Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons maintains a website and publishes the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, both of which host information concerning “important medical, economic, and legal issues about vaccines,” The Association, joined by an individual, sued a Member of Congress (Schiff) who wrote to several technology and social media companies before and during the COVID-19 pandemic expressing concern about vaccine-related misinformation on their platforms and inquiring about the companies’ policies for handling such misinformation. The Association alleged that the inquiries prompted the technology companies to disfavor and deprioritize its vaccine content, thereby reducing traffic to its web page and making the information more difficult to access.The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Association has not plausibly alleged injury-in-fact; it maintains that Schiff’s actions interfered with its “free negotiations” with the technology companies but never alleged that it has made any attempts at such negotiations, nor that it has concrete plans to do so in the future. The Association’s other claimed injuries, to its financial prospects and to its speech and associational interests, are not adequately supported by allegations that any injury is “fairly traceable” to Schiff’s actions. View "Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Schiff" on Justia Law

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe sought compensation for the expropriation of its interests in a company in Venezuela. The district court granted Saint-Gobain summary judgment after determining it had properly served the Republic of Venezuela with court process pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters.The D.C. Circuit reversed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1608, identifies four methods for serving a foreign state. The method at issue is “by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents”; the Hague Convention is such an international agreement. Articles 2-6 of the Hague Convention require that a plaintiff request service from a Central Authority designated by the receiving state and receive a certificate of service from the Central Authority stating it has served the defendant by a method consistent with the state’s internal law. Venezuelan law requires lawsuits against the Republic to be served on the Attorney General, and the Attorney General was never served. View "Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela" on Justia Law

The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission owns a power supply system in the Hetch Hetchy Valley and transmission lines but does not own distribution lines and relies on PG&E’s distribution system. The Commission is both a customer and a competitor of PG&E. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PG&E’s Tariff, which stated the generally applicable terms for “open-access” wholesale distribution service. In 2019, San Francisco filed a complaint under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, 825e, 825h, challenging PG&E’s refusal to offer secondary-voltage service in lieu of more burdensome primary-voltage service to certain San Francisco sites and provide service to delivery points that San Francisco maintains are eligible for service under the Tariff’s grandfathering provision. PG&E maintained that it had not given customers the right to dictate the level of service to be received and that any denials of secondary-voltage service were supported by “technical, safety, reliability, and operational reasons.”FERC denied San Francisco’s complaint, ruling that PG&E should retain discretion to determine what level of service is most appropriate for a customer because the provider “is ultimately responsible for the safety and reliability of its distribution system.” The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded, citing FERC’s own precedent and noting a “troubling pattern of inattentiveness to potential anticompetitive effects of PG&E’s administration of its open-access Tariff.” View "City and County of San Francisco v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Five registered national securities exchanges filed proposed rules with the SEC to establish fee schedules for Wireless Bandwidth Connections, which connect a customer’s equipment located on the premises of a petitioner-exchange with the customer’s equipment located on the premises of a third-party data center, and Wireless Market Data Connections, which connect a customer to the proprietary data feed of a petitioner-exchange. SEC’s Final Order asserted jurisdiction over the services and approved the proposed rules.The exchanges argued that the SEC’s assertion of jurisdiction over the services was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the statutes that define “exchange” and “facility,” that SEC arbitrarily and capriciously ignored the effect of the Final Rule upon the ability of the wireless services to compete, and that SEC ignored regulations defining “exchange” and arbitrarily departed from relevant agency precedents.The D.C. Circuit upheld the order. The Connections are subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction as “facilities” of an exchange--a market facility maintained by an exchange for bringing together purchasers and sellers of an exchange. The SEC correctly concluded that the fee schedules for the Connections had to be filed as “rules of an exchange,” consistent with SEC regulations and precedent. View "Intercontinental Exchange, Inc v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Duke generates electricity for Power, a “joint agency” of 32 North Carolina municipalities. Power pays Duke an Energy Charge that “reimburses Duke only for its fuel costs and variable operations and maintenance costs associated with producing the energy consumed by Power" and a Capacity Charge, designed to cover Duke’s fixed costs and provide a return on its infrastructure investments, calculated by determining its pro-rata share of the demand on Duke’s system during a one-hour “snapshot” of system usage taken during the peak hour on Duke’s system each month.Their agreement regulates activities Power may employ to modify its electricity use, including Demand-Side Management and Demand Response. Demand-Side Management involves end-users accepting an inducement to sign up for a program where Power can turn off and on their appliances around high-demand periods. Demand Response involves a supplier providing end-users information on the price of energy at a given time and those end users then modifying their consumption to avoid elevated prices.In 2019, Power petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) arguing that the provisions that permit Demand-Side Management and Demand Response activities permit deploying battery storage technology to reduce metered demand during peak load periods and drawing from those batteries during the high-demand “snapshot” hour. Concerned that Power would reduce its Capacity Charge to zero, Duke opposed the petition. The D.C. Circuit affirmed FERC’s grant of Power’s petition, finding that the agreement permits Power to use battery storage technology as either Demand-Side Management or Demand Response. View "Duke Energy Progress, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of RICU's complaint alleging that the Department's determination that critical care telehealth services provided by physicians who are outside of the United States are ineligible for Medicare reimbursement. The court concluded that RICU seeks to avoid well-settled authority requiring administrative exhaustion under the Medicare Act by presenting a concrete claim for payment of rendered services to the Department for decision. Because RICU has neither satisfied the channeling requirement of 42 U.S.C. 405(g) nor demonstrated that the Illinois Council exception applies, the court dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of RICU's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "RICU LLC v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit remanded the Department's Final Rule setting more stringent efficiency standards than those of the ASHRAE for "commercial packaged boilers," large boilers commonly used to heat commercial and multifamily residential buildings. The court rejected the contention that the DOE did not apply the clear and convincing evidence standard required by statute. Rather, in promulgating the Final Rule, the DOE expressly said satisfaction of the clear and convincing standard, if applicable, was an alternative ground supporting the Rule.Without a cogent and reasoned response to the substantial concerns petitioners raised about the assignment of efficiencies to the buildings, a crucial part of its analysis, the court cannot say that it was reasonable for the DOE to conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the adoption of a more stringent standard. Furthermore, the court cannot say that the Secretary reasonably concluded she had clear and convincing evidence a more stringent efficiency standard is economically justified. The court remanded for the DOE to address several issues raised by petitioners. View "American Public Gas Association v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted the City's petitions for review of FERC orders rejecting the City's complaint regarding periodic outflow coming from the operation of the Pensacola Project, a downstream dam licensed by FERC. The court found FERC's position unpersuasive and remanded for the Commission to determine the role of the Corps, the responsibility the Authority bears if it caused flooding in the City, analyze the evidence petitioner has produced, and finally interpret the Pensacola Act. View "The City of Miami, Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

In 2018, Li filed a Form 211 with the IRS Whistleblower Office (WBO) alleging tax violations by the “target taxpayer,” seeking a monetary whistleblower award under 26 U.S.C. 7623(b). A WBO classifier reviewed Li’s Form 211 and the target taxpayer’s returns and concluded that Li’s allegations were “speculative and/or did not provide specific or credible information regarding tax underpayments or violations of internal revenue laws,” making Li ineligible for an award. The WBO did not forward Li’s form to an IRS examiner for any potential action against the target taxpayer.Li appealed to the Tax Court, which rejected the case on summary judgment. The court found that the WBO adequately performed its evaluative function and did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the form for an award. The D.C. Circuit remanded for dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. The WBO rejected Li’s Form 211 for providing vague and speculative information it could not corroborate and did not forward it to an IRS examiner; the IRS did not take any action against the target taxpayer. There was no proceeding and no “award determination,” so the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to review the WBO’s threshold rejection of Li’s Form 211. View "Li v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two criminal counts, remanding for resentencing. Both defendant and the government agree that a court may deviate from the Sentencing Guidelines, including by imposing consecutive sentences that exceed the total recommended punishment, after considering the Guidelines range and the other statutory sentencing factors.The court explained that, consistent with the Sentencing Commission's statutory mandate to promote fairness and uniformity in sentencing, the Guidelines provide recommended sentencing ranges based on two factors: a defendant's culpable conduct and criminal history. Chapter 7 of the Guidelines sets out recommended terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. Finding consensus among Chapter 7's text, context, and purpose, the court held that the sentencing ranges in Chapter 7's Revocation Table represent the Guidelines' total recommended punishment for supervised release violations. Those recommendations do not depend on the number of counts for which a defendant is serving supervised release. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law