these third parties to obtain customer consent before accessing CLI, in practice, the carriers did not verify compliance, and several third parties accessed the data without proper consent. After public reports revealed abuses—including unauthorized access by law enforcement and bounty hunters—the carriers terminated some third-party access but continued their programs for months without implementing effective new safeguards.The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) investigated and issued Notices of Apparent Liability (NALs) to both carriers, alleging violations of the Communications Act’s duty to protect the confidentiality of customer proprietary network information (CPNI), which includes CLI. The FCC found that the carriers’ reliance on contractual promises, without independent verification or effective monitoring, was unreasonable. The FCC also concluded that the carriers failed to promptly address their inadequate safeguards after learning of the breaches. The FCC assessed penalties totaling $92 million, calculating separate violations for each third-party relationship that allowed unauthorized access after the carriers were on notice of the problems.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the carriers’ petitions challenging the FCC’s orders. The court held that CLI is CPNI under the Communications Act, that the carriers’ safeguards were inadequate, and that the FCC’s interpretation of the statute was the most natural reading, providing fair notice. The court also found the penalty calculations reasonable and rejected the carriers’ constitutional arguments, including their Seventh Amendment claim, because they had the statutory right to a jury trial but waived it by paying the penalties and seeking direct appellate review. The court denied the petitions for review. View "Sprint Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company sought approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market tasimelteon, a drug previously approved for a rare sleep disorder, as a treatment for jet lag. The company submitted results from several clinical trials, focusing on both objective sleep measures and subjective assessments of alertness and next-day functioning. The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research issued a complete response letter indicating that the application did not provide substantial evidence of efficacy, particularly criticizing the measurement of next-day impairment and the tools used for subjective endpoints. The company engaged in further discussions and dispute resolution with the FDA, including proposing a narrower indication for approval, but these efforts were unsuccessful.After the FDA issued a formal notice of opportunity for a hearing (NOOH), the company requested a hearing and submitted expert declarations supporting the adequacy of its clinical evidence. The FDA ultimately denied both the application and the hearing request, finding no genuine and substantial issue of fact warranting a hearing. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that the FDA was required to hold a hearing, that material factual disputes existed, that the FDA’s decision-making was arbitrary and capricious, and that the final decision violated the Appointments Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not require the FDA to hold a hearing before denying every new drug application, but the agency must grant a hearing if there are material factual disputes. The court found that, in this case, the FDA’s refusal to hold a hearing was arbitrary and capricious because the company’s expert evidence created genuine disputes over the adequacy of the clinical trials. The court remanded the case to the FDA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law

A former federal employee alleged that her union mishandled an arbitration proceeding and discriminated against her based on sex and disability. She claimed that the union’s local president made unwanted sexual advances, disparaged her status as a nursing mother, and ultimately withdrew union support for her grievance against her employer. The employee filed several unfair labor practice (ULP) charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), some of which were dismissed as untimely, and also filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which issued her a right-to-sue letter. She then brought two lawsuits in federal district court: one alleging violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the union and its local, and another, pro se, alleging retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the union, its local, and two union officials.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both lawsuits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) precluded the employee’s claims, holding that her allegations were essentially claims for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which must be pursued exclusively through the FLRA’s administrative process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that the FSLMRS does not preclude federal employees from bringing Title VII and ADA claims against their unions in federal district court, even when the alleged conduct could also constitute a ULP. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to displace these specific statutory discrimination remedies with the FSLMRS’s more limited scheme. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FLSA retaliation claim, finding no indication that Congress intended for such claims against unions to proceed in district court alongside the FSLMRS process. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Title VII and ADA claims. View "Lucas v. American Federation of Government Employees" on Justia Law

The case concerns the executive branch’s decision to freeze foreign aid funds that Congress had appropriated for fiscal year 2024. On January 20, 2025, the President issued an executive order directing the State Department and USAID to pause foreign assistance spending, pending a review of those programs. This led to the suspension or termination of thousands of grant awards and significant restructuring within the agencies. Organizations that were recipients of these funds, many of which relied heavily on such funding, challenged the executive order, arguing that the freeze unlawfully impounded funds that Congress had directed to be spent.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted a temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction, against the executive branch (excluding the President personally). The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing due to financial harm, and that they were likely to succeed on their claims that the executive branch’s actions violated the separation of powers, the Take Care Clause, the Impoundment Control Act (ICA), the Anti-Deficiency Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court ordered the government to make available the full amount of appropriated funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action to pursue their claims. Specifically, it found that the plaintiffs could not bring a freestanding constitutional claim when the alleged violations were statutory in nature, that the ICA precludes APA review by private parties (reserving enforcement to the Comptroller General), and that the plaintiffs could not reframe their claims as ultra vires actions. The court concluded that, although the plaintiffs had standing, they were not entitled to the preliminary injunction because they were unlikely to succeed on the merits. View "Global Health Council v. Trump" on Justia Law

After registering to receive an email newsletter from a news publication, the plaintiff visited the publication’s website and watched videos there. The website contained a tracking tool, the Meta Pixel, which transmitted information about the videos she viewed to Meta (Facebook’s owner) without her knowledge or consent. The plaintiff did not access the website or its videos through the newsletter, nor did she allege that the newsletter itself transmitted any information about her video viewing to Meta.The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the news publication’s owner violated the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) by disclosing her personally identifiable information to Meta. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that the plaintiff was not a “consumer” under the VPPA because she had not purchased, rented, or subscribed to the specific videos or similar audio-visual materials at issue. The court found that merely subscribing to the newsletter, which was unrelated to the videos she watched on the website, was insufficient to establish the necessary connection under the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that to state a claim under the VPPA, a plaintiff must allege that she purchased, rented, or subscribed to the specific video or similar audio-visual good or service, and that the protected information disclosed must concern that same good or service. Because the plaintiff did not subscribe to or otherwise acquire the videos she watched on the website, she was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA with respect to those videos. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Pileggi v. Washington Newspaper Publishing Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Terri R. Winnon, a former executive assistant and controller for a group of skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) in Texas, alleged that her former employers and associated entities engaged in fraudulent schemes to obtain improper reimbursements from Medicare and Texas Medicaid. She claimed that the defendants paid unlawful kickbacks to doctors and hospital discharge planners for patient referrals and inflated therapy service bills to maximize government reimbursements. Winnon’s allegations included specific practices such as employee bonuses tied to Medicare census targets, “sham” medical directorships, and “marketing gifts” to hospital staff, as well as systematic upcoding of therapy services by a contracted provider, RehabCare.After Winnon filed her qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and related Texas statutes, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed her claims. The court found that her allegations against RehabCare were barred by the FCA’s public disclosure provision, as similar claims had already been made public in a prior lawsuit, United States ex rel. Halpin & Fahey v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc. The district court also determined that Winnon’s claims against the SNF Defendants did not meet the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as they lacked sufficient particularity regarding the alleged fraudulent conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissals. The appellate court held that Winnon’s claims against RehabCare were precluded by the public disclosure bar because her allegations were substantially similar to those previously disclosed and she did not qualify as an “original source” under the FCA. Regarding the SNF Defendants, the court concluded that Winnon’s allegations failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement for particularity, as she did not provide enough specific details to support a strong inference that false claims were actually submitted. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments in full. View "USA v. Lozano" on Justia Law

After Georgia enacted the Election Integrity Act (SB 202) following the 2020 elections, several organizations and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging the law on various grounds, including race discrimination. The DOJ and several plaintiff organizations entered into a common-interest agreement to coordinate their litigation efforts and share privileged attorney work product. Georgia, suspecting improper coordination, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the DOJ seeking all communications between the DOJ and the aligned non-governmental plaintiffs. The DOJ produced many documents but withheld or redacted others, citing FOIA Exemption 5, which protects privileged attorney work product from disclosure.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Georgia’s suit to enforce its FOIA request. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia, holding that the communications between the DOJ and non-governmental parties were not “intra-agency” records under Exemption 5 and that the DOJ had waived any work-product privilege by sharing the materials with third parties, even under a common-interest agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that when the government shares attorney work product with aligned parties under a common-interest agreement, those communications qualify as “intra-agency” materials for purposes of FOIA Exemption 5. The court further held that such sharing does not waive the attorney work-product privilege, provided the parties are aligned and the sharing is pursuant to a common-interest agreement. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment only as to two emails predating the agreement but reversed the remainder of the district court’s decision, allowing the DOJ to withhold the other documents. View "State of Georgia v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Police responded to reports of gunfire at a rowhouse in Southeast Washington, D.C., where they found spent shell casings but no suspects. Reviewing footage from a recently installed pole-mounted surveillance camera, officers observed a man firing a gun from the rear of the residence and later identified him as Demetrius Green. A search warrant executed that day at the residence uncovered large quantities of narcotics, digital scales, and a firearm. Green attempted to flee but was apprehended inside. Evidence linking Green to the residence included identification cards, personal items, and data from his cellphone, which contained a photograph of a bag of powder on a scale and a text message referencing drug sales.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Green’s motion to suppress the pole-camera footage, finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area surveilled. The court also admitted the challenged exhibits from Green’s cellphone, determining they were relevant to show knowledge and intent, and that any risk of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a limiting instruction. At trial, Green was convicted by a jury on four counts related to drug and firearm offenses. He was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment and appealed his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the use of the pole camera did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the area surveilled was exposed to public view and the surveillance was brief. The court also found the evidence sufficient to establish Green’s constructive possession of the drugs, given his connection to the residence and the items found. Finally, the court concluded that the challenged exhibits were properly admitted, and even if their admission was erroneous, any error was harmless. View "USA v. Green" on Justia Law

An employee of a multinational information technology company alleged that his employer engaged in fraudulent practices by obtaining less expensive L-1 and B-1 visas for foreign workers who, according to him, should have been sponsored under the more costly H-1B visa program. He claimed this allowed the company to avoid paying higher application fees and payroll taxes owed to the U.S. government. The employee also asserted that after he reported these alleged practices internally, the company retaliated against him by imposing unrealistic performance goals, removing him from a key client account, and ultimately terminating his employment.After the employee filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed the employee’s first amended complaint, holding that he failed to state a claim for a reverse false claim under the FCA because the company was not obligated to pay higher payroll taxes or application fees for visas it never sought. The court also dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that the employee’s reports concerned only potential statutory and regulatory violations, not FCA-protected activity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the reverse false claim, concluding that the employer had no established obligation under the FCA to pay higher payroll taxes or H-1B visa fees for visas it did not apply for. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, holding that the employee sufficiently alleged he engaged in protected activity under the FCA and that the employer retaliated against him for this conduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the retaliation claim. View "United States v. Tata Consultancy Services, LTD" on Justia Law

In this case, an individual provided the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with information about tax-avoidance schemes involving two corporations, based on his work at a foreign bank. The information included credit applications that indicated the bank had made loans, not factoring transactions, to the corporations, which was relevant to whether the companies could claim certain tax deductions. The IRS used this information to issue a summons to the bank, gather further evidence, and ultimately settle with both corporations for underpaid taxes. The whistleblower sought an award for his contribution under the statutory whistleblower program.The United States Tax Court reviewed the whistleblower’s appeal after the IRS Whistleblower Office denied his claim. The Tax Court granted summary judgment to the IRS, holding that the administrative record was sufficient and that the Whistleblower Office had not applied the wrong legal standard. The Tax Court also found that the whistleblower’s information did not substantially contribute to the IRS’s actions against the corporations, relying on the record as designated by the Whistleblower Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Tax Court erred by applying the correct legal standard itself, rather than remanding the case to the Whistleblower Office after finding that the Office had applied an incorrect, overly restrictive standard. The court also found that the Tax Court abused its discretion by refusing to supplement the administrative record with relevant documents that were omitted but material to the whistleblower’s claim. The case was remanded to the Whistleblower Office to apply the correct “substantial contribution” standard to a complete administrative record. View "Estate of Insinga v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law