Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Miriyeva, a citizen of Azerbaijan, lawfully entered the U.S. and sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440. She enlisted in the U.S. Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program, under which noncitizens have an expedited path to citizenship by serving honorably in the military without first having lawful permanent residence. In 2018, USCIS approved Miriyeva’s application. Before the agency scheduled Miriyeva’s oath of citizenship ceremony, the Army sent her to basic training. During training, a medical condition ended her service. The Army described Miriyeva’s separation as “uncharacterized” since her service ended while she was still at “entry-level.” After her medical discharge, Miriyeva scheduled her oath ceremony but the agency reversed its approval of her naturalization application because the military did not describe her separation as “honorable.”Miriyeva argued that the military refers to “uncharacterized” as “separated under honorable conditions,” when required to do so and that the Army’s policy of treating an uncharacterized separation as not under honorable conditions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution’s Uniform Rule of Naturalization Clause, and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed Miriyeva’s declaratory judgment suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c), which precluded Miriyeva’s Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional claims; her Declaratory Judgment Act claim failed without a different, standalone source of jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Miriyeva strayed from the statutory path for judicial review of claims intertwined with denied naturalization applications. View "Miriyeva v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

In 2002, Meza was served with a notice to appear, at a removal hearing, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1), charging that he entered the country “at or near Brownsville, Texas,” and that he was “not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An agent had observed him “wading the Rio Grande River.” An IJ ordered Meza removed in absentia. Meza neither appeared at his removal hearing nor filed a timely petition for review in the Eleventh Circuit. He remained in the U.S. In 2017, Meza applied for an adjustment of status. USCIS denied the application for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Meza was not an arriving alien, so the immigration courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the application. Meza argued that a checkbox on his notice to appear labeled him as an arriving alien and that immigration officers had paroled him into the U.S.The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction to review USCIS’s decision because Meza had not exhausted his administrative remedies. To succeed, Meza must show that he was an arriving alien, even though the IJ concluded otherwise; he seeks to contest a question of fact arising from his removal proceeding, which he could have done only by filing a timely petition for review of his removal order in the Eleventh Circuit. View "Meza v. Renaud" on Justia Law

UnitedHealthcare Medicare Advantage insurers challenged the Overpayment Rule, promulgated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under 42 U.S.C. 1301-1320d-8, 1395-1395hhh, in an effort to trim costs. The Rule requires that, if an insurer learns that a diagnosis submitted to CMS for payment lacks support in the beneficiary’s medical record, the insurer must refund that payment within 60 days. UnitedHealth claims that the Overpayment Rule is subject to a principle of “actuarial equivalence,” and fails to comply. Two health plans that pay the same percentage of medical expenses are said to have benefits that are actuarially equivalent.The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge. Actuarial equivalence does not apply to the Overpayment Rule or the statutory overpayment-refund obligation under which it was promulgated. Reference to actuarial equivalence appears in a different statutory subchapter from the requirement to refund overpayments; neither provision cross-references the other. The actuarial-equivalence requirement and the overpayment-refund obligation serve different ends. The actuarial-equivalence provision requires CMS to model a demographically and medically analogous beneficiary population in traditional Medicare to determine the prospective lump-sum payments to Medicare Advantage insurers. The Overpayment Rule, in contrast, applies after the fact to require Medicare Advantage insurers to refund any payment increment they obtained based on a diagnosis they know lacks support in their beneficiaries’ medical records. View "UnitedHealthcare Insurance Co v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Randolph-Sheppard Act (RSA) gives licensed blind individuals priority to operate vending facilities on federal property, 20 U.S.C. 107(b). The Secretary of Education promulgates implementing regulations and designates state agencies to administer the program. The RSA includes a grievance scheme for vendors to challenge a state’s operation of its Randolph-Sheppard program through the state licensing agency. A licensee dissatisfied with the results of the state’s hearing may seek further review before the Secretary, who must “convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute.” In the District of Columbia, the designated licensing agency is the Rehabilitation Services Administration.The plaintiffs, current and former vendors in the District’s Randolph-Sheppard program, claim that the District discriminated against them, based on their blindness, specifically by discriminatory inspections of vending facilities and failing to provide aids such as human or electronic readers. The plaintiffs did not pursue the Randolph-Sheppard grievance procedure but filed a lawsuit, claiming disability-based discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs had to proceed through the RSA grievance procedure before pursuing their discrimination claims in court; no futility exception could apply here. View "Patten v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The FCC regulates facilities and devices that transmit radio waves and microwaves, including cell phones and facilities for radio, TV, and cell phone communications, 47 U.S.C. 302a(a). Radio waves and microwaves are electromagnetic energy, “radiofrequency” that move through space, as “RF radiation.” RF radiation at sufficiently high levels can heat human body tissue, resulting in “thermal” effects. Exposure to lower levels of RF radiation might also cause other biological effects.The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to account for the environmental effects of their proposed actions; a “major Federal action” requires an environmental impact statement, 42 U.S.C. 4332(C). If it is unclear whether a proposed action will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment,” the agency may prepare a limited environmental assessment. An agency may also use “categorical exclusions.” Pursuant to NEPA, the FCC has guidelines for human exposure to RF radiation, last updated in 1996. In 2013, the FCC issued a notice of inquiry regarding the adequacy of its guidelines and sought comments on five issues in response to changes in the ubiquity of wireless devices and in scientific standards and research. In 2019, the FCC issued a final order, declining to undertake any of the changes contemplated in the notice of inquiry.The D.C. Circuit remanded. The FCC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its determination that its guidelines adequately protect against the harmful effects of exposure to radiofrequency radiation unrelated to cancer. View "Environmental Health Trust v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

In 2008, four long-term care hospitals that treat patients who are dually eligible for the Medicare and Medicaid programs were denied reimbursement by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for “bad debts,” unpaid coinsurances and deductibles owed by patients. The Secretary denied reimbursement on the grounds that the hospitals failed to comply with the “must-bill” policy, 42 C.F.R. 413.89(e)(2), which requires hospitals to bill the state Medicaid program to determine whether Medicaid will cover the bad debts first, and obtain a “remittance advice” indicating whether the state “refuses payment,” before seeking reimbursement under Medicare. uring the relevant time period, the hospitals were not enrolled in Medicaid and were unable to bill their state Medicaid programs; they claim they were previously reimbursed and that there was an abrupt policy change.The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Secretary, concluding that substantial evidence supported a finding that there was no change in policy. The court rejected arguments that the denial decision impermissibly required them to enroll in Medicaid, despite the fact that Medicaid participation is voluntary, and was arbitrary. View "New LifeCare Hospitals of North Carolina LLC v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Bellion produces and distributes vodka that is infused with NTX, a proprietary blend that Bellion contends mitigates alcohol’s damage to a person’s DNA. Bellion filed a petition with the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), the agency that regulates alcoholic beverage labeling and advertising, to determine whether Bellion could lawfully make certain claims about NTX on labels and in advertisements. TTB found that the claims were scientifically unsubstantiated and misleading so that including them on vodka labels and in advertisements would violate the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. 201, and TTB’s regulations.Bellion filed suit, alleging that TTB’s denial of the petition violated Bellion’s First Amendment rights and that the standards under which TTB rejected the proposed NTX claims are unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted TTB summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. In making its decision, TTB did not rubber-stamp the FDA’s analysis of the scientific evidence or delegate final decision-making authority to the FDA. Bellion’s proposed claims are misleading and can be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment. Bellion received a clear response from TTB about why its proposed claims were denied. Bellion cannot bring an as-applied vagueness challenge to the regulation; its facial challenge to the regulation is without merit. View "Bellion Spirits, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

A 2015 auction for electrical capacity (commitments by power plants to provide electricity to utilities in the future) in Illinois produced a striking result. Capacity in neighboring regions uniformly sold for less than $3.50 per megawatt-day; in a region covering much of Illinois, the auction resulted in capacity prices of $150 per megawatt-day, a nearly ninefold increase from the prior year’s price of $16.75. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission identified numerous problems with the existing auction rules and ordered that the rules be changed prospectively. FERC also launched an investigation into potential market manipulation in the 2015 Auction but later ruled that the identified flaws in the auction rules and the high price range those rules established, plus the allegations of market manipulation, did not call into question the 2015 Auction or the price it produced.The D.C. Circuit granted a petition for review in part. Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791, FERC need not approve every auction price before it goes into effect. That is not what the market-based rate scheme requires. However, FERC’s analysis of the 2015 Auction, was arbitrary and capricious; it failed to adequately explain why the problems it identified in the existing auction rules affecting pricing— problems it ordered fixed going forward—did not also affect the fairness of the 2015 Auction. View "Public Citizen, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Gaskins served almost eight years of a 22-year sentence on a narcotics conspiracy charge before the D.C. Circuit reversed his conviction for insufficient evidence in 2012. At his trial, Gaskins had invoked his constitutional right not to testify. After the reversal of his conviction, he sought limited discovery and a chance to testify in support of his motion for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513, a prerequisite to a claim against the government for compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The district court denied the certificate of innocence without acting on Gaskins’ motion for discovery.The D.C. Circuit vacated. A failure to prove criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt requires acquittal but does not necessarily establish innocence. On a motion for a certificate of innocence, the burden is on the claimant to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court erred by denying Gaskins’ motion for a certificate of innocence without addressing his procedural motion. The key issue bearing on whether Gaskins is entitled to the certificate concerns his state of mind--whether he agreed to work with co-conspirators with the specific intent to distribute drugs. His actions, as established by the trial evidence, do not add up to the charged offenses unless he agreed to join the conspiracy. The court declined to reassign the case. View "United States v. Gaskins" on Justia Law

The Union and AT&T entered into a contract governing certification of the Union to represent non-management employees and the relationship between the parties, requiring the parties to arbitrate disputes over “the description of an appropriate unit for bargaining” and the definition of “nonmanagement” employees. All other disputes arising under the contract “shall not be subject to arbitration.” Disputes that are subject to arbitration must “be submitted to arbitration administered by, and in accordance with, the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).” The AAA’s Labor Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his own jurisdiction, “including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.” After AT&T acquired Time Warner, the Union initiated discussions about “appropriate potential bargaining units in the newly acquired company.” The parties could not reach an agreement. The Union sought to compel arbitration. The district court dismissed, finding the dispute did not lie within the categories of arbitrable disputes, and that it (as opposed to the arbitrator) could make that threshold determination.The D.C. Circuit vacated. The agreement delegates threshold questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The question of whether the parties’ dispute falls within the contract’s arbitration clause, then, is for an arbitrator, not a court, to decide. The district court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the dispute must be submitted to arbitration. View "Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. AT&T Inc." on Justia Law