Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Federal Railroad Administration (“Administration”) issued a broad-ranging rule revising the regulations governing freight railroad safety (“Final Rule”). Two unions representing employees of freight railroads—the Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (together, “Unions”)—petitioned for review. The Unions principally argue that the Administration fell short in numerous respects in its statutory obligation to prioritize safety in regulatory decision-making. They also contend that the Administration impermissibly denied them an opportunity to seek reconsideration, and that the Final Rule was untimely issued.   The DC Circuit agreed with Unions that the portion of the Final Rule lifting calibration requirements for certain telemetry devices did not grapple with the Administration’s safety obligation. But the court found that all Petitioner’s other challenges fail either on the merits or for lack of jurisdiction. As a result, the court granted the petition in part, denied the petition in part, dismissed the petition in part, and remanded part of the Final Rule.   The court stated that it agrees that the Administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the safety consequences of its decision for end-of-train devices that lack self-calibration technology. The court explained that nothing in the Administration’s explanation amounts to an “express and considered conclusion” regarding this safety issue, let alone a reasonable one. And the Administration offered no other explanation for how jettisoning a safety rule in favor of manufacturers’ self-regulation promotes safe rail operations. View "Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers v. FRA" on Justia Law

Appellant made a series of Freedom of Information Act request seeking records related to the animal rights movement. During five years of litigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) produced tens of thousands of pages of responsive documents. The district court found that the FBI had adequately searched for responsive records and granted summary judgment in its favor. The FOIA requester now challenges the adequacy of the search for electronic surveillance records, as well as several of the district court’s interlocutory rulings.   The DC Circuit explained that because it agrees with the district court that the FBI’s search was largely adequate, it affirmed in most respects. It remanded, however, for the Bureau to provide a more detailed explanation of its search for electronic surveillance records related to individuals mentioned in but not party to monitored conversations.   The court explained that despite the FBI’s good-faith effort to process the voluminous requests, it agrees with Appellant that its declarations inadequately address one class of records: those related to individuals mentioned in monitored communications but not directly targeted for surveillance. According to its declarations, the FBI’s electronic surveillance indices include “the names of all individuals whose voices have been monitored,” but for many years field offices have not been “required to forward to [FBI headquarters] the names of all individuals mentioned during monitored conversations.” Thus, a limited remand is appropriate for the FBI to fill this gap in its declarations. View "Ryan Shapiro v. DOJ" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) required Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“MISO”) to institute reforms to its interregional planning process and directed MISO to propose a cost allocation method for its share of certain interregional project costs. Since that time, MISO has twice submitted proposals for such cost allocation. Both times, FERC rejected the proposals, finding that they were not just and reasonable as required by the Federal Power Act (the “Act”), because they were inconsistent with the cost causation principle. After the second rejection, FERC, on its own initiative, established a cost allocation method for certain MISO-PJM projects.   Petitioners challenged FERC’s rejection of MISO’s second proposal and FERC’s corresponding implementation of a cost allocation method. The DC Circuit denied the petitions and affirmed FERC’s orders in all respects. The court explained that according to MISO’s own representations to FERC in its filings, the Second Interregional Filing was “designed to work seamlessly with the revisions proposed in the [Second Regional Filing]” and relied on definitions and provisions in the Second Regional Filing As such, it was appropriate and well within FERC’s discretion to reject MISO’s Second Interregional Filing based on its rejection of the Second Regional Filing, as it would obviously suffer from the same critical flaw.   Further, as FERC noted, it made clear that its Third Regional Order was only addressing regional projects, not interregional ones. Thus, because MISO’s SPP Metric would identify regional benefits, disregarding such known benefits in cost allocation is inconsistent with the cost causation principle. Accordingly, FERC reasonably rejected MISO’s Second Interregional Filing. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Cherokee, owns a qualifying cogeneration facility in South Carolina. Intervenor, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, is a public utility that sells wholesale and retail electric services to customers in North Carolina and South Carolina. Petitioner sells the entirety of its generated capacity and energy to Duke “under a Power Sales Agreement (PPA) pursuant to PURPA.”This case arose because Petitioner sought compensation for the reactive service it provides to Duke’s transmission system. Petitioner filed a proposed rate schedule for its reactive service with FERC pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. Section 824d.   Duke intervened and claimed that FERC lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s section 205 filing. Duke contended that Petitioner’s facility is a qualifying facility selling energy or capacity to Duke pursuant to South Carolina’s implementation of PURPA. Petitioner contended that FERC’s dismissal of its section 205 rate filing is arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that while it clearly has jurisdiction over the petitions, it lacks authority to consider Petitioner’s arguments because they were not adequately presented in its petition for rehearing. The court wrote that FERC did not devise a new rationale out of the blue, instead, Petitioner made the “energy or capacity” argument in its original Answer to Duke’s motion to dismiss, but then dropped it in its petition for rehearing. Thus, Petitioner did not meet its obligation to show that its filing avoided the cogeneration regulation’s exemption from FERC jurisdiction. As such, the court concluded it does not have authority to consider the Petitioner’s arguments. View "Cherokee County Cogeneration Partners, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the National Association of Broadcasters, sought a review of an order (“the Order”) of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). The Order mandated that radio broadcasters check two federal sources to verify a sponsor’s identity.The DC Circuit vacated the Order holding that the FCC has no authority to impose that verification requirement. The court wrote that the FCC’s verification requirement ignores the limits that the statute places on broadcasters’ narrow duty of inquiry. It instead tells a broadcaster to seek information from two federal sources in addition to the two sources that the statute prescribes. That is not the law that Congress wrote. Here, Congress chose the means for broadcasters to obtain the information necessary to announce who paid for programming: Ask employees and sponsors. The FCC cannot alter Congress’s choice. View "National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, and first-degree fraud. On appeal, she mounted a single challenge: the prosecution made improper comments during its rebuttal closing argument that substantially prejudiced her and denied her a fair trial. Appellant objected to most of the prosecution’s statements in the district court, and the court sustained the objections.   The DC Circuit affirmed Appellant’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s response to the prosecution’s challenged statements. Appellant argued that the court should apply harmless-error review. However, the court explained that harmless-error review is inapplicable in the circumstances of this case. Harmless-error analysis generally applies when a district court erroneously rejects a defendant’s timely claim of an error. Here, though, the district court did not erroneously reject Appellant’s claim of an error. Indeed, the court did not reject any relevant claim of error at all. Appellant’s claim involves the four allegedly improper statements made by the prosecution in the rebuttal closing argument. But Appellant raised no objection in the district court to the fourth of those statements, so there was no claim of any error at trial as to that one. And while Appellant did object to the other three statements, the district court did not erroneously overrule her objections.   Further, Appellant cannot demonstrate plain error. The district court did not err, much less plainly err, in responding to the prosecution’s challenged statements. Lastly, even assuming the district court should have taken any additional actions, the court’s failure to do so did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Brynee Baylor" on Justia Law

The House of Representatives Oversight Committee issued a subpoena to then-President Trump’s personal accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP. The subpoena sought an array of the President’s personal financial records. President Trump then brought a lawsuit challenging the Committee’s authority to subpoena his financial records.   After the DC Circuit upheld the subpoena, the Supreme Court took up the matter. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). Since the remand, there have been two developments that potentially affected the shape of the court’s inquiry into the subpoena’s validity. First, President Trump is no longer the sitting President. And second, the Committee’s chairwoman has prepared a detailed explanation of the legislative purposes the subpoena serves and of how the subpoena satisfies the test laid out by the Supreme Court.   The DC Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court. The court agreed with President Trump that the heightened separation-of-powers scrutiny prescribed by the Supreme Court continues to govern in the unique circumstances of this case even though he is no longer the sitting President. However, the court also agreed with the Committee that the court can consider its detailed accounting of the legislative purposes its subpoena serves even though that explanation came after the subpoena’s original issuance.   Thus, the court upheld the Committee’s authority to subpoena certain of President Trump’s financial records in furtherance of the Committee’s enumerated legislative purposes. However, the court wrote it cannot sustain the breadth of the Committee’s subpoena. Rather, in carrying out the Supreme Court’s directive to “insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective,” the court determined that the Committee’s subpoena must be narrowed in a number of respects. View "Donald Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP" on Justia Law

In 2015 the labor union representing employees of Temple University Hospital (“Hospital”)  petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) to exercise jurisdiction over its relationship with the Hospital. Over the Hospital’s objections, the NLRB granted the petition, asserted jurisdiction, and certified the union as the representative of an expanded unit of employees. the Hospital refused to bargain with the union and eventually filed a petition for review.   On remand, the NLRB again asserted jurisdiction over the Hospital after determining that principles of judicial estoppel are inapplicable. The Hospital continued to resist that result, and it renewed the additional arguments the DC Circuit had no occasion to address in 2019.   The DC Circuit denied the petition or review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. The court held that the Hospital did not identify any error in NLRB’s decision.The court explained that the Hospital points out that the Board’s jurisdiction is discretionary and not mandatory. The Board, though, recognized as much, acknowledging that it “does not always exercise the power Congress granted it in Section 10(a).”  The fact that the Board may at times decline to exercise its jurisdiction is by no means inconsistent with its choice to avoid a regime in which the petition-filing practices of private parties—rather than the Board’s own discretionary decisions—could prevent it from hearing a dispute it would otherwise entertain. Moreover, the Board reasonably determined that the Hospital does not qualify as a political subdivision of Pennsylvania. View "Temple University Hospital v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (“MPPAA”) requires an employer to pay “withdrawal liability” if it decides to leave a multiemployer pension plan. Calculating the amount of money the employer owes the plan requires an actuary to project the plan’s future payments to pensioners. The MPPAA requires the actuary to use “assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. Section 1393(a)(1).   The Energy West Mining Company (“Energy West”) withdrew from the United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan (“Pension Plan”). In calculating Energy West’s withdrawal liability, the actuary did not rely on the Pension Plan’s performance to determine what discount rate to use but instead adopted a risk-free discount rate. An arbitrator upheld the risk-free discount rate and the district court granted summary judgment to the Pension Plan, enforcing the arbitral award.   The Second Circuit reversed because the actuary’s choice of a risk-free rate violates the MPPAA’s command. The court explained that to calculate Energy West’s withdrawal liability from the Pension Plan, the actuary was required to base his assumptions on the Plan’s actual characteristics. Because the actuary failed to do so, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for vacatur of the arbitration award. When the actuary calculates Energy West’s withdrawal liability, the discount rate assumption must be similar, but need not be identical, to the discount rate assumption used to calculate minimum funding. View "United Mine Workers of America v. Energy West Mining Company" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) granted NEXUS Gas Transmission, LLC (“Nexus”) a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate a natural gas pipeline from Ohio to Michigan. After FERC granted Nexus the certificate, the City of Oberlin (“City”) petitioned for review claiming, among other things, that FERC did not adequately justify its reliance on agreements to transport gas ultimately bound for export to Canada as evidence of need for the pipeline.   The DC Circuit denied the petition, explaining that the FERC’s explanation on remand from was reasonable and because its decision comported with the Natural Gas Act and the Takings Clause. The court wrote FERC’s justification for considering the agreements to transport gas bound for export is well reasoned and comports with both the Natural Gas Act and the Takings Clause. FERC’s alternative explanation that it would have granted Nexus a certificate even without considering the export agreements also passes muster. View "City of Oberlin, Ohio v. FERC" on Justia Law