Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Adam Steele and Krystal Comer, tax return preparers, challenged the IRS's requirement to obtain or renew a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) by completing Form W-12, which involves paying a fee and disclosing personal information. They initially joined a class action in 2014 contesting the IRS's authority to impose these fees and the amount of information required by Form W-12. However, class counsel later withdrew these claims. Steele and Comer then attempted to revive these claims in a separate lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed their complaint, citing the rule against claim-splitting, which prevents duplicative litigation between the same parties asserting the same claims, even without a final judgment in the first case. The district court found that Steele and Comer had already raised and then withdrawn these claims in the ongoing class action and were denied leave to amend the complaint to reassert them.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) does not bar judicial review of the IRS's authority to demand information through Form W-12, but the rule against claim-splitting still precludes the plaintiffs' suit. The court emphasized that claim-splitting bars duplicative litigation filed before final judgment and that Steele and Comer had a fair opportunity to litigate their claims in the earlier class action. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal was proper to prevent strategic end runs around procedural rulings and to preserve the integrity of the adjudicative process. View "Steele v. United States" on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. ("Crowley") entered into a contract with the Department of Defense United States Transportation Command ("USTRANSCOM") in 2016 to provide transportation coordination services, which involved hiring motor carriers to transport freight. The General Services Administration ("GSA"), not a party to the contract, began auditing Crowley's bills under a provision of the Transportation Act of 1940, claiming Crowley overbilled USTRANSCOM by millions of dollars. GSA sought to recover these overcharges by garnishing future payments to Crowley.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Crowley's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims, holding that the claims were essentially contractual and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that Crowley's suit was not a contract claim and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court held that GSA could audit both carriers and non-carriers but agreed with Crowley that the USTRANSCOM Contracting Officer's interpretations governed any GSA audits. The court enjoined GSA from issuing Notices of Overcharge ("NOCs") contrary to the Contracting Officer's determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that 31 U.S.C. § 3726(b) allows GSA to audit only bills presented by carriers and freight forwarders. The court found that Crowley is not a carrier because it does not physically transport freight nor is it contractually bound to help perform the movement of goods. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision on the scope of § 3726(b) and remanded for further proceedings, permanently enjoining GSA from conducting postpayment audits of Crowley's bills. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with six intelligence agencies seeking documents related to the upstreaming and unmasking of forty-eight named current and former members of congressional intelligence committees from January 1, 2008, to January 15, 2020. All six agencies issued Glomar responses, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of such records, citing multiple FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 1 for classified national security materials. The Project challenged these responses in court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies, concluding that the Glomar responses were proper under FOIA’s first exemption. The court found that the agencies were not required to search for responsive documents before issuing their Glomar responses and that the agencies' affidavits sufficiently supported their responses.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the agencies' Glomar responses were justified under Exemption 1, which allows withholding information that is classified under criteria established by an Executive order. The court found that the agencies' affidavits provided specific, logical, and plausible justifications for the Glomar responses, explaining that disclosing the existence or nonexistence of the requested records could harm national security by revealing intelligence sources, methods, and priorities. The court also rejected the Project's argument that the agencies were required to search for records before issuing Glomar responses, citing precedent that an agency need not search its records before invoking Glomar. View "Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Two Mauritian mining companies, Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. and Amari Nickel Holdings Zimbabwe Ltd., filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and Zimbabwe’s Chief Mining Commissioner. The plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce a judgment from the High Court of Zambia, which confirmed an arbitral award issued in Zambia. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived their immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) through the arbitration exception and the implied waiver exception.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on the scope of the FSIA exceptions. The court determined that the arbitration exception did not apply because it covers actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize and enforce foreign court judgments. However, the district court held that the implied waiver exception applied, reasoning that by signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in Zambia, the defendants waived their immunity from the action to recognize a foreign court judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the arbitration exception did not apply, as the exception covers only actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize foreign court judgments. The court also concluded that the implied waiver exception did not apply, as signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in a signatory state did not demonstrate an intent to waive immunity from judgment recognition actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction, vacated the remaining orders, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp." on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approved over 4,000 permits for oil and gas wells on public land in New Mexico and Wyoming from January 2021 to August 2022. Environmental organizations challenged these permits, alleging that BLM failed to adequately consider the climate and environmental justice impacts of the wells. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The plaintiffs appealed, asserting standing based on affidavits from their members who live, work, and recreate near the drilling sites, claiming injuries to their health, safety, and recreational and aesthetic interests. They also claimed standing based on the wells' overall contribution to global climate change and an organizational injury from the government's failure to publicize information about climate change.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently link their alleged harms to the specific agency actions they sought to reverse. The court emphasized that plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each challenged permit by showing a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. The court found that the plaintiffs' generalized claims about the harms of oil and gas development were insufficient to establish standing for the specific permits at issue.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims of organizational standing, finding that the alleged injuries were limited to issue advocacy and did not demonstrate a concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Tobias Jones, a self-described citizen journalist, was filming a Secret Service building in Washington, D.C. when two officers ordered him to stop. When he refused, they detained, handcuffed, and searched him. A third officer later informed Jones that he had the right to film, and he was released. Jones sued the officers for damages, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought prospective relief against the Secret Service.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Jones' case. The court held that Jones did not have a valid cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jones' Fourth Amendment claims presented a new context under Bivens, as the Secret Service officers were performing protective duties, which differ from the law enforcement activities in Bivens. The court found that extending Bivens to this new context was inappropriate due to the potential for judicial intrusion into executive functions and the availability of alternative remedies through the Department of Homeland Security. The court also declined to extend Bivens to Jones' First Amendment claim, noting that the Supreme Court has never done so and has foreclosed Bivens remedies for First Amendment retaliation claims.Regarding prospective relief, the court held that Jones lacked standing because he did not plausibly allege a substantial risk of future harm. The court noted that Jones' allegations of potential future encounters with Secret Service officers were speculative and insufficient to establish standing.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jones' case. View "Jones v. Secret Service" on Justia Law

Gary Sebastian Brown, III filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the FBI for witness accounts related to the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. Brown argued that the FBI's search was inadequate and that it improperly withheld information. The FBI initially provided 19 pages of previously released documents and, after Brown's dissatisfaction, conducted a new search, locating 411 pages. The FBI withheld some records under FOIA Exemption 7(A) due to a pending investigation. After the investigation concluded, the FBI released 406 pages, redacting some information under various FOIA exemptions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI, finding that the FBI's search was adequate and that its redactions were consistent with FOIA. Brown appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the FBI's search was reasonable and that it properly construed Brown's request for "witness accounts, narratives, or statements" as seeking formal witness interviews. The court also found that the FBI's invocation of FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D) to withhold personal information and information provided by confidential sources was justified. The court noted that the FBI adequately explained the foreseeable harms from disclosure and that the redactions were not overbroad.The court also upheld the district court's decision to deny in camera review of the redactions, finding no evidence of bad faith or contradictions in the FBI's declaration. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the FBI's actions complied with FOIA requirements. View "Brown v. FBI" on Justia Law

Respondents Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak bin ‘Atash, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi are being tried by military commission at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for their roles in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In July 2024, they entered into pretrial agreements to plead guilty in exchange for the government not seeking the death penalty. However, on August 2, 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III withdrew from these agreements.The military commission judge and the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) refused to recognize the Secretary’s withdrawal, ruling that the respondents had begun to perform under the agreements. The CMCR denied the government’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and the military judge scheduled the entry of the respondents’ pleas. The government then sought relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary of Defense had the legal authority to withdraw from the pretrial agreements. The court found that the respondents had not begun performance of promises contained in the agreements, as their actions did not constitute the beginning of performance under the agreements' terms. The court concluded that the government had no adequate alternative remedy and that the equities warranted the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition. Consequently, the court granted the government’s petition, vacated the military judge’s order preventing the Secretary’s withdrawal, and prohibited the military judge from conducting hearings to enter guilty pleas under the withdrawn agreements. View "In re: United States of America" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor (DoL) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in 2019 to amend its 2010 regulations regarding the H-2A visa program. In January 2021, during the final days of the Trump Administration, the DoL announced a final rule and submitted it to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication. However, the rule was withdrawn by the DoL under the Biden Administration before it was made available for public inspection. In 2022, the DoL issued a new rule based on the 2019 NPRM.The National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) challenged the withdrawal of the 2021 rule and the promulgation of the 2022 rule, arguing that the 2021 rule was unlawfully repealed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the NCAE lacked standing to challenge the withdrawal of the 2021 rule but had standing to challenge the 2022 rule. The court denied the NCAE's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted the DoL's cross-motion for summary judgment, determining that the 2021 rule had not become final because it was never made available for public inspection by the OFR.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the rulemaking process culminated in the 2022 rule. The court determined that a substantive rule is not final until the OFR makes it available for public inspection. Since the 2021 rule was withdrawn before it became final, the DoL did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the 2022 rule without a new round of notice and comment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "National Council of Agricultural Employers v. DOL" on Justia Law

Energy Harbor, LLC, the owner and operator of the W.H. Sammis power plant, was assessed $12 million in penalties by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. for failing to comply with PJM’s Tariff during a major winter storm in December 2022. Energy Harbor contested these penalties, arguing that the penalties were inconsistent with the terms of the Tariff, particularly the exception for maintenance outages. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied Energy Harbor’s complaint, leading Energy Harbor to petition for judicial review.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed Energy Harbor’s complaint and found that PJM had correctly interpreted the Tariff and calculated the penalties. FERC concluded that the maintenance outage at the Sammis Plant was not the sole cause of the performance shortfall, as the plant had sufficient capacity to meet its commitments but failed due to forced outages. Energy Harbor’s request for rehearing was denied by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decision. The court agreed with FERC’s interpretation of the Tariff, stating that PJM correctly evaluated whether the maintenance outage was the sole cause of the performance shortfall. The court found that the Sammis Plant had enough installed capacity to meet its expected performance during the emergency, and the forced outages were also causes of the shortfall. The court also rejected Energy Harbor’s argument that the penalty exception should be assessed for each generating unit, affirming that the entire Sammis Plant was the resource at issue. Consequently, the court denied Energy Harbor’s petition for review. View "Energy Harbor, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law