Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, a private insurance company, TIG Insurance Company, sought to enforce two judgments against the Republic of Argentina. The dispute centers on whether Argentina, as the successor to a state-owned Argentine company, Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, is liable under reinsurance contracts that Caja entered into with TIG in 1979. TIG alleged that Caja failed to pay as promised under these contracts, leading to arbitral awards and subsequent judgments in TIG's favor.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Argentina, finding that Argentina's property was immune from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because it was not used for commercial activity at the time the writ would issue. The court also held that the Illinois district court lacked jurisdiction over Argentina for the 2018 judgment and that TIG needed to amend the 2001 judgment in Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in D.C. TIG appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that two FSIA exceptions—the arbitration and waiver exceptions—might apply. The court held that an agreement could be "made by" a sovereign if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate, even if the sovereign was not an original signatory. The court also found that implied waiver does not require evidence of subjective intent but can be based on objective actions, such as agreeing to arbitration or a choice-of-law clause. The court vacated the district court's decisions and remanded for further analysis and factfinding on these issues.The appellate court affirmed the denial of TIG's request for jurisdictional discovery and precluded TIG from advancing an alter ego theory or arguing that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive pleading. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's instructions. View "TIG Insurance Company v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

In a dispute between the Republic of Djibouti and Doraleh Container Terminal (Doraleh), Doraleh secured a $474 million arbitral award against Djibouti. Djibouti then nationalized a majority interest in Doraleh and appointed a provisional administrator, Chantal Tadoral, to manage the company. Quinn Emanuel, a law firm, sought to enforce the arbitral award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming to represent Doraleh. However, Tadoral stated she did not authorize the filing, and Djibouti requested the case be dismissed.The District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Doraleh, holding that Quinn Emanuel’s authority was irrelevant or, alternatively, that Djibouti had forfeited the issue by not raising it during arbitration. Djibouti appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not determining whether Quinn Emanuel had the authority to represent Doraleh.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that Quinn Emanuel’s authority is relevant and that the issue of a lawyer’s authority can be challenged at any point in litigation. The court found that Djibouti presented substantial evidence questioning Quinn Emanuel’s authority, which required the district court to determine whether the law firm had the authority to file the suit. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to determine Quinn Emanuel’s authority to represent Doraleh. View "Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. Republic of Djibouti" on Justia Law

The case involves People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and two animal rights advocates, Madeline Krasno and Ryan Hartkopf, who frequently commented on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) social media pages to criticize NIH’s funding of animal testing. NIH used keyword filters to automatically hide comments containing specific words like “animal,” “testing,” and “cruel,” which resulted in the appellants' comments being filtered out and not viewable to the public. The appellants argued that NIH’s policy violated the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the comment threads on NIH’s social media pages were limited public forums and upheld NIH’s speech restrictions as reasonable. The court found that the restrictions were viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the forum's purpose. The appellants then appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that NIH’s comment threads are limited public forums. However, the court held that NIH’s “off-topic” restriction, as implemented through its keyword filters, was not reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and was therefore unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court found that the restriction lacked objective, workable standards and was inflexible and unresponsive to context, which made it unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and summary judgment was directed in favor of the appellants. View "People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Tabak" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a certificate to Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC (Transco) to construct and operate a pipeline through several states, including New Jersey. The New Jersey Conservation Foundation and other petitioners argued that FERC overlooked significant environmental consequences and failed to consider evidence of a lack of market need for the pipeline. They also contended that FERC ignored New Jersey state laws mandating reductions in natural gas consumption.The lower court, FERC, approved the pipeline project, finding that the public benefits outweighed the adverse impacts. FERC based its decision on precedent agreements with local gas distribution companies (LDCs) and concluded that the project satisfied the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Petitioners requested a rehearing, arguing that FERC's decision was arbitrary and capricious. FERC denied the rehearing request, maintaining its position on market need and environmental impact assessments.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that FERC acted arbitrarily by not adequately explaining its decision regarding the significance of greenhouse gas emissions and failing to discuss possible mitigation measures. The court also held that FERC did not properly consider evidence showing that current capacity was sufficient to meet New Jersey's natural gas demands and that the precedent agreements with LDCs did not necessarily indicate market need. Additionally, the court found that FERC misinterpreted New Jersey's mandatory energy efficiency laws as unenforceable.The court vacated FERC's orders and remanded the case for further action, requiring FERC to reassess the market need and environmental impacts of the pipeline project. View "New Jersey Conservation Foundation v. FERC" on Justia Law

Exxon Mobil Corporation owned subsidiaries in Cuba that had various oil and gas assets. In 1960, the Cuban government expropriated these assets without compensating Exxon. In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue those who traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. Exxon sued three state-owned defendants, alleging they trafficked in the confiscated property by participating in the oil industry and operating service stations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied one defendant's motion to dismiss based on foreign sovereign immunity. The court held that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and jurisdiction depends on an FSIA exception. The court found that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply but that the commercial-activity exception did. The court allowed limited jurisdictional discovery for the other two defendants and later denied their motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not confer jurisdiction and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception is inapplicable. However, the court concluded that the district court needed to undertake additional analysis before determining that jurisdiction exists under the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception. The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further analysis on the applicability of the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba)" on Justia Law

The case involves the Western Coal Traffic League (the League), a coalition of coal shippers, petitioning for a writ of mandamus to compel the Surface Transportation Board (the Board) to take action on a proceeding related to the concept of "revenue adequacy" in freight rail shipping rates. The Board had opened an informational docket in April 2014 to gather public comments on how it calculates and applies revenue adequacy in rate cases. Over the next six years, the Board collected information through written comments and public hearings but had not issued a decision since February 2020. The League participated in the hearings and submitted comments advocating for changes to the Board's framework.The League filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in May 2023, arguing that the Board's delay in responding to the comments was unreasonable and requesting the court to compel the Board to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking or issue a final decision within 90 days. The League relied on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to argue that the Board's inaction was a clear violation of its duty to act promptly.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy reserved for clear violations of a duty to act. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ because the Board's management of the Revenue Adequacy docket did not constitute a "final order" subject to judicial review under the Hobbs Act. The Board had convened the proceeding solely to gather public comments without any statutory duty or plans to undertake a rulemaking or specific regulatory action. Consequently, the court dismissed the League's petition for mandamus for lack of jurisdiction. View "In re: Western Coal Traffic League" on Justia Law

Naquel Henderson pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(1) and (b)(1). After his plea but before sentencing, the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States held that the government must prove a defendant knew they possessed a firearm and belonged to a prohibited category. Henderson did not appeal directly but later moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and voluntary.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Henderson's motion, finding he failed to show cause for procedural default, actual prejudice, or actual innocence. The court noted that Henderson knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm, as evidenced by his prior conviction and interactions with the judicial system.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Henderson did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial if informed of the Rehaif decision. The court found substantial evidence that Henderson knew of his felon status, including his prior guilty plea to attempted robbery and subsequent charges for firearm possession. Consequently, Henderson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing plea failed, as he could not show actual prejudice or actual innocence. The court affirmed the denial of Henderson's motion to vacate his conviction. View "USA v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Andres Cabezas was arrested in an FBI sting operation in 2017 and later pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. While his appeal was pending, he submitted FOIA requests to the FBI for records related to his case. After six months without a response, Cabezas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking the release of the requested records. The FBI eventually released some records but withheld others, citing various FOIA exemptions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FBI, finding that it had conducted a reasonable search and properly withheld documents under FOIA and the Privacy Act.Cabezas appealed the district court's decision, challenging the adequacy of the FBI's search and the justification for withholding records. He also contested the denial of his motions for limited discovery and in camera review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the FBI had made a good faith effort to conduct a reasonable search, using appropriate methods and search terms. The court also found that the FBI's affidavits provided a detailed account of the search process and the reasons for withholding certain records.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the FBI had conducted a reasonable search and properly invoked FOIA exemptions to withhold certain records. The court also upheld the denial of Cabezas's motions for limited discovery and in camera review, finding no abuse of discretion. The court concluded that Cabezas had not provided sufficient evidence to challenge the adequacy of the FBI's search or the validity of the exemptions claimed. View "Cabezas v. FBI" on Justia Law

In February 2021, a severe cold snap hit the central United States, causing widespread power outages and fatalities. This event highlighted the need for improved grid reliability. The Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), which manages the electrical grid in the region, proposed changes to its capacity market to address these issues. MISO's new system includes seasonal capacity markets, a revised method for calculating generator capacity, and new rules for generator outages. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved these changes.Entergy Arkansas, LLC, along with other companies, petitioned for review of FERC's approval, arguing that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Entergy challenged three main aspects: the new method for calculating generator capacity, the requirement for generator owners to replace capacity if offline for more than 31 days in a season, and the 120-day notice requirement for planned outages. Entergy was supported by several intervenors, including public utilities commissions and the East Texas Electric Cooperative.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that FERC had adequately explained its approval of MISO's changes. FERC's reliance on a study showing the new methodology's accuracy was deemed reasonable. The court also upheld the 31-day capacity replacement rule and the 120-day notice requirement, finding that FERC had provided sufficient rationale for these rules. The court denied Entergy's petitions for review and did not address issues raised solely by the intervenors. The court concluded that FERC's decisions were not arbitrary or capricious and were supported by substantial evidence. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Federal agents seized packages containing noncompliant plant and animal products shipped to Amazon fulfillment centers in the U.S. by overseas sellers. The Department of Agriculture concluded that Amazon, by providing its fulfillment services, had aided, abetted, caused, or induced the unlawful importation of these products and imposed a $1 million fine on Amazon.The case was initially reviewed by an administrative law judge (ALJ) who granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, finding that Amazon had unlawfully imported the products by aiding, abetting, causing, or inducing their importation. The ALJ rejected Amazon's argument that it was unaware of the sellers' noncompliance, stating that neither bad intent nor any mens rea was required for liability. The Judicial Officer of the Department affirmed the ALJ's decision, concluding that Amazon's conduct fell within the scope of the statutes and that Amazon had substantially assisted the importations with knowledge.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and set aside the Department's order. The court held that civil aiding-and-abetting liability generally requires conscious and culpable participation in unlawful conduct. The Plant Protection Act and Animal Health Protection Act incorporate this understanding. The court found that Amazon's provision of a neutral fulfillment service did not amount to conscious and culpable participation in the sellers' wrongdoing. Therefore, the court granted Amazon's petition for review, vacated the Department's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Amazon Services LLC v. AGRI" on Justia Law