Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission owns a power supply system in the Hetch Hetchy Valley and transmission lines but does not own distribution lines and relies on PG&E’s distribution system. The Commission is both a customer and a competitor of PG&E. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PG&E’s Tariff, which stated the generally applicable terms for “open-access” wholesale distribution service. In 2019, San Francisco filed a complaint under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, 825e, 825h, challenging PG&E’s refusal to offer secondary-voltage service in lieu of more burdensome primary-voltage service to certain San Francisco sites and provide service to delivery points that San Francisco maintains are eligible for service under the Tariff’s grandfathering provision. PG&E maintained that it had not given customers the right to dictate the level of service to be received and that any denials of secondary-voltage service were supported by “technical, safety, reliability, and operational reasons.”FERC denied San Francisco’s complaint, ruling that PG&E should retain discretion to determine what level of service is most appropriate for a customer because the provider “is ultimately responsible for the safety and reliability of its distribution system.” The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded, citing FERC’s own precedent and noting a “troubling pattern of inattentiveness to potential anticompetitive effects of PG&E’s administration of its open-access Tariff.” View "City and County of San Francisco v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Five registered national securities exchanges filed proposed rules with the SEC to establish fee schedules for Wireless Bandwidth Connections, which connect a customer’s equipment located on the premises of a petitioner-exchange with the customer’s equipment located on the premises of a third-party data center, and Wireless Market Data Connections, which connect a customer to the proprietary data feed of a petitioner-exchange. SEC’s Final Order asserted jurisdiction over the services and approved the proposed rules.The exchanges argued that the SEC’s assertion of jurisdiction over the services was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the statutes that define “exchange” and “facility,” that SEC arbitrarily and capriciously ignored the effect of the Final Rule upon the ability of the wireless services to compete, and that SEC ignored regulations defining “exchange” and arbitrarily departed from relevant agency precedents.The D.C. Circuit upheld the order. The Connections are subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction as “facilities” of an exchange--a market facility maintained by an exchange for bringing together purchasers and sellers of an exchange. The SEC correctly concluded that the fee schedules for the Connections had to be filed as “rules of an exchange,” consistent with SEC regulations and precedent. View "Intercontinental Exchange, Inc v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Duke generates electricity for Power, a “joint agency” of 32 North Carolina municipalities. Power pays Duke an Energy Charge that “reimburses Duke only for its fuel costs and variable operations and maintenance costs associated with producing the energy consumed by Power" and a Capacity Charge, designed to cover Duke’s fixed costs and provide a return on its infrastructure investments, calculated by determining its pro-rata share of the demand on Duke’s system during a one-hour “snapshot” of system usage taken during the peak hour on Duke’s system each month.Their agreement regulates activities Power may employ to modify its electricity use, including Demand-Side Management and Demand Response. Demand-Side Management involves end-users accepting an inducement to sign up for a program where Power can turn off and on their appliances around high-demand periods. Demand Response involves a supplier providing end-users information on the price of energy at a given time and those end users then modifying their consumption to avoid elevated prices.In 2019, Power petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) arguing that the provisions that permit Demand-Side Management and Demand Response activities permit deploying battery storage technology to reduce metered demand during peak load periods and drawing from those batteries during the high-demand “snapshot” hour. Concerned that Power would reduce its Capacity Charge to zero, Duke opposed the petition. The D.C. Circuit affirmed FERC’s grant of Power’s petition, finding that the agreement permits Power to use battery storage technology as either Demand-Side Management or Demand Response. View "Duke Energy Progress, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of RICU's complaint alleging that the Department's determination that critical care telehealth services provided by physicians who are outside of the United States are ineligible for Medicare reimbursement. The court concluded that RICU seeks to avoid well-settled authority requiring administrative exhaustion under the Medicare Act by presenting a concrete claim for payment of rendered services to the Department for decision. Because RICU has neither satisfied the channeling requirement of 42 U.S.C. 405(g) nor demonstrated that the Illinois Council exception applies, the court dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of RICU's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "RICU LLC v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit remanded the Department's Final Rule setting more stringent efficiency standards than those of the ASHRAE for "commercial packaged boilers," large boilers commonly used to heat commercial and multifamily residential buildings. The court rejected the contention that the DOE did not apply the clear and convincing evidence standard required by statute. Rather, in promulgating the Final Rule, the DOE expressly said satisfaction of the clear and convincing standard, if applicable, was an alternative ground supporting the Rule.Without a cogent and reasoned response to the substantial concerns petitioners raised about the assignment of efficiencies to the buildings, a crucial part of its analysis, the court cannot say that it was reasonable for the DOE to conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the adoption of a more stringent standard. Furthermore, the court cannot say that the Secretary reasonably concluded she had clear and convincing evidence a more stringent efficiency standard is economically justified. The court remanded for the DOE to address several issues raised by petitioners. View "American Public Gas Association v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted the City's petitions for review of FERC orders rejecting the City's complaint regarding periodic outflow coming from the operation of the Pensacola Project, a downstream dam licensed by FERC. The court found FERC's position unpersuasive and remanded for the Commission to determine the role of the Corps, the responsibility the Authority bears if it caused flooding in the City, analyze the evidence petitioner has produced, and finally interpret the Pensacola Act. View "The City of Miami, Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

In 2018, Li filed a Form 211 with the IRS Whistleblower Office (WBO) alleging tax violations by the “target taxpayer,” seeking a monetary whistleblower award under 26 U.S.C. 7623(b). A WBO classifier reviewed Li’s Form 211 and the target taxpayer’s returns and concluded that Li’s allegations were “speculative and/or did not provide specific or credible information regarding tax underpayments or violations of internal revenue laws,” making Li ineligible for an award. The WBO did not forward Li’s form to an IRS examiner for any potential action against the target taxpayer.Li appealed to the Tax Court, which rejected the case on summary judgment. The court found that the WBO adequately performed its evaluative function and did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the form for an award. The D.C. Circuit remanded for dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. The WBO rejected Li’s Form 211 for providing vague and speculative information it could not corroborate and did not forward it to an IRS examiner; the IRS did not take any action against the target taxpayer. There was no proceeding and no “award determination,” so the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to review the WBO’s threshold rejection of Li’s Form 211. View "Li v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two criminal counts, remanding for resentencing. Both defendant and the government agree that a court may deviate from the Sentencing Guidelines, including by imposing consecutive sentences that exceed the total recommended punishment, after considering the Guidelines range and the other statutory sentencing factors.The court explained that, consistent with the Sentencing Commission's statutory mandate to promote fairness and uniformity in sentencing, the Guidelines provide recommended sentencing ranges based on two factors: a defendant's culpable conduct and criminal history. Chapter 7 of the Guidelines sets out recommended terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. Finding consensus among Chapter 7's text, context, and purpose, the court held that the sentencing ranges in Chapter 7's Revocation Table represent the Guidelines' total recommended punishment for supervised release violations. Those recommendations do not depend on the number of counts for which a defendant is serving supervised release. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of Jaysh al-Mahdi terrorist attacks and the victims' family members, filed suit alleging that defendants, large medical supply and manufacturing companies, knowingly gave substantial support to the attacks against them in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), and state law. Plaintiffs claim that defendants, aware of Jaysh al-Mahdi's command of the Ministry, secured lucrative medical-supply contracts with the Ministry by giving corrupt payments and valuable gifts to Jaysh al-Mahdi. The district court held that the complaint failed to state claims for either direct or secondary (aiding-and-abetting) liability under the ATA, and that it lacked personal jurisdiction over six foreign defendants.The DC Circuit reversed on three issues and remanded the balance of the issues to be addressed by the district court consistent with the court's opinion. First, the court concluded that plaintiffs plead facts that suffice to support their aiding-and-abetting claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Second, with respect to the direct liability claim, the court concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that defendants' payments to Jaysh al Mahdi proximately caused plaintiffs' injuries. Third, the court concluded that the district court's personal jurisdiction analysis was unduly restrictive. View "Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Limited" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Tatneft's petition to confirm and enforce its arbitral award against Ukraine. The court agreed with the district court's decision rejecting Ukraine's arguments that the court should have declined to enforce the award under The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), and should have dismissed the petition on the basis of forum non conveniens. In this case, the enforcement of the arbitral award should not have been denied under the New York Convention arti. (V)(1)(C) where the district court neither exceeded its discretion nor made legal error when it denied Ukraine's motion for supplemental briefing, made years after the parties had initially briefed the merits; Ukraine can pay the $173 million judgment without risking a collapse; the district court did not exceed its authority under the New York Convention; and the court rejected Ukraine's contention that the district court mistakenly enforced the award in spite of the public policy and improper composition exceptions. Furthermore, the court has squarely held that forum non conveniens is not available in proceedings to confirm a foreign arbitral award because only U.S. courts can attach foreign commercial assets found within the United States. View "Tatneft v. Ukraine" on Justia Law