Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Georgia enacted the Election Integrity Act (SB 202) following the 2020 elections, several organizations and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging the law on various grounds, including race discrimination. The DOJ and several plaintiff organizations entered into a common-interest agreement to coordinate their litigation efforts and share privileged attorney work product. Georgia, suspecting improper coordination, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the DOJ seeking all communications between the DOJ and the aligned non-governmental plaintiffs. The DOJ produced many documents but withheld or redacted others, citing FOIA Exemption 5, which protects privileged attorney work product from disclosure.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Georgia’s suit to enforce its FOIA request. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia, holding that the communications between the DOJ and non-governmental parties were not “intra-agency” records under Exemption 5 and that the DOJ had waived any work-product privilege by sharing the materials with third parties, even under a common-interest agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that when the government shares attorney work product with aligned parties under a common-interest agreement, those communications qualify as “intra-agency” materials for purposes of FOIA Exemption 5. The court further held that such sharing does not waive the attorney work-product privilege, provided the parties are aligned and the sharing is pursuant to a common-interest agreement. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment only as to two emails predating the agreement but reversed the remainder of the district court’s decision, allowing the DOJ to withhold the other documents. View "State of Georgia v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Police responded to reports of gunfire at a rowhouse in Southeast Washington, D.C., where they found spent shell casings but no suspects. Reviewing footage from a recently installed pole-mounted surveillance camera, officers observed a man firing a gun from the rear of the residence and later identified him as Demetrius Green. A search warrant executed that day at the residence uncovered large quantities of narcotics, digital scales, and a firearm. Green attempted to flee but was apprehended inside. Evidence linking Green to the residence included identification cards, personal items, and data from his cellphone, which contained a photograph of a bag of powder on a scale and a text message referencing drug sales.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Green’s motion to suppress the pole-camera footage, finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area surveilled. The court also admitted the challenged exhibits from Green’s cellphone, determining they were relevant to show knowledge and intent, and that any risk of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a limiting instruction. At trial, Green was convicted by a jury on four counts related to drug and firearm offenses. He was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment and appealed his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the use of the pole camera did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the area surveilled was exposed to public view and the surveillance was brief. The court also found the evidence sufficient to establish Green’s constructive possession of the drugs, given his connection to the residence and the items found. Finally, the court concluded that the challenged exhibits were properly admitted, and even if their admission was erroneous, any error was harmless. View "USA v. Green" on Justia Law

An employee of a multinational information technology company alleged that his employer engaged in fraudulent practices by obtaining less expensive L-1 and B-1 visas for foreign workers who, according to him, should have been sponsored under the more costly H-1B visa program. He claimed this allowed the company to avoid paying higher application fees and payroll taxes owed to the U.S. government. The employee also asserted that after he reported these alleged practices internally, the company retaliated against him by imposing unrealistic performance goals, removing him from a key client account, and ultimately terminating his employment.After the employee filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed the employee’s first amended complaint, holding that he failed to state a claim for a reverse false claim under the FCA because the company was not obligated to pay higher payroll taxes or application fees for visas it never sought. The court also dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that the employee’s reports concerned only potential statutory and regulatory violations, not FCA-protected activity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the reverse false claim, concluding that the employer had no established obligation under the FCA to pay higher payroll taxes or H-1B visa fees for visas it did not apply for. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, holding that the employee sufficiently alleged he engaged in protected activity under the FCA and that the employer retaliated against him for this conduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the retaliation claim. View "United States v. Tata Consultancy Services, LTD" on Justia Law

In this case, an individual provided the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with information about tax-avoidance schemes involving two corporations, based on his work at a foreign bank. The information included credit applications that indicated the bank had made loans, not factoring transactions, to the corporations, which was relevant to whether the companies could claim certain tax deductions. The IRS used this information to issue a summons to the bank, gather further evidence, and ultimately settle with both corporations for underpaid taxes. The whistleblower sought an award for his contribution under the statutory whistleblower program.The United States Tax Court reviewed the whistleblower’s appeal after the IRS Whistleblower Office denied his claim. The Tax Court granted summary judgment to the IRS, holding that the administrative record was sufficient and that the Whistleblower Office had not applied the wrong legal standard. The Tax Court also found that the whistleblower’s information did not substantially contribute to the IRS’s actions against the corporations, relying on the record as designated by the Whistleblower Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Tax Court erred by applying the correct legal standard itself, rather than remanding the case to the Whistleblower Office after finding that the Office had applied an incorrect, overly restrictive standard. The court also found that the Tax Court abused its discretion by refusing to supplement the administrative record with relevant documents that were omitted but material to the whistleblower’s claim. The case was remanded to the Whistleblower Office to apply the correct “substantial contribution” standard to a complete administrative record. View "Estate of Insinga v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

Two electric utility companies merged in 1998, with federal approval conditioned on their participation in a regional grid operator to prevent customers from paying multiple, overlapping transmission fees (“pancaked” rates). Several years later, the merged company was allowed to leave the grid operator, but only if it continued to protect certain customers from redundant fees through a special rate schedule. In 2019, the company sought to end this obligation, arguing that continued protection was no longer necessary. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted this request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated that order, finding FERC had failed to consider the impact on customer rates.On remand, FERC issued a new order denying the company’s request to end the fee protection, concluding that removing the protection would adversely affect rates for certain customers and that the benefits of removal did not outweigh these harms. FERC also denied rehearing, maintaining that the company had not shown sufficient alternative protections for affected customers. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that FERC’s orders were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with law and precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not violate its statutory mandate or precedent in its general approach. However, the court found that FERC failed to adequately consider whether alternative customer protections, such as transition agreements, could mitigate the adverse rate impacts. The court therefore granted the petitions for review, vacated FERC’s orders, and remanded the matter for further consideration of whether such protections would suffice to offset the adverse effects on rates. View "Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Slovenian-born U.S. permanent resident, claimed to have discovered billions of dollars dispersed across Africa after the death of Muammar Gaddafi. He sought to repatriate these funds to the United States and enlisted the help of a Washington, D.C. lawyer. The appellant alleged that, during his efforts in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, he was unable to complete the repatriation due to issues with verifying the legitimacy of Treasury Department letters. He further claimed that, while detained in Côte d'Ivoire, the funds were stolen and replaced with counterfeit cash, and that he was later arrested for alleged money laundering and misrepresentation of U.S. documents. Upon returning to the United States, the lawyer withdrew representation due to the criminal allegations against the appellant.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the appellant’s fraud claims in two parts. First, it found that the complaint failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation by the lawyer, noting that the lawyer had provided legal services as agreed. Second, for the claims against three federal employees, the court allowed the United States to substitute itself as defendant under the Westfall Act, as the employees were acting within the scope of their employment. The court then dismissed the claim against the United States on the basis of sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the appellant’s complaint did not allege with particularity any fraudulent misrepresentation by the lawyer at the time of contract formation. Regarding the federal employees, the court found that the appellant failed to rebut the government’s certification that the employees acted within the scope of their employment, and thus sovereign immunity barred the claim. The court also denied the appellant’s request for leave to amend and for jurisdictional discovery. View "Plevnik v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Michael Hurd, Jr. was sentenced in 2005 to 15 months in prison for a felony firearm charge and an additional 27 months for four misdemeanor firearm and drug possession charges. After serving his felony sentence in federal custody, Hurd was mistakenly released instead of being transferred to serve his misdemeanor sentence. He completed his supervised release and, years later, was reincarcerated by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections when the error was discovered during a subsequent, unrelated incarceration. Hurd was not given a hearing before being required to serve the remainder of his original sentence.After his reincarceration, Hurd filed a habeas petition in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which was denied. His appeal was dismissed as moot after he completed his sentence. Hurd then brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the District, finding no substantive due process violation and holding that his procedural due process claim was barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that reincarcerating a person to serve the remainder of a lawfully imposed sentence after an erroneous release does not violate substantive due process, as such action does not “shock the conscience.” The court also held that Hurd’s procedural due process claim for damages was barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement, which had not been set aside. View "Hurd v. DC" on Justia Law

Several companies incorporated in Cyprus and the Isle of Man, who were shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company, alleged that the Russian Federation unlawfully expropriated Yukos’s assets between 2003 and 2004. The shareholders initiated arbitration proceedings under the Energy Charter Treaty, which Russia had signed but not ratified, claiming that Russia’s actions violated the Treaty’s protections against expropriation. The arbitral tribunal in The Hague found in favor of the shareholders, awarding them over $50 billion in damages. Russia contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that it was not bound to arbitrate under the Treaty because provisional application of the arbitration clause was inconsistent with Russian law, and that the shareholders were not proper investors under the Treaty.After the tribunal’s decision, Russia sought to set aside the awards in Dutch courts. The Dutch Supreme Court ultimately upheld the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the awards, finding that Russia was provisionally bound by the Treaty’s arbitration clause and that the shareholders qualified as investors. Meanwhile, the shareholders sought to enforce the arbitral awards in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Russia moved to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and arguing that the arbitration exception did not apply because there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court denied Russia’s motion, holding that it had jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception, and deferred to the arbitral tribunal’s determination that an arbitration agreement existed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the existence of an arbitration agreement is a jurisdictional fact under the FSIA that must be independently determined by the district court, rather than deferred to the arbitral tribunal. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for independent consideration of whether the FSIA’s arbitration exception applies, including whether the Dutch courts’ judgments should have preclusive effect. View "Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding a rule requiring broadcasters to disclose if any programming was paid for by a foreign governmental entity. The FCC's 2021 Rule mandated such disclosures and included specific diligence steps for broadcasters to follow. NAB challenged the rule, leading to a court decision that vacated part of the rule requiring broadcasters to search federal databases.The FCC then issued a revised rule in 2024, which retained the core disclosure requirements but modified the diligence steps. The new rule exempted commercial ads and political candidate ads from the disclosure requirement but included paid public service announcements (PSAs) and issue advertisements. NAB challenged the 2024 Rule, arguing it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the First Amendment, and exceeded the FCC's statutory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2024 Rule complied with the APA's notice-and-comment requirements and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the rule did not violate the First Amendment, as it was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in preventing foreign influence in U.S. broadcasting. The court further determined that the FCC did not exceed its statutory authority with the reasonable diligence requirements, as the rule did not directly regulate lessees but required broadcasters to seek information from them.Ultimately, the court denied NAB's petition for review, upholding the FCC's 2024 Rule. View "National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, a federally recognized tribe, operates several substance-abuse health programs funded by the federal government. To support these programs, the Tribe built the Obaashiing Chemical Health Treatment Center, costing $5.8 million, financed through a $4.95 million loan from the Department of Agriculture and $850,000 of the Tribe's own funds. The Tribe sought compensation from the Indian Health Service (IHS) for both the facility's depreciation and the loan payments under a § 105(l) lease.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The Government had compensated the Tribe for depreciation in 2020 and 2021 and for loan payments in 2022 but refused to compensate for both costs each year, citing 25 C.F.R. § 900.70, which prohibits duplicative compensation. The district court upheld the Government's decision, agreeing that compensating for both depreciation and loan payments would be duplicative.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government correctly declined to compensate the Tribe for both depreciation and loan payments, as doing so would result in duplicative compensation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the 2022 decision but reversed the judgment for 2020 and 2021. The court instructed the district court to vacate the Government's decision for those years and remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings, allowing the Government to apply its anti-duplication rationale consistently across all years. View "Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. HHS" on Justia Law