Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On January 6, 2021, Darrell Neely, a radio host, entered the U.S. Capitol building during the riot that disrupted the certification of the 2020 presidential election. Neely spent over an hour inside the Capitol, during which he stole items belonging to the U.S. Capitol Police. He was later indicted and convicted of five misdemeanor offenses, resulting in a 28-month prison sentence. Neely appealed, challenging the denial of three pretrial motions on statutory and constitutional grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Neely's motions to dismiss certain charges, transfer venue, and suppress a confession. Neely argued that the statute under which he was charged did not apply to his conduct, that he could not receive a fair trial in the District of Columbia, and that his confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The District Court rejected these arguments, leading to Neely's conviction and sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Neely's appeal. The court held that the statute in question did apply to Neely's conduct, as it did not specify that only the Secret Service could restrict the relevant areas. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court determined that Neely's Miranda rights were not violated, as there was no evidence of a deliberate two-step interrogation strategy by the FBI. Finally, the court upheld the denial of the motion to transfer venue, finding no presumption of jury prejudice. Consequently, the court affirmed Neely's convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Neely" on Justia Law

James Little participated in the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, where he roamed the Senate Gallery, took photographs, and sent messages to his family and friends. He pleaded guilty to one count of Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol Building, a violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G), which carries a maximum punishment of six months in prison or five years of probation. The district court initially sentenced him to 60 days in prison followed by three years of probation.Little appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred by imposing both imprisonment and probation for a single violation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court resentenced Little to 150 days in prison, giving him credit for the 60 days already served and an additional 30 days for the time spent on probation.Little appealed again, claiming that his new sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with Little's arguments. The court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the imposition of additional punishment because the time Little served on the original sentence was credited against his new sentence. The court also found that Little had no legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence because he had appealed it. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Little's new sentence of 150 days in prison. View "USA v. Little" on Justia Law

Aenergy, S.A. (Aenergy) sought damages from the Republic of Angola for unpaid work related to power turbines to be installed in Angola. Aenergy had previously entered into contracts with Angolan utility subsidiaries to construct, supply, and maintain power plants and water infrastructure. The contracts involved General Electric (GE) turbines and were financed by a credit line from GE Capital. Aenergy alleged that a GE accounting error led to forged contract amendments, resulting in the Angolan government terminating the contracts and seizing turbines.Aenergy initially filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), which dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. The court found that Angola was an adequate alternative forum for the dispute. The Second Circuit affirmed this decision, emphasizing that Aenergy could bring similar claims in Angola, even if the breach-of-contract claim was time-barred. Aenergy's requests for rehearing and certiorari were denied.Aenergy then filed a new lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, focusing on breach of contract for unpaid work. The district court dismissed the case, citing issue preclusion based on the prior SDNY and Second Circuit rulings. The court also conducted a fresh forum non conveniens analysis, concluding that Angola remained the appropriate forum.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that issue preclusion applied because the adequacy of Angola as an alternative forum had already been determined in the previous litigation. The court found that Aenergy's trimmed-down complaint did not change the forum non conveniens analysis, and the Supreme Court of Angola's subsequent dismissal of Aenergy's administrative action did not alter the adequacy of Angola as a forum. View "Aenergy, S.A. v. Republic of Angola" on Justia Law

Howard University’s Board of Trustees amended the institution’s bylaws to remove trustee positions that had been filled by alumni, students, and faculty for several decades. A group of alumni sued the University and the Board in D.C. Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the Board’s amendment was ultra vires because it violated the governing bylaws. Howard removed the case to federal court, arguing that the governance dispute hinged on the University’s federal charter. The alumni moved to remand the case back to state court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the alumni’s motion to remand, holding that the suit implicated a significant federal issue under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. The District Court then granted Howard’s motion to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals determined that the case did not arise under federal law nor present a significant, disputed federal issue under Grable. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Jenkins v. Howard University" on Justia Law

Stingray Pipeline Company LLC operates a pipeline system under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Due to declining throughput and financial losses, Stingray sought FERC's permission to abandon part of its pipeline network by selling it to a non-jurisdictional entity. However, a hurricane damaged a segment of the pipeline, Segment 3394, which has remained out of service since 2020. FERC granted the abandonment request but imposed a condition that Stingray must either restore Segment 3394 to service or reach an agreement with the affected shipper, ERT.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission largely granted Stingray's application to abandon the pipeline but imposed the condition regarding Segment 3394. Stingray challenged this condition as unreasonable and unsupported by the record. FERC reaffirmed its order, leading Stingray to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and denied the Petition for Review. The court held that FERC's decision to impose the condition was not arbitrary and capricious. The court found that Stingray had not met its burden to show that unconditional abandonment was consistent with the public convenience and necessity. The court emphasized that Stingray had repeatedly assured FERC that it would restore Segment 3394 to service but failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify abandoning the segment without restoring service or reaching an agreement with ERT. The court also rejected Stingray's arguments that the condition exceeded FERC's regulatory authority. View "Stingray Pipeline Company, L.L.C. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule implementing section 2613 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), as amended by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act. The rule concerns the assertion and treatment of confidential business information (CBI) claims for information reported to or obtained by the EPA under the TSCA. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenged three aspects of the rule, arguing that it was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) also challenged the rule, arguing that it allowed for the unlawful disclosure of information protected by section 2613(a) of the TSCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. EDF argued that the EPA's regulatory definition of "health and safety study" was impermissibly narrow, that the EPA should require substantiation and routine review of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization, and that the EPA's use of permissive language in the rule was inappropriate. ACC argued that the rule allowed for the unlawful disclosure of specific chemical identities when downstream entities reported information without knowledge of the specific chemical identity.The court denied EDF's petition for review, holding that the EPA's definition of "health and safety study" was consistent with the statute and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the TSCA does not require reassertion and substantiation of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization and that the EPA's use of permissive language was reasonable. However, the court granted ACC's petition for review, holding that the rule was unlawful to the extent it required entities reporting by non-confidential accession numbers and without knowledge of the underlying chemical identity to assert CBI claims for the underlying chemical identity. The court vacated these requirements under the rule. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law

Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought fast track designation from the FDA for its investigational drug, tradipitant, intended to treat gastroparesis. The FDA denied the request, citing a partial clinical hold on the drug due to the lack of long-term animal studies to assess its toxicological effects. Vanda argued that the FDA's denial was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA, upholding the agency's decision. Vanda then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the FDA's denial of Vanda's fast track application was neither contrary to law nor arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the FDA properly considered the drug's development plan, including the clinical hold, in assessing whether tradipitant demonstrated the potential to address unmet medical needs. The court also noted that the FDA's definition of the unmet medical need as long-term treatment of gastroparesis symptoms was reasonable, given the chronic nature of the condition and the existing short-term treatment options. The court rejected Vanda's arguments that the FDA's decision was inconsistent with its prior positions and that the agency improperly considered the clinical hold. The court concluded that the FDA's decision was supported by a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law

VTCU Corp., a manufacturer of electrical transformers, contested the results of a mail ballot representation election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 302, won the election by 21 votes. VTCU alleged misconduct by the NLRB’s Region 27 Office and the Union, claiming insufficient voting time, failure to provide ballots to eligible voters, and counting of void ballots. VTCU also accused Union agents of threatening and intimidating employees. VTCU requested the election be overturned or an evidentiary hearing be held.The Regional Director found no merit in VTCU’s claims, overruled the objections without a hearing, and certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative. The Director determined many of VTCU’s objections were untimely, unsupported, or refuted by an administrative investigation. The Director concluded the Regional Office’s conduct was consistent with the Board’s Casehandling Manual, the parties’ Stipulated Election Agreement, and Board precedent.After the Board denied VTCU’s request for review, VTCU refused to bargain with the Union. The Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging VTCU’s refusal to bargain violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Board concluded VTCU committed unfair labor practices and ordered it to recognize and bargain with the Union. VTCU petitioned for review, arguing the Board erred in rejecting its objections and denying requests for an extension of time and a post-election hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found no merit in VTCU’s claims. The court held the Board’s decision was consistent with applicable law and supported by established precedent. The court also noted it lacked jurisdiction to consider several of VTCU’s claims due to failure to raise them with the Board. Consequently, the court denied VTCU’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order. View "VTCU Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Acumen Capital Partners, LLC, a commercial property management company, discharged engineer Gregory Zapata, allegedly due to his failure to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Zapata had been involved in union activities, including signing union authorization cards and discussing unionization with colleagues. Acumen's chief engineer, Salvatore Coppola, who was aware of Zapata's union activities, had informed Zapata that the company's owner, Jeffrey Rosenblum, did not want a union in the building.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Acumen discharged Zapata because of his protected union activities, violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) credited the testimonies of Zapata and another engineer, Gabriel Garcia, while discrediting Rosenblum's testimony. The ALJ concluded that Acumen's stated reason for discharging Zapata—non-compliance with the vaccination mandate—was pretextual, as the company had not enforced the mandate consistently and had not excluded other unvaccinated employees from the workplace.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB's findings that Acumen had knowledge of Zapata's union activities and that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in his discharge. The court noted the timing of the discharge, the pretextual nature of Acumen's explanation, and the disproportionate response to Zapata's unvaccinated status. The court denied Acumen's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its decision and order, which included reinstating Zapata with backpay. View "Acumen Capital Partners, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Bryan Burwell and Aaron Perkins were involved in a series of bank robberies and were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, including mandatory minimum sentences for firearms-related convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which mandates enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Burwell and Perkins argued that their convictions under § 924(c) were erroneous because federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is not categorically a crime of violence.The District Court denied their post-conviction motions, which challenged the application of § 924(c) based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c) as unconstitutionally vague. Burwell and Perkins appealed, arguing that bank robbery by extortion does not involve the use or threat of force and thus cannot be considered a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is indivisible regarding the means of committing bank robbery—by force and violence, intimidation, or extortion. The court concluded that extortion, as a means of committing bank robbery, does not necessarily involve the use or threat of force. Therefore, bank robbery under § 2113(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). Consequently, the court vacated Burwell's and Perkins's § 924(c) convictions and remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether to release them immediately. View "United States v. Burwell" on Justia Law