Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

To determine whether to list a given site, the EPA primarily uses the Hazard Ranking System (“HRS”), a set of comprehensive scoring points for evaluating the potential damage from hazardous waste releases. After performing an HRS analysis of a site of groundwater contamination southwest of Minneapolis, Minnesota, the EPA determined that the HRS site score exceeded the required threshold for NPL listing.   Petitioners Daikin Applied Americas Inc. and Super Radiator Coils LP, former owners of a metal fabricating facility that is a possible source of the contaminants, challenged the listing as arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. Petitioners contended that the EPA arbitrarily ignored other possible sources of contamination in determining the site and that the EPA both ignored evidence disproving, and failed to provide adequate evidence of, aquifer interconnectivity.   Petitioners argued that the EPA did not adequately establish observed releases. In particular, they contend that the EPA’s chemical analysis was flawed. The DC Circuit rejected the Petitioners’ claims and denied the petition for review. The Court held that the EPA was not required to attribute the contamination to a specific source and adequately supported aquifer interconnectivity. The court wrote that Petitioners misread the chart listing the wells and the hazardous substances exceeding the release threshold. Second, the EPA did not arbitrarily select well data. Further, the EPA correctly noted that “at this stage of the listing, groundwater modeling, 3D or otherwise, to predict migration pathways [is] not required as part of an HRS evaluation." View "Daikin Applied Americas Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Federal Express Corporation—commonly known as FedEx—challenged the Department of Commerce’s authority to hold it strictly liable for aiding and abetting violations of the 2018 Export Controls Act.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of FedEx’s complaint, holding that Commerce’s regulation, 15 C.F.R. Section 764.2(b), and its strict-liability interpretation of it are not ultra vires. The court concluded that the statutory text, circuit precedent, and deference to the Executive Branch in matters of national security and foreign affairs all support Commerce’s interpretation.   The court explained that the first barrier to FedEx’s ultra vires challenge is that Commerce’s interpretation of its regulation to allow for strict liability in civil enforcement actions does not contravene any clear statutory command. Next, FedEx’s ultra vires argument runs into a second headwind—relevant circuit precedent. The court wrote that given that the DC circuit has already specifically held that Commerce can attach strict liability to the first term in the string of verbs “cause or aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, permit, or approve[,]” 15 C.F.R. Section 764.2(b), there is no basis for the court to hold that Commerce acted ultra vires in attaching that same strict-liability reach to the next two verbs. Further, since FedEx has not shown that its asserted mens rea requirement for aiding and abetting liability was truly settled in the common law at the time the statute was promulgated, or that its common-law meaning fits within this specialized national-security scheme, FedEx’s argument does not come close to satisfying the strict standard for an ultra vires claim. View "Federal Express Corporation v. U.S. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted petitions for review as to two order issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) aimed at consolidating existing national market system (NMS) plans governing the dissemination of equity market data into a single, consolidated plan (CT Plan) and modifying the governance structure to increase efficiencies and facilitate greater involvement by non-exchange stakeholders (Governance Plan), holding that Petitioners' petitions were granted as to one challenged provision.Petitioners, a group of national securities exchanges, brought this action challenging the Commission's orders, arguing that several of the provisions were arbitrary and capricious or were contrary to the the text and goals of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. Specifically, Petitioners challenged a provision of the final Commission-approved CT Plan that included representatives that did not belong to "self-regulatory organizations" (SROs) as voting members of the CT Plan's operating committee. The District of Columbia Circuit granted Petitioners' petitions as to the non-SRO representation provision and denied them in all other respects, holding that the provision including non-SROs on the CT Plan's operating committee as voting members was invalid. View "Nasdaq Stock Market LLC v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss this complaint alleging, among other things, an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs or for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, holding that dismissal was warranted.While he was incarcerated in federal prison and suffering from Hepatitis C, Plaintiff applied to receive treatment with Harvoni. Dr. Jeffrey Allen, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Medical Director, denied the request under BOP's then-operative protocol. Pursuant to later-revised protocol, Plaintiff received treatment, and his Hepatitis C was cured. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendant inflicted cruel and unusual punishment upon him by failing to grant his initial treatment request. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that qualified immunity protected Defendant from Plaintiff's claims. View "Bernier v. Allen" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court declining to reach the merits of Plaintiffs' complaint challenging a determination of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2), holding that the district court erred in concluding that the FDIC exceeded its authority in making the determination.Plaintiffs, two bank executives, were fired after a proposed merger because they refused to accept a reduction in the amount of a payment that was contractually provided for them. Plaintiffs sued the bank that terminated them and the bank with which it merged, alleging that they were entitled to the full payments. The banks, in turn, sought guidance from the FDIC as to whether the relief sought by Plaintiffs would constitute a statutorily-restricted "golden parachute" payment. The FDIC responded that the payment would constitute a golden parachute. Plaintiffs then brought this action challenging the FDIC's determination as unlawful under the APA. The district court declined to reach the merits, concluding that the FDIC lacked authority to render a golden parachute determination at all. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the FDIC lacked authority to render its golden parachute determination. View "Bauer v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Manuel Reynoso was convicted by jury on a gun-possession charge and two drug charges. On appeal, Reynoso challenged his convictions on several grounds. On the same day the district court sentenced Reynoso, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which established that the felon-in-possession statute required the government to show not only that the defendant knew he possessed a gun but also that he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. Reynoso contended on appeal that his felon-in-possession conviction had to be overturned due to the government’s failure to make the additional showing Rehaif required. Because Reynoso did not raise that argument in the district court, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed his claim for only plain error. After the appellate court heard oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court granted review in another case to consider whether a person might be entitled to plain-error relief on appeal in a case involving a Rehaif error, Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021). Greer held that Rehaif errors at trial normally will not qualify as plain errors of a kind warranting relief in appeals from felon-in-possession convictions. In accordance with Greer, the Court of Appeal concluded the district court’s Rehaif error in this case did not amount to plain error. The Court also rejected Reynoso’s other challenges to his convictions, thus affirming the district court. View "United States v. Reynoso" on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. sued the General Services Administration and its Administrator (collectively, GSA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the GSA’s purported practice of interfering with payments owed to Crowley under its contract with the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Crowley argued the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the district court to review the GSA’s alleged violation of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, and the Transportation Act of 1940. The question this case presented for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's review was whether Crowley’s suit against the GSA, whichwasis not a party to Crowley’s contract with TRANSCOM, was “at its essence” contractual, including whether Crowley “in essence” sought more than $10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government such that it was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) pursuant to the Tucker Act. The district court answered affirmatively and dismissed Crowley’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals disagreed: Crowley’s action against the GSA in district court was not “at its essence” contractual because Crowley did not seek to enforce or recover on the contract with TRANSCOM. Nor did Crowley “in essence” seek monetary relief from the federal government in district court. Rather, it requested declaratory and injunctive relief that, if granted, would have considerable value independent of (and not negligible in comparison to) any monetary recovery Crowley may ultimately attain in other proceedings. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. GSA" on Justia Law

Petitioners, all environmental organizations, sought to vacate the Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC” or the “Commission”) order giving the green light to Mountain Valley, LLC to construct a new pipeline. That pipeline, the “Southgate Project,” would extend Mountain Valley’s Mainline System Project, connecting its terminus in Virginia to facilities in North Carolina. Its “newness,” as an extension of the nonoperational Mainline System Project, is one of the prime subjects of dispute.   Petitioners also requested that the DC Circuit vacate the Commission’s denial of rehearing. Petitioners challenged the Commission’s Certificate Order and its denial of rehearing as arbitrary and capricious on two bases: the approved return on equity rate and the adequacy of the Commission’s Environmental Impact Statement.     The DC Circuit denied the petition finding that the Commission’s decisions on both scores were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court wrote that Petitioners’ fear that the return on equity presents a market-skewing incentive is misplaced. The long-term agreement shows an actual need for the Project, not an attempt to overbuild purely for profit.   Further, Petitioners do not marshal compelling evidence to counter the Commission’s cumulative impacts analysis. The City of Roanoke briefing lists downstream sediment as a concern of the Mountain Valley pipeline but does not present any statistical evidence contradicting FERC’s conclusions. Further, the research Petitioners presented in their rehearing request, allegedly demonstrating that fine sediment can travel hundreds of miles and therefore will accumulate between the two Projects, is taken from an environmental product company’s website. These sources thus do not call into question the Commission’s analysis. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

The city of Scottsdale, Arizona filed a petition challenging the Federal Aviation Administration’s approval of certain east-bound flight paths out of the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, claiming the flights resulted in injury to the city because planes flying along those routes produce noise and pollution on property that the city owns.The D.C. Circuit denied Scottsdale's petition, holding that, while this is the type of harm that could confer standing, Scottsdale was unable to identify evidence proving the city suffered actual harm. The City presented no evidence of increased noise or pollution. View "City of Scottsdale, Arizona v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  (“FERC”) gave Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC permission to build a natural-gas pipeline that will run through Appellants’ property. Appellants sued in district court to prevent the pipeline’s construction. The district court dismissed their suit because the Natural Gas Act’s  (“NGA”) exclusive review process precluded its jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed concluding that the NGA creates an exclusive review scheme for challenges to pipeline certificates, one that doesn’t allow for the Appellants’ district court filing. The court wrote that when, as here, Congress creates an exclusive review scheme, it precludes any other court’s jurisdiction over challenges that fit within that scheme. Therefore, Appellants may file their suit in district court only if their facial nondelegation challenge falls outside the NGA’s judicial-review scheme. The court explained that the mere fact that Appellants press constitutional claims (even facial ones) therefore does not control the preclusion inquiry. Further, the mere fact that Appellants are challenging FERC’s structure does not take their suit outside the NGA’s review provision. View "Cletus Bohon v. FERC" on Justia Law