Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") operates local commuter trains in Philadelphia and its suburbs. Amtrak and SEPTA dispute ownership of the Commuter Easement that grants access to Amtrak’s Philadelphia-area rail lines and stations. The original owner of the Easement was the now-defunct Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”).SEPTA claimed that a series of federal rail statutes gave it the option to acquire the Easement from Conrail and that it exercised that right in 1982. Amtrak claims that when SEPTA tried to acquire the Easement, Amtrak exercised a contractual right of first refusal and purchased the Easement, and therefore SEPTA has no right to access Amtrak’s lines and stations.The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding that an easement was not effectively conveyed to SEPTA, finding that SEPTA had a public right to acquire the easment and Amtrak had no authority to block Conrail from conveying it to SEPTA. View "National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed through various foreign subsidiaries of Morgan Stanely between 2006 and 2016. Plaintiff claims that, between 2014 and 2016, he raised concerns about U.S. securities violations, which occurred overseas but affected U.S. markets. After receiving a pay cut and a recommendation that he find employment elsewhere. In January 2016, Plaintiff resigned. Plaintiff then hired counsel. However, counsel withdrew after Morgan Stanley threatened to pursue an action against counsel for violations of his professional obligations.The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board dismissed Plaintiff's claim under Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, finding that Section 806 did not apply because he was not an "employee" at the time of any alleged retaliation. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff did not meet the definition of "employee" at any time during the alleged retaliation. View "Christopher Garvey v. Administrative Review Board" on Justia Law

Appellants, three Sikh men, intended to join the Marines. However, existing Marines pre-enlistment requirements pertaining to hair length, beards, and a prohibition on wearing certain non-uniform items, conflicted with their faith. The Marines allowed an accommodation, but only after the men completed basic training.Appellants sought a preliminary injunction, and the district court refused. After considering the competing interests in the case, the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision as it related to two men, finding that they showed a likelihood for success on the merits and proved irreparable harm. The court remanded the third man's case for further proceedings. View "Jaskirat Singh v. David Berger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Black student at George Washington University, claimed that the university discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court, applying the one-year statute of limitations contained in the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, granted summary judgment to the university. Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment, finding that the lower court erred in applying the one-year statute of limitations under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act; the proper statute of limitations was the three-year limit that applies to personal injury actions. The court also refused to affirm on alternate grounds, as requested by the university. View "Jabari Stafford v. George Washington University" on Justia Law

Before registering a pesticide, EPA must consult with the statutorily specified agencies that have expertise on risks to species’ survival. But for decades, the EPA skipped that step when it registered pesticides, including those at issue in this case. After the EPA went ahead and approved the five registrations, the Conservation Groups petitioned the D.C. Circuit court to invalidate them. The parties then jointly requested that the court hold the petitions in abeyance to allow for settlement negotiations.The parties arrived at the terms of a settlement allowing the registrations to stand if EPA fulfills core ESA obligations by agreed deadlines. As a condition of their settlement agreement’s binding effect, the parties then jointly moved for an Order returning the cases to abeyance until the specified deadlines to afford EPA time to comply with the parties’ settlement terms.The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Order of Consent and held in the case in abeyance. However, the court dismisses as moot the challenge to the registration of cuprous iodide based on the parties’ report that EPA has complied to their satisfaction with the proposed settlement regarding that pesticide ingredient. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

In a license revocation proceeding before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the United States sought to admit classified evidence relating to electronic surveillance it had conducted against China Telecom (Americas) Corporation (China Telecom). Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),the government filed this petition for a determination that the electronic surveillance was lawful and that fruits of the surveillance were admissible in the underlying FCC proceedings. After the district court granted the government’s petition, the FCC revoked China Telecom’s license in the underlying action and we then denied China Telecom’s petition for review of the FCC order without relying on or otherwise considering the classified evidence.   The DC Circuit vacated the district court order granting the government’s petition because the government’s petition no longer presents a live controversy. Accordingly, China Telecom’s appeal from the district court order is moot. The court explained that here, the district court’s review of the surveillance materials was triggered by the government’s notice of its intent to use the surveillance in a “trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before [a] court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States.” In response, China Telecom principally requests disclosure pursuant to section 1806(g), asserting a due process right to discover the classified materials so that it may defend itself in the underlying FCC proceeding. The court explained that any order requiring the government to disclose classified evidence at issue in an FCC revocation proceeding would be wholly ineffectual because the proceedings in which the parties sought to use that evidence have ended. View "USA v. China Telecom (Americas) Corporation" on Justia Law

Appellants are foreign companies that allegedly launder money for Kassim Tajideen, a prominent Hezbollah financier and specially designated global terrorist (SDGT). The United States seized three sums totaling $612,168.23 belonging to Appellants and filed the instant forfeiture action in order to keep the funds permanently. When no one claimed the funds for more than a year after the government gave notice of the forfeiture action, the government moved for a default judgment. Apparently realizing their mistake, Appellants belatedly attempted to file claims to the seized funds to prevent the district court from ordering forfeiture. The court struck Appellants’ filings as untimely and entered default judgment in favor of the government. After the court denied Appellants’ late reconsideration motion, they filed the instant appeal.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court in part and dismiss the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Appellants’ Rule 59(e) motion was untimely and, as a result, so was its notice of appeal, at least with respect to the district court’s June 3 order striking Appellants’ putative claims and entering default judgment. Further, although the notice of appeal was timely with respect to the district court’s order denying Appellants’ Rule 59(e) motion, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The motion was not only untimely but also presented arguments that either were or could have been raised before judgment was entered. View "USA v. Three Sums Totaling $612,168.23 in Seized United States Currency" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) licensing of the Conowingo Dam on the Susquehanna River in Maryland. Under section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, FERC may issue a license only if the state where the dam is located either certifies that the dam will comply with the Act’s water quality standards or waives its authority to do so. After initially granting a section 401(a)(1) certification, Maryland attempted to withdraw it and waive its authority as part of a settlement with the dam’s operator, which FERC then used as the basis for the Conowingo license.   The DC Circuit vacated the license explaining that by issuing a license under such circumstances, FERC exceeded its authority under section 401(a)(1). The court remanded o FERC for further proceedings. The court explained that Section 401(a)(1) limits FERC’s power to issue a license to two circumstances: (1) where a state has granted a certification; or (2) where the state has waived its authority to certify “as provided in the preceding sentence” by failing or refusing to act. This leaves no room for FERC’s third alternative, in which it issued a license based on a private settlement arrangement entered into by Maryland after the state had issued a certification with conditions but then changed its mind. Accordingly, the court held that vacatur is appropriate. View "Waterkeepers Chesapeake v. FERC" on Justia Law

Claiming that the code they write qualifies as speech protected by the First Amendment, Appellants brought a pre-enforcement action challenging the DMCA on facial and as-applied First Amendment grounds. The government moved to dismiss all claims, and the district court partially granted the motion. The district court dismissed all, but the as-applied First Amendment claims. The district court summarily denied an injunction for the dismissed claims. Appellants appealed the district court’s dismissal of their facial challenge and denial of injunctive relief.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court first addressed jurisdiction and held that declaring the DMCA facially unconstitutional would resolve Appellants’ as-applied claims, but not so in reverse, ensuring that their as-applied claims remain anything but inextricably bound to their facial challenge. The court, therefore, held that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellants’ facial challenge.   In regards to the Appellant, that wants to publish an academic book “to instruct readers in the methods of security research,” which will include “examples of code capable of bypassing security measures, the court held that the government’s concession ends any “credible threat of prosecution” against Appellant, leaving him without standing to obtain a preliminary injunction. Moreover, the court held that the other Appellant’s arguments on the remaining preliminary injunction factors rest entirely on his flawed claim that continued enforcement of the DMCA imperils his First Amendment rights. View "Matthew Green v. DOJ" on Justia Law

This case involves an ongoing dispute between owners and operators of power lines and power generators over who is responsible for paying for upgrades to existing power lines. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ruled in favor of the owners and operators; however, FERC's decision was not "reasonably explained." Thus, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case back to FERC without vacating the FERC order because the court found that the FERC ruling may very well stand once it is explained. View "American Clean Power Assoc v. FERC" on Justia Law