Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sacks is a law firm with a 20-year history of working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 2011, IMF hired Sacks to negotiate disputed claims of various contractors that worked on the renovation of its headquarters. The parties’ contract asserts IMF’s immunity from suit and provides that any disputes not settled by mutual agreement shall be resolved by arbitration. In a subsequent fee dispute between Sacks and IMF, Sacks filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA. The arbitration panel awarded Sacks $39,918.82 plus interest but denied Sacks’ claim of underpayment in connection with earlier work.Sacks sued the Fund, claiming that the award should be vacated pursuant to the D.C. Code as “the result of misconduct by the arbitrators.” IMF removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it on immunity grounds pursuant to its Articles of Agreement, given effect in the U.S. by the Bretton Woods Act, 22 U.S.C. 286h. Sacks asserted the contract waived immunity by expressly providing for arbitration pursuant to the AAA Rules, which contemplate courts’ entry of judgment on arbitral awards. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The AAA Rules and D.C. law contemplate judicial involvement in the enforcement of arbitral awards, so arguably the contract also does so but an international organization's waiver of the immunity must be explicit. The parties' contract expressly retains the IMF’s immunity, reiterating it even within the arbitration clause. View "Leonard A. Sacks & Associates P.C. v. International Monetary Fund" on Justia Law

For seven years, NTE worked to build a natural gas-fueled power plant in Killingly, Connecticut to sell electricity on the New England grid. NTE worked with ISO, the independent system operator authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to manage the regional grid, to have the project “qualified” to bid for the right to sell electricity. NTE secured a “capacity supply obligation” (CSO) for the 2022 commitment period. NTE secured a guaranteed income stream for the first seven years of the plant’s operation.NTE subsequently encountered setbacks that prevented it from meeting its financing and construction goals. On November 4, 2021, NTE told ISO that it remained confident it could complete construction on time but ISO-NE asked FERC to terminate the Killingly plant’s CSO. In January 2022, FERC did so. In February, the Second Circuit issued an emergency stay of FERC’s order. FERC likely fell short of its obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act to explain its decision. Absent emergency relief, FERC’s order would have irreparably harmed NTE, preventing it from participating in an auction to sell future electricity capacity to New England consumers. Nothing in FERC’s reasoning suggests the risk that incumbents may have to reallocate electricity capacity amongst themselves outweighs the harm of delaying NTE’s project, which could benefit consumers through more efficient, less expensive electricity. View "In re: NTE Connecticut, LLC" on Justia Law

The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 authorizes USPS to “classify and fix the compensation and benefits of all officers and employees,” 39 U.S.C. 1003(a), to “provide adequate and reasonable differentials in rates of pay between employees in the clerk and carrier grades . . . and supervisory and other managerial personnel.” USPS must “achieve and maintain compensation for its . . . employees comparable to the rates and types of compensation paid in the private sector of the economy” and must allow organizations representing supervisory and other managerial employees “to participate directly in the planning and development of pay policies and schedules” relating to supervisory and managerial employees.The Association, a recognized organization of supervisory personnel, challenged USPS’s adoption of the 2016–2019 pay package for “Field” Executive and Administrative Schedule personnel. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the cited provisions state “policy goals.” not mandatory and enforceable directives.The D.C. Circuit reversed. The Association plausibly alleged that USPS exceeded its statutory authority by failing to institute “some differential” in pay for supervisors and by failing to demonstrate that it set its compensation levels by reference, inter alia, to the compensation paid” in the private sector. USPS failed to comply with the Act by refusing to consult with the Association on compensation for “Area” and “Headquarters” employees; by refusing to consult regarding postmasters; and by failing to provide the Association with reasons for rejecting its recommendations. View "National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law

The FCC promulgated a regulation which originally authorized the installation on private property, with the owner's consent, of "over-the-air reception devices," regardless of State and local restrictions, "including zoning, land-use, or building regulation[s], or any private covenant, homeowners' association rule or similar restriction on property." The FCC later expanded coverage to include antennas that act as "hub sites" or relay service to other locations. Petitioners, expressing concern about possible health effects from increased radiofrequency exposure, argued that the proliferation of commercial-grade antennas would increase the suffering of those with radiofrequency sensitivity—violating their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the U.S. Constitution's protections of private property and personal autonomy. Petitioners also contend that the amendments would deny affected individuals fair notice and an opportunity to be heard.The DC Circuit first concluded that two of the petitioners' interests are impacted directly by the FCC's order and that CHD has associational standing. The court also concluded that the Commission's citation of and reliance on the Commission's Continental Airlines decision provided sufficient explanation for its authority to expand the regulation to hub-and-relay antennas carrying broadband Internet. The court rejected petitioners' contentions to the contrary that the order is unsupported by Section 303 of the Communications Act. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' contention that the order lacks a reasoned foundation because the Commission disregarded the human health consequences of its action. Rather, the court concluded that the Commission sufficiently explained that its order does not change the applicability of the Commission's radio frequency exposure requirements and that such concerns were more appropriately directed at its radiofrequency rulemaking. Furthermore, the Commission may also preempt restrictions on the placement of the new category of antennas now included in the regulation. Therefore, the court denied the petition challenging the FCC's order. View "Children's Health Defense v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that WMATA's negligence resulted in the death of their son, Okiemute Whiteru (Mr. Whiteru), a WMATA passenger who sustained grievous injuries after falling in the parapet area of the Judiciary Square Metro Station in Washington, D.C. Plaintiffs contend that under the common law of the District of Columbia, WMATA, as a common carrier, breached its duty to render aid to Mr. Whiteru, because WMATA had reason to know that he was injured and needed assistance, but failed to discover him.The DC Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to WMATA as to whether Mr. Whiteru's contributory negligence bars the negligence claim, concluding that the record at summary judgment fails to demonstrate that WMATA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court agreed with plaintiffs that there are genuine factual disputes regarding whether WMATA breached its duty to aid Mr. Whiteru after he negligently injured himself. The court explained that the District of Columbia unambiguously recognizes the special relationship between common carriers and passengers: a common carrier cannot evade liability for negligence if it knows or has reason to know that a passenger is injured, breaches its duty to render aid to the injured passenger, and the passenger’s original injuries are aggravated as a result. The court stated that the law provides that a common carrier is liable in this scenario even if the passenger's own negligence caused his initial injuries. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Whiteru v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Wye sued Iraq. The district court denied Iraq’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds and entered judgment in Wye’s favor years later. An intervening Fourth Circuit ruling rejected Iraq’s contention that none of the exceptions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602, applied to Wye’s breach of contract claims; because Wye alleged that it had engaged in acts inside the U.S. under the contract, the lawsuit could proceed under the second clause of the FSIA’s commercial activities exception, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity with respect to claims that are “based upon . . . an act performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.”The D.C. Circuit vacated. Iraq’s participation in the trial did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity. The law of the case doctrine does not require adherence to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions. The D.C. Circuit concluded that section 1605(a)(2) does not apply to this case. A plausible basis for sustaining the district court’s jurisdictional ruling can be found in the commercial activity exception’s third clause, abrogating immunity if the action is “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.” The district court is best positioned to determine whether Iraq’s breach of contract caused “direct effects” in the U.S. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians purchased the Sibley Parcel with interest from its Self-Sufficiency Fund and sought to have the land taken into trust by the Department of the Interior with a view to establishing gaming operations. The Tribe claimed the Parcel was acquired for the “enhancement of tribal lands,” a permitted use of Fund interest under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act Section 108(c). Interior concluded that the mere acquisition of additional land was not an “enhancement” and declined to take the Parcel into trust because the Tribe failed to demonstrate how the Parcel would improve or enhance tribal lands. The land is in Michigan’s Lower Peninsula far from the Tribe’s existing lands in the Upper Peninsula.The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribe. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Under the plain meaning of the Michigan Act, before assuming a trust obligation, The Department has the authority to verify that the Tribe properly acquired the land with Fund interest, consistent with the limited uses for such interest in Section 108(c). In exercising that authority, The Department correctly determined that “enhancement of tribal lands” does not include an acquisition that merely increases the Tribe’s landholdings. To enhance tribal lands, an acquisition must improve the quality or value of the Tribe’s existing lands. View "Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Haaland" on Justia Law

In 2020, the FLRA adopted a new threshold for when collective bargaining is required. Under the new standard, the duty to bargain is triggered only if a workplace change has "a substantial impact on a condition of employment." Labor unions challenged the FLRA's decision to alter the bargaining threshold, maintaining that the FLRA's new standard is both inconsistent with the governing statute and insufficiently explained.The DC Circuit held that the FLRA's decision to abandon its de minimis exception in favor of a substantial-impact threshold was not sufficiently reasoned, and thus is arbitrary and capricious in violation of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. In this case, the cursory policy statement that the FLRA issued to justify its choice to abandon thirty-five years of precedent promoting and applying the de minimis standard and to adopt the previously rejected substantial-impact test is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court granted the labor unions' petitions for review and vacated the FLRA's policy statement. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

Unions challenged a Policy Statement of the Federal Labor Relations Authority that announced for the first time that zipper clauses (provisions that foreclose midterm bargaining) are mandatory bargaining subjects. The Authority determined that, if an agency and a union intractably disagree over a zipper clause proposal, the agency may bring the proposal to the impasses panel—which has the authority to put it (or a different clause reflecting what it determines to be a better resolution) into the parties’ term agreement. Before 2020, the Authority had not issued any Policy Statement in over 35 years.The D.C. Circuit vacated the Policy Statement. The Authority structured its consideration of the zipper clause question in two steps, first holding that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute does not entitle employees to demand midterm bargaining even when the parties’ agreement is silent on the matter. The Authority then relied on that holding as “necessary” to its conclusion that proposed contractual zipper clauses expressly foreclosing midterm bargaining are mandatory bargaining subjects. The first holding was arbitrary. The Authority’s errors “include miscasting Supreme Court precedent, relying on conclusory assertions, and mischaracterizing its dramatic shift of the bargaining baseline as allowing the parties to resolve the issue.” View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

The owners of New England electric generation facilities are paid through formula rates established by ISO New England’s (a regional transmission organization) open access transmission tariff. The owners challenged Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) orders approving Schedule 17, an amendment to the ISO tariff, establishing a new recovery mechanism for costs incurred by certain electric generation and transmission facilities to comply with mandatory reliability standards FERC had approved.FERC ruled that the owners could use Schedule 17 to recover only costs incurred after they filed and FERC approved a cost-based rate under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d. FERC reasoned that recovery was limited to prospective costs, citing the filed rate doctrine, which forbids utilities from charging rates other than those properly filed with FERC, and its corollary, the rule against retroactive rate-making, which prohibits FERC from adjusting current rates to make up for a utility’s over- or under-collection in prior periods.The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review. FERC’s application of the filed rate doctrine and the rule against retroactive rate-making to Schedule 17 was not arbitrary or capricious. Schedule 17 does not expressly permit recovery of mandatory reliability costs incurred prior to a facility’s individual FPA filing. View "Cogentrix Energy Power Management, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law