Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The FCC regulates facilities and devices that transmit radio waves and microwaves, including cell phones and facilities for radio, TV, and cell phone communications, 47 U.S.C. 302a(a). Radio waves and microwaves are electromagnetic energy, “radiofrequency” that move through space, as “RF radiation.” RF radiation at sufficiently high levels can heat human body tissue, resulting in “thermal” effects. Exposure to lower levels of RF radiation might also cause other biological effects.The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to account for the environmental effects of their proposed actions; a “major Federal action” requires an environmental impact statement, 42 U.S.C. 4332(C). If it is unclear whether a proposed action will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment,” the agency may prepare a limited environmental assessment. An agency may also use “categorical exclusions.” Pursuant to NEPA, the FCC has guidelines for human exposure to RF radiation, last updated in 1996. In 2013, the FCC issued a notice of inquiry regarding the adequacy of its guidelines and sought comments on five issues in response to changes in the ubiquity of wireless devices and in scientific standards and research. In 2019, the FCC issued a final order, declining to undertake any of the changes contemplated in the notice of inquiry.The D.C. Circuit remanded. The FCC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its determination that its guidelines adequately protect against the harmful effects of exposure to radiofrequency radiation unrelated to cancer. View "Environmental Health Trust v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

In 2008, four long-term care hospitals that treat patients who are dually eligible for the Medicare and Medicaid programs were denied reimbursement by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for “bad debts,” unpaid coinsurances and deductibles owed by patients. The Secretary denied reimbursement on the grounds that the hospitals failed to comply with the “must-bill” policy, 42 C.F.R. 413.89(e)(2), which requires hospitals to bill the state Medicaid program to determine whether Medicaid will cover the bad debts first, and obtain a “remittance advice” indicating whether the state “refuses payment,” before seeking reimbursement under Medicare. uring the relevant time period, the hospitals were not enrolled in Medicaid and were unable to bill their state Medicaid programs; they claim they were previously reimbursed and that there was an abrupt policy change.The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Secretary, concluding that substantial evidence supported a finding that there was no change in policy. The court rejected arguments that the denial decision impermissibly required them to enroll in Medicaid, despite the fact that Medicaid participation is voluntary, and was arbitrary. View "New LifeCare Hospitals of North Carolina LLC v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Bellion produces and distributes vodka that is infused with NTX, a proprietary blend that Bellion contends mitigates alcohol’s damage to a person’s DNA. Bellion filed a petition with the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), the agency that regulates alcoholic beverage labeling and advertising, to determine whether Bellion could lawfully make certain claims about NTX on labels and in advertisements. TTB found that the claims were scientifically unsubstantiated and misleading so that including them on vodka labels and in advertisements would violate the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. 201, and TTB’s regulations.Bellion filed suit, alleging that TTB’s denial of the petition violated Bellion’s First Amendment rights and that the standards under which TTB rejected the proposed NTX claims are unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted TTB summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. In making its decision, TTB did not rubber-stamp the FDA’s analysis of the scientific evidence or delegate final decision-making authority to the FDA. Bellion’s proposed claims are misleading and can be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment. Bellion received a clear response from TTB about why its proposed claims were denied. Bellion cannot bring an as-applied vagueness challenge to the regulation; its facial challenge to the regulation is without merit. View "Bellion Spirits, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

A 2015 auction for electrical capacity (commitments by power plants to provide electricity to utilities in the future) in Illinois produced a striking result. Capacity in neighboring regions uniformly sold for less than $3.50 per megawatt-day; in a region covering much of Illinois, the auction resulted in capacity prices of $150 per megawatt-day, a nearly ninefold increase from the prior year’s price of $16.75. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission identified numerous problems with the existing auction rules and ordered that the rules be changed prospectively. FERC also launched an investigation into potential market manipulation in the 2015 Auction but later ruled that the identified flaws in the auction rules and the high price range those rules established, plus the allegations of market manipulation, did not call into question the 2015 Auction or the price it produced.The D.C. Circuit granted a petition for review in part. Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791, FERC need not approve every auction price before it goes into effect. That is not what the market-based rate scheme requires. However, FERC’s analysis of the 2015 Auction, was arbitrary and capricious; it failed to adequately explain why the problems it identified in the existing auction rules affecting pricing— problems it ordered fixed going forward—did not also affect the fairness of the 2015 Auction. View "Public Citizen, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Gaskins served almost eight years of a 22-year sentence on a narcotics conspiracy charge before the D.C. Circuit reversed his conviction for insufficient evidence in 2012. At his trial, Gaskins had invoked his constitutional right not to testify. After the reversal of his conviction, he sought limited discovery and a chance to testify in support of his motion for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513, a prerequisite to a claim against the government for compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The district court denied the certificate of innocence without acting on Gaskins’ motion for discovery.The D.C. Circuit vacated. A failure to prove criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt requires acquittal but does not necessarily establish innocence. On a motion for a certificate of innocence, the burden is on the claimant to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court erred by denying Gaskins’ motion for a certificate of innocence without addressing his procedural motion. The key issue bearing on whether Gaskins is entitled to the certificate concerns his state of mind--whether he agreed to work with co-conspirators with the specific intent to distribute drugs. His actions, as established by the trial evidence, do not add up to the charged offenses unless he agreed to join the conspiracy. The court declined to reassign the case. View "United States v. Gaskins" on Justia Law

The Union and AT&T entered into a contract governing certification of the Union to represent non-management employees and the relationship between the parties, requiring the parties to arbitrate disputes over “the description of an appropriate unit for bargaining” and the definition of “nonmanagement” employees. All other disputes arising under the contract “shall not be subject to arbitration.” Disputes that are subject to arbitration must “be submitted to arbitration administered by, and in accordance with, the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).” The AAA’s Labor Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his own jurisdiction, “including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.” After AT&T acquired Time Warner, the Union initiated discussions about “appropriate potential bargaining units in the newly acquired company.” The parties could not reach an agreement. The Union sought to compel arbitration. The district court dismissed, finding the dispute did not lie within the categories of arbitrable disputes, and that it (as opposed to the arbitrator) could make that threshold determination.The D.C. Circuit vacated. The agreement delegates threshold questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The question of whether the parties’ dispute falls within the contract’s arbitration clause, then, is for an arbitrator, not a court, to decide. The district court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the dispute must be submitted to arbitration. View "Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. AT&T Inc." on Justia Law

Radmanesh, a U.S. citizen born in 1969, lived in Iran, 1978-1986. In 1979, armed members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a military arm of the Iranian government, stormed into the family home and accused Radmanesh’s father of treason. The family was threatened with execution unless the father trained Iranians as engineers. Radmanesh was forced to attend an Iranian-run school, where his classmates physically abused him while chanting “Death to Americans.” Members of a youth paramilitary organization beat Radmanesh. One beating sent Radmanesh to the hospital with broken ribs, lacerations, and a concussion. In 1986, Radmanesh was conscripted to fight in the Iran-Iraq War. Radmanesh’s commander told him that he was being sent to die as a martyr for Islam and forced Radmanesh at gunpoint to shoot and kill a sleeping Iraqi soldier. Radmanesh was diagnosed with PTSD and, while on leave, escaped to the United States.Radmanesh sued Iran and the IRGC, alleging hostage-taking, torture, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against Iran, finding that Radmanesh failed to establish that this case falls within the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1604. What Radmanesh endured during the Iran-Iraq War was no different from the hardships that soldiers routinely suffer during wartime. The events that occurred before the war were not severe enough to amount to torture. View "Radmanesh v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

In 2009, Finberg became the Chief Operating Officer of Adams, a produce distributor. Grinstead was Adams’s CEO. In 2011, federal authorities investigated Adams for fraud against the Department of Defense. Finberg claims he was unaware of the scheme until later when suppliers and Adams’s CFO discussed the scheme in front of him. Finberg agreed to gradually end the scheme to avoid further detection. Adams hired a law firm to internally investigate its operations, which revealed that CEO Grinstead had engaged in extensive fraud. PNC Bank froze the business’s accounts; Adams was unable to promptly pay suppliers $10 million. Adams declared bankruptcy. Grinstead pled guilty to wire fraud, misprision of felony, and multiple failures to file tax returns. Finberg pled guilty to misprision of a felony. A disciplinary complaint was filed against Adams with the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, alleging violation of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. 499b(4), by failing to promptly pay suppliers. The determination that Adams violated the Act triggered the Act’s employment bar for each person who was responsibly connected to the violation.An ALJ found that Finberg was responsibly connected. A USDA Judicial Officer affirmed, finding that Finberg exercised judgment, discretion, or control once he learned of the fraudulent scheme and failed to report. The D.C. Circuit reversed The agency lacked substantial evidence that Finberg’s activities contributed to Adam’’s violation of the Act. View "Finberg v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authorized the construction and operation of three liquified natural gas (LNG) export terminals on the shores of the Brownsville Shipping Channel in Cameron County, Texas, and the construction and operation of two 135-mile pipelines that will carry LNG to one of those terminals. Objectors filed challenges under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C); the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717b(a).The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition concerning the Annova Terminal as moot, and granted the petitions with respect to the Rio Grande and Texas Terminals, without vacatur. The Commission’s analyses of the projects’ impacts on climate change and environmental justice communities were deficient under NEPA and the APA, and the Commission failed to justify its determinations of public interest and convenience under Sections 3 and 7 of the NGA. On remand, the Commission must explain whether 40 C.F.R. 1502.21(c) requires it to apply the social cost of carbon protocol or some other analytical framework, as “generally accepted in the scientific community” within the meaning of the regulation, and if not, why not. View "Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Alaska Communications provides telecommunications services throughout Alaska and in Oregon. While most of the company’s employees are based in Alaska, some are in Oregon. The union that represents a majority of the company’s employees did not previously represent any of the Oregon-based employees and sought to hold a representation election among a subset of the Oregon-based employees. The National Labor Relations Board certified a voting group that differed slightly from the petitioned-for unit, 29 U.S.C. 157, and that group voted to join the preexisting bargaining unit. The petitioned-for unit encompassed 12 Cable Systems Group employees, including both Holmes and Pavlenko. The Board excluded those individuals as being supervisors and added the only two employees who had not been included in the petition, finding that their exclusion “would unduly fragment the workforce and render the proposed Voting Group an irrational and indistinct one.”The D.C. Circuit rejected the company’s challenge to the certification of the voting group. The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Board. The Board permissibly adjusted the composition of the voting group and permissibly determined that the group shares a community of interest with the preexisting bargaining unit it voted to join. View "Alaska Communications Systems Holdings, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law