Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Four years after his release from prison, and after completing three years of supervised release, plaintiff was told he would have to serve another 27 months in jail based on an erroneous release from prison because he had a consecutive misdemeanor to serve. Plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court ruled that he must serve the remainder of his sentence. Plaintiff appealed, but the district court failed to act on the appeal until December 2013, at which point it dismissed the petition as moot because plaintiff had been released from jail upon completion of his sentence.Plaintiff then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that his spontaneous incarceration deprived him of due process under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case based on claim preclusion in light of plaintiff's prior unsuccessful habeas corpus action. The DC Circuit reversed and, on remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the District.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that plaintiff failed to establish a pattern of constitutional violations or to demonstrate deliberate indifference. The court explained that plaintiff's evidence fails to show either that the District had a relevant custom of unconstitutional actions or that the District acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court vacated the entry of summary judgment for the District on the claim of unconstitutional policy because the nature and contours of the alleged policy present a number of disputed issues of material fact. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hurd v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed with the Board alleging that the Company had violated sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by discharging one employee, laying off another employee, and closing RAV because employees engaged in union activity. The Board reviewed the case after a hearing before an ALJ and issued a decision and order finding that petitioner had committed the unfair labor practices as alleged.The DC Circuit denied a petition for review with respect to the Board's determination that petitioner committed unfair labor practices by terminating one employee and laying off another, concluding that substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion. Therefore, the court enforced the Board's proposed remedies, other than the restoration order and the bargaining order. The court remanded the issues of RAV's closure and the restoration order so that the Board may address the matters raised in this opinion regarding those issues. Furthermore, the Board must determine whether a unit of mechanics formerly employed by Petitioner at 3773 Merritt Avenue still exists, apart from Concrete Express, in a form that makes a bargaining order under the NLRA feasible. View "RAV Truck and Trailer Repairs, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

PCTC filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking release of USGS records relating to the agency's coal tar sealant studies. USGS produced 52,000 pages of records, but withheld the modeling data and personally identifiable information relevant to this appeal. USGS withheld the model runs under Exemption Five on the ground that the release of the exploratory analysis would inhibit the ability to freely explore and analyze data without concern for external criticism. USGS withheld the house dust study participants' personal information under Exemption Six because release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and would not serve a public interest because the pertinent scientific data associated in this category of records is already released. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the district court granted USGS's motion.The DC Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court PCTC's claims regarding the urban lakes model runs withheld under Exemption Five, concluding that USGS failed to carry its burden to show that the model runs are pre-decisional. Furthermore, USGS failed to prove beyond dispute that the model runs are deliberative. Therefore, the absence of evidence establishing that the requested model runs are protected from disclosure amounts to the agency's failure to establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision to withhold the house dust study location information under Exemption Six. The court explained that the study participants have a greater than de minimis privacy interest in their addresses, household compositions, smoking and cooking habits, and the extensive personal details included in the questionnaires. The court further explained that releasing their addresses serves no cognizable public interest. View "Pavement Coatings Technology Council v. United States Geological Survey" on Justia Law

This case involves four subgroups of the Drone Advisory Committee (DAC), which provided advice to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The subgroups—one subcommittee and three task groups—provided advice to the DAC, but never directly to the FAA. At issue is whether section 10(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applies to records that these subgroups created but never provided to the DAC.The DC Circuit held that the DAC subgroups were not themselves advisory committees and that section 10(b) of FACA does not extend to documents that the subgroups created but never gave to the DAC. The court found unpersuasive EPIC's contentions that the subcommittee and task groups satisfy FACA's definition of an advisory committee. Rather, the court concluded that the subgroups here provided no advice to the FAA directly, and the DAC functioned as more than a rubber-stamp for the subgroups' work product. As to section 10(b), the court concluded that the present dispute involves only records created by the subgroups and never given to the DAC; such records were neither "made available to" nor "prepared for or by" the DAC; and, instead, the records were "prepared for or by" the subgroups themselves. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Drone Advisory Committee" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly transporting an individual to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2421(a), the district court sentenced him to 22 months in prison and six years of supervised release.The DC Circuit vacated the supervised release portion of defendant's sentence, agreeing with defendant that his attorney provided ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object when the district court relied on the wrong provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In this case, USSG 5D1.2(c) was the incorrect provision to apply, and the proper Guidelines provision was USSG 5D1.2(c). The court explained that the record of defendant's sentencing shows a reasonable probability that the district court would have chosen a five-year sentence but for his counsel's failure to object to the incorrect Guidelines provision. Therefore, defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea on the understanding that the government would not argue that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction because of his alleged supervisory or managerial role in a drug-smuggling conspiracy. Doing so would eliminate a statutory barrier to defendant seeking relief under the Safety Valve provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(4), from his mandatory minimum sentence. However, the government understood its promise differently, arguing that it retained the ability to oppose any Safety Valve relief and characterizing the relevant language in the plea agreement as inelegant and unnecessary.The DC Circuit held that the plea agreement is ambiguous as to the government's ability to oppose Safety Valve relief on the ground that defendant was a supervisor or manager in a drug conspiracy. The court explained that controlling precedent requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding, untainted and uninfluenced by the government's breach of the plea agreement and the evidence it introduced in the process. View "United States v. Moreno-Membache" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts related to his involvement in a Mexican cartel called the Los Zetas. The first count involved a racketeer influenced and corrupt organization (RICO) conspiracy to import controlled substances into the United States, and the second and third counts related to being an accessory after the fact to the murder and attempted murder in Mexico of two U.S. Special Agents.The DC Circuit concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in determining the drug quantity for which defendant was responsible; the district court did not commit reversible error in applying the two-point supervisory role enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(c); and the district court did not commit reversible error in imposing a two-point enhancement for the use of threats and violence under USSG 2D1.1(b)(2) and a two-point enhancement for the use of physical restraints under USSG 3A1.3. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's calculation of defendant's sentence for the RICO conspiracy. However, the court vacated defendant's convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1114 for accessory after the fact to the murder and attempted murder of U.S. officials. The court concluded that the district court committed plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights by convicting and sentencing defendant under section 1114 because the underlying conduct occurred in Mexico. The court remanded for a limited resentencing. View "United States v. Carbajal Flores" on Justia Law

Appellants challenge the district court's dismissal of their claims against Ukraine for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Appellants' claims stemmed from Ukraine's "total destruction" of their property for the construction of a road and railway bridge project.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Ukraine based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the district court correctly determined that appellants' lawsuit does not fall within the FSIA's expropriation exception. With respect to Appellants Luxexpress–II and the Ivanenkos, their claims are barred by the domestic takings rule. The court explained that, although the domestic takings rule does not apply to Alamo Group, it failed to show that its property is "owned or operated" by an instrumentality of Ukraine. In this case, even assuming arguendo, that the Ukraine South–Western Railway occupies the land that Luxexpress–II had leased, there are no allegations that it "owned or operated" Alamo Group's property. The court also concluded that appellants cannot satisfy the FSIA's commercial activity exception where the allegations describe conduct that is quintessentially sovereign and which could not have been carried out by a private participant in the marketplace. Therefore, Ukraine's alleged conduct was not in connection with commercial activity. Finally, the court concluded that Ukraine did not waive its sovereign immunity and rejected appellants' claims to the contrary. View "Ivanenko v. Yanukovich" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to PBGC, concluding that 29 C.F.R. 4044.4(b) is valid and that the PBGC Appeals Board reasonably applied section 4044.4(b) to deny appellant's lumpsum request. The court also concluded that, because fiduciaries must act in accordance with the terms of plan documents only "insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of" the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Penn Traffic fulfilled its fiduciary duties by denying appellant's request in compliance with section 4044.4(b). Therefore, the court need not address appellant's contentions that Penn Traffic's handling of his lumpsum request was inconsistent with the Plan's terms. View "Fisher v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp." on Justia Law

Wilton Rancheria, a Sacramento area Indian tribe, was federally recognized in 1927. The 1958 Rancheria Act disestablished Wilton and 40 other reservations. In 1979, several California rancherias, including Wilton, sued. The government agreed to restore Indian status. Wilton was erroneously excluded from the settlement. In 2009, the Department of the Interior restored Wilton’s federal recognition and agreed to “accept in trust certain lands formerly belonging to” Wilton. Wilton petitioned to acquire 282 acres near Galt for a casino. A draft environmental impact statement (EIS), under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347, identified alternatives, including a 30-acre Elk Grove parcel. Wilton changed its preference and requested that the Department acquire the Elk Grove location. Objectors responded that acquiring the Elk Grove location would moot pending state-court suits.The Department’s final EIS identified the Elk Grove location as the preferred alternative. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary– Indian Affairs, Roberts, signed the Record of Decision (ROD) pursuant to delegated authority. Roberts had served as Acting Assistant Secretary– Indian Affairs (AS–IA), but after his acting status lapsed under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, Roberts continued to exercise the non-exclusive AS–IA functions. Black, who became Acting AS–IA in the new administration, signed off on the acquisition.Objectors filed suit before the issuance of the Department’s ROD and unsuccessfully sought a temporary restraining order. The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Department, rejecting claims that the Department impermissibly delegated the authority to make a final agency action to acquire the land to an official who could not wield this authority, was barred from acquiring land in trust on behalf of Wilton’s members, and failed to comply with NEPA. View "Stand Up For California! v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law