Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Liechtenstein-based satellite company was developing a network of low-Earth-orbit satellites and had obtained radio-frequency usage rights through a contract with another company, TRION AG. In 2021, a competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., took over TRION and TRION’s board terminated the contract with the satellite company, transferring the frequency rights to Rivada. The legality of this transfer is being contested in European litigation. Shortly after the contract termination, Rivada’s CEO made public statements on an industry podcast, asserting that the satellite company no longer had usage rights and suggesting it planned to move its operations to China. These statements were broadcast during a major satellite industry conference, after which manufacturers expressed doubts about the satellite company’s viability and some refused to partner with it.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the satellite company’s defamation lawsuit against Rivada. The court assumed, without deciding, that the statements were false and defamatory, but found they were not defamatory per se and that the complaint failed to adequately allege special damages, specifically a causal link between the statements and any harm suffered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the statements were not defamatory per se, as they did not inherently impute professional misconduct or dishonesty. However, the appellate court found that the complaint plausibly alleged special damages, specifically that the statements caused the loss of business relationships with satellite manufacturers, leading to identifiable economic harm. The court held that the complaint’s factual allegations were sufficient to support a plausible inference of causation at the pleading stage.The appellate court affirmed the dismissal in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the special damages theory. View "KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

A high school student in the District of Columbia was sexually assaulted by a classmate in a school bathroom. The student’s mother reported the incident to school officials, prompting an investigation by the District. The District ultimately found the assault claim credible and took steps to support the student, including offering counseling and a school transfer. However, the school principal, before any investigation, expressed disbelief in the student’s claim, made derogatory remarks about her, and attempted to undermine the investigation, even after video evidence corroborated the student’s account. The principal’s conduct included misleading superiors and withholding information. The student and her mother later learned of these actions, which caused them significant distress.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the student’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) for failure to state a claim, finding that the school-student relationship alone did not create a special duty under D.C. law. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and Title IX claims, holding that the District’s response was not deliberately indifferent and that the principal’s conduct did not meet the standard for IIED because the remarks were made outside the student’s presence.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the NIED claim and the grant of summary judgment to the District on the Title IX claims, finding the District’s overall response was not clearly unreasonable and that the principal’s actions could not be attributed to the District for Title IX retaliation. However, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the IIED claim against the principal, holding that a reasonable jury could find her conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended or recklessly caused severe emotional distress, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Doe v. DC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a series of actions taken by the leadership of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in early 2025, following a change in presidential administration. The new Acting Directors, first Scott Bessent and then Russell Vought, implemented measures to significantly downsize the agency. These included pausing most agency activities, terminating employees (including the Student Loan Ombudsman), canceling contracts, declining additional funding, moving to smaller headquarters, and requiring advance approval for agency work. Some statutorily required services were neglected during this period, though agency leadership later clarified that legally mandated work should continue.Several plaintiffs, including organizations representing CFPB employees and groups that use CFPB services, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged that the agency’s actions amounted to an unlawful attempt to “shut down” the CFPB, violating both statutory mandates and the separation of powers. The district court found that agency leadership had indeed decided to shut down the Bureau and issued a preliminary injunction. This injunction required the government to reinstate terminated employees, refrain from further firings except for cause, maintain certain services, and rescind contract terminations, among other measures.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over claims related to loss of employment, as such claims must proceed through the Civil Service Reform Act’s specialized review scheme. For the remaining plaintiffs, the court found that their claims did not challenge a final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), nor did they present a constitutional claim reviewable in equity. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ attempt to challenge an inferred, overarching decision to shut down the CFPB was not viable under the APA or in equity. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought" on Justia Law

After two Category 5 hurricanes struck the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2017, the Virgin Islands Housing Finance Authority undertook extensive restoration projects and sought reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for over $594 million in costs. FEMA denied approximately $85 million of the claimed costs, and after an internal appeal, the Authority recovered an additional $8.5 million. To pursue the remaining disputed amount, the Authority opted for arbitration before the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. The arbitration panel, originally composed of three members, issued its decision with only two members after one took extended leave, denying the Authority full reimbursement.Following the arbitration, the Authority requested the Board to vacate the award, arguing that the decision was invalid due to the lack of a quorum. The Board denied this request. The Authority then filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and also sought relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The District Court denied the motion, finding that the Authority had missed the FAA’s three-month deadline for serving notice and that the APA claim was precluded by the availability of review under the FAA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court held that the FAA’s three-month deadline for serving notice of a motion to vacate an arbitration award applies even when the challenge is based on the arbitrators allegedly exceeding their authority or lacking a quorum. The Court also held that the FAA provides an adequate and exclusive remedy for challenging arbitration awards, thereby precluding review under the APA in this context. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Virgin Islands Housing Finance Authority v. FEMA" on Justia Law

Sprint Corporation and T-Mobile USA, Inc., both wireless carriers, operated programs that sold customer location information (CLI) to third-party aggregators, who then resold the data to other service providers. Although the carriers’ contracts required these third parties to obtain customer consent before accessing CLI, in practice, the carriers did not verify compliance, and several third parties accessed the data without proper consent. After public reports revealed abuses—including unauthorized access by law enforcement and bounty hunters—the carriers terminated some third-party access but continued their programs for months without implementing effective new safeguards.The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) investigated and issued Notices of Apparent Liability (NALs) to both carriers, alleging violations of the Communications Act’s duty to protect the confidentiality of customer proprietary network information (CPNI), which includes CLI. The FCC found that the carriers’ reliance on contractual promises, without independent verification or effective monitoring, was unreasonable. The FCC also concluded that the carriers failed to promptly address their inadequate safeguards after learning of the breaches. The FCC assessed penalties totaling $92 million, calculating separate violations for each third-party relationship that allowed unauthorized access after the carriers were on notice of the problems.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the carriers’ petitions challenging the FCC’s orders. The court held that CLI is CPNI under the Communications Act, that the carriers’ safeguards were inadequate, and that the FCC’s interpretation of the statute was the most natural reading, providing fair notice. The court also found the penalty calculations reasonable and rejected the carriers’ constitutional arguments, including their Seventh Amendment claim, because they had the statutory right to a jury trial but waived it by paying the penalties and seeking direct appellate review. The court denied the petitions for review. View "Sprint Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company sought approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market tasimelteon, a drug previously approved for a rare sleep disorder, as a treatment for jet lag. The company submitted results from several clinical trials, focusing on both objective sleep measures and subjective assessments of alertness and next-day functioning. The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research issued a complete response letter indicating that the application did not provide substantial evidence of efficacy, particularly criticizing the measurement of next-day impairment and the tools used for subjective endpoints. The company engaged in further discussions and dispute resolution with the FDA, including proposing a narrower indication for approval, but these efforts were unsuccessful.After the FDA issued a formal notice of opportunity for a hearing (NOOH), the company requested a hearing and submitted expert declarations supporting the adequacy of its clinical evidence. The FDA ultimately denied both the application and the hearing request, finding no genuine and substantial issue of fact warranting a hearing. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that the FDA was required to hold a hearing, that material factual disputes existed, that the FDA’s decision-making was arbitrary and capricious, and that the final decision violated the Appointments Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not require the FDA to hold a hearing before denying every new drug application, but the agency must grant a hearing if there are material factual disputes. The court found that, in this case, the FDA’s refusal to hold a hearing was arbitrary and capricious because the company’s expert evidence created genuine disputes over the adequacy of the clinical trials. The court remanded the case to the FDA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law

A former federal employee alleged that her union mishandled an arbitration proceeding and discriminated against her based on sex and disability. She claimed that the union’s local president made unwanted sexual advances, disparaged her status as a nursing mother, and ultimately withdrew union support for her grievance against her employer. The employee filed several unfair labor practice (ULP) charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), some of which were dismissed as untimely, and also filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which issued her a right-to-sue letter. She then brought two lawsuits in federal district court: one alleging violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the union and its local, and another, pro se, alleging retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the union, its local, and two union officials.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both lawsuits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) precluded the employee’s claims, holding that her allegations were essentially claims for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which must be pursued exclusively through the FLRA’s administrative process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that the FSLMRS does not preclude federal employees from bringing Title VII and ADA claims against their unions in federal district court, even when the alleged conduct could also constitute a ULP. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to displace these specific statutory discrimination remedies with the FSLMRS’s more limited scheme. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FLSA retaliation claim, finding no indication that Congress intended for such claims against unions to proceed in district court alongside the FSLMRS process. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Title VII and ADA claims. View "Lucas v. American Federation of Government Employees" on Justia Law

The case concerns the executive branch’s decision to freeze foreign aid funds that Congress had appropriated for fiscal year 2024. On January 20, 2025, the President issued an executive order directing the State Department and USAID to pause foreign assistance spending, pending a review of those programs. This led to the suspension or termination of thousands of grant awards and significant restructuring within the agencies. Organizations that were recipients of these funds, many of which relied heavily on such funding, challenged the executive order, arguing that the freeze unlawfully impounded funds that Congress had directed to be spent.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted a temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction, against the executive branch (excluding the President personally). The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing due to financial harm, and that they were likely to succeed on their claims that the executive branch’s actions violated the separation of powers, the Take Care Clause, the Impoundment Control Act (ICA), the Anti-Deficiency Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court ordered the government to make available the full amount of appropriated funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action to pursue their claims. Specifically, it found that the plaintiffs could not bring a freestanding constitutional claim when the alleged violations were statutory in nature, that the ICA precludes APA review by private parties (reserving enforcement to the Comptroller General), and that the plaintiffs could not reframe their claims as ultra vires actions. The court concluded that, although the plaintiffs had standing, they were not entitled to the preliminary injunction because they were unlikely to succeed on the merits. View "Global Health Council v. Trump" on Justia Law

After registering to receive an email newsletter from a news publication, the plaintiff visited the publication’s website and watched videos there. The website contained a tracking tool, the Meta Pixel, which transmitted information about the videos she viewed to Meta (Facebook’s owner) without her knowledge or consent. The plaintiff did not access the website or its videos through the newsletter, nor did she allege that the newsletter itself transmitted any information about her video viewing to Meta.The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the news publication’s owner violated the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) by disclosing her personally identifiable information to Meta. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that the plaintiff was not a “consumer” under the VPPA because she had not purchased, rented, or subscribed to the specific videos or similar audio-visual materials at issue. The court found that merely subscribing to the newsletter, which was unrelated to the videos she watched on the website, was insufficient to establish the necessary connection under the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that to state a claim under the VPPA, a plaintiff must allege that she purchased, rented, or subscribed to the specific video or similar audio-visual good or service, and that the protected information disclosed must concern that same good or service. Because the plaintiff did not subscribe to or otherwise acquire the videos she watched on the website, she was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA with respect to those videos. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Pileggi v. Washington Newspaper Publishing Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Terri R. Winnon, a former executive assistant and controller for a group of skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) in Texas, alleged that her former employers and associated entities engaged in fraudulent schemes to obtain improper reimbursements from Medicare and Texas Medicaid. She claimed that the defendants paid unlawful kickbacks to doctors and hospital discharge planners for patient referrals and inflated therapy service bills to maximize government reimbursements. Winnon’s allegations included specific practices such as employee bonuses tied to Medicare census targets, “sham” medical directorships, and “marketing gifts” to hospital staff, as well as systematic upcoding of therapy services by a contracted provider, RehabCare.After Winnon filed her qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and related Texas statutes, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed her claims. The court found that her allegations against RehabCare were barred by the FCA’s public disclosure provision, as similar claims had already been made public in a prior lawsuit, United States ex rel. Halpin & Fahey v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc. The district court also determined that Winnon’s claims against the SNF Defendants did not meet the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as they lacked sufficient particularity regarding the alleged fraudulent conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissals. The appellate court held that Winnon’s claims against RehabCare were precluded by the public disclosure bar because her allegations were substantially similar to those previously disclosed and she did not qualify as an “original source” under the FCA. Regarding the SNF Defendants, the court concluded that Winnon’s allegations failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement for particularity, as she did not provide enough specific details to support a strong inference that false claims were actually submitted. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments in full. View "USA v. Lozano" on Justia Law