Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In consolidated petitions for review, RadNet challenges the Board's decisions finding unfair labor practices based on RadNet's refusal to bargain with the Union on behalf of six separate bargaining units, each representing certain technical workers employed at a different RadNet facility in Southern California. RadNet contends that all six certifications are marred by defects in election procedure, election misconduct, or underlying representation issues.The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that the Regional Director did not abuse its discretion in determining that certain Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Technologists and Nuclear Technologists were not guards within the meaning of section 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); RadNet's claim that the elections were a priori defective because they were conducted pursuant to the Board's 2014 revised election rules lacks merit; although the Board abused its discretion in choosing to postpone the counting of ballots and the disclosure of results until the conclusion of voting in all ten of the individual unit elections, the error was harmless; the Board did not abuse its discretion by overruling RadNet's union affiliation objection, and in any event, RadNet has shown no prejudice; even assuming the veracity of RadNet's factual allegations, the court was unpersuaded that the Board abused its discretion in overruling the four separate objections concerning the conduct of individual elections, and the court saw no specific evidence of prejudice to the fairness of the election; and the Board did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment to the General Counsel without allowing relitigation of certain underlying representation issues. View "RadNet Management, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

VoteVets claims that the Federal Advisory Committee Act applies to an entity allegedly established by President Trump and the Department of Veterans Affairs to advise the Department. VoteVets calls the entity the "Mar-a-Lago Council." VoteVets alleged that although the Council operated for nearly two years and provided advice on various topics, the Department failed to comply with the Act's requirements.After determining that VoteVets has standing to sue, the DC Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of VoteVets' complaint, concluding that VoteVets plausibly alleges that the Council was a governmentally established or utilized advisory group within the meaning of the Act. In this case, the complaint states a claim under the Act based on the alleged advisory committee having been "established" by the President, possibly together with the agency. The court need not reach VoteVets' alternative theory that the group was "utilized" by the government. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "VoteVets Action Fund v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. 801, requires the Secretary of the Department of Labor, through the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), to negotiate mine-specific ventilation plans with companies that operate the mines. In 2006-2018, Knight Hawk Coal operated its Prairie Eagle Mine pursuant to an MSHA-approved ventilation plan that permitted perimeter mining with 40-foot perimeter cuts. In 2018, MSHA conducted a ventilation survey at Prairie Eagle and concluded that the approved plan did not adequately ventilate the perimeter cuts. MSHA relied primarily on the results of chemical smoke tests, which involved survey team members observing smoke movement from a 44-foot distance. Months later, MSHA revoked the Prairie Eagle ventilation plan. After receiving a technical citation from MSHA for operating without an approved plan, Knight Hawk sought review by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.The Commission’s ALJ found the revocation arbitrary and capricious, in part because the chemical smoke test results were unreliable and inconsistent and the Secretary ignored disagreements among MSHA ventilation survey team members regarding the results. The ALJ reinstated the previously-approved ventilation plan. The Commission affirmed, concluding that the Secretary failed to explain adequately why the existing ventilation plan was deficient. The D.C. Circuit denied the Secretary’s petition for review, finding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding. View "Secretary of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Klayman founded Judicial Watch in 1994 and was its general counsel until 2003. Following a 2013 complaint to the D.C. Bar, a Hearing Committee concluded that Klayman violated Professional Conduct Rules 8.4(d) and 1.9. One client, a former Judicial Watch employee, had alleged a hostile work environment. Klayman had advised Judicial Watch about her complaints. After Klayman left Judicial Watch and without seeking its consent, he entered an appearance on her behalf. Another client was a Judicial Watch donor, seeking the return of her donation, represented by Klayman without consent. The third client, a former Judicial Watch client, sued Judicial Watch; Klayman entered an appearance without seeking consent.The Hearing Committee found that Klayman violated Rule 1.9 or its Florida equivalent in all three representations, Klayman’s representation of the third client violated Rule 8.4(d), by “[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice,” and that Klayman gave false testimony before the Committee. The Committee recommended a 90-day suspension, with reinstatement contingent upon a showing of his fitness to practice law. The Board on Professional Responsibility agreed with respect to Rule 1.9 but disagreed concerning Rule 8.4(d) and false testimony. It rejected the reinstatement condition. Suspended for 90 days by the D.C. Court of Appeals, Klayman did not challenge the Rule 1.9 finding but sought to avoid reciprocal discipline. The D.C. Circuit imposed a reciprocal 90-day suspension and referred the matter to the Committee on Admissions and Grievances for recommendations on whether further discipline is warranted. View "In re: Klayman" on Justia Law

In 2012, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service scientists discovered that endangered mussels were dying on the banks of Indiana's Tippecanoe River. The Service focused on the upstream Oakdale Dam, which significantly restricts the flow of water downstream in order to generate hydroelectricity and to create a lake. The Service worked with Oakdale's operator to develop new procedures that would require the dam to release more water during droughts. After a lengthy process of interagency cooperation and public dialogue, the new procedures were approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which has licensing authority over hydroelectric dams on federally regulated waters.Local governmental entities sought review of the Commission’s decision and the Service’s Biological Opinion upon which the Commission relied. The D.C. Circuit affirmed in part. The court rejected some challenges to the validity of the Biological Opinion, which were not raised on rehearing before the Commission. There was otherwise no error in the agencies’ expert scientific analyses. The agencies failed to adequately explain why the new dam procedures do not violate a regulation prohibiting the Service from requiring more than “minor” changes to the Commission’s proposal for dam operations. Because vacating the agencies’ decisions would subject the dam operator to contradictory legal obligations imposed by separate agencies, the court remanded to the Commission without vacatur for further proceedings. View "Shafer & Freeman Lakes Environmental Conservation Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit considered an appeal of a pretrial detention order issued after a magistrate judge had previously ordered the two appellants released pursuant to a lengthy set of stringent conditions. After appellants, Eric Munchel and his mother, Lisa Eisenhart, participated in the January 6, 2021 incident at the Capitol, a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Munchel and Eisenhart with obstruction of an official proceeding; Munchel with unlawful entry while armed with a dangerous weapon, and violent entry while armed with a dangerous weapon; and Eisenhart with aiding and abetting unlawful entry while armed with a dangerous weapon, and aiding and abetting violent entry while armed with a dangerous weapon.The court need not reach appellants' contention that the district court erred in not deferring to the magistrate judge's factual findings as to their dangerousness where the situation here was more akin to a new hearing in light of the substantial additional evidence the government submitted to the district judge that had not been presented to the magistrate judge. The court rejected the argument that the district court inappropriately relied on a finding that appellants were unlikely to abide by release conditions to detain them, because that factor is applicable only to revocation of pretrial release. The court also rejected the argument that the charged offenses do not authorize detention.However, the court concluded that the district court did not demonstrate that it adequately considered, in light of all the record evidence, whether Munchel and Eisenhart present an identified and articulable threat to the community. In this case, the district court did not adequately demonstrate that it considered whether Munchel and Eisenhart posed an articulable threat to the community in view of their conduct on January 6, and the particular circumstances of January 6, and failed to demonstrate that it considered the specific circumstances that made it possible, on January 6, for Munchel and Eisenhart to threaten the peaceful transfer of power. Accordingly, the court remanded for further factfinding.Finally, the court rejected appellants' contention that the government's proffer of dangerousness should be weighed against the fact that the government did not seek detention of other defendants where these facts and circumstances are best evaluated by the district court in the first instance. View "United States v. Munchel" on Justia Law

After the Commissioner issued tax adjustments to the partnership of BCP, members of BCP, themselves limited partnerships, challenged the adjustments, arguing they were untimely and that the Commissioner mistakenly determined that the investment partnership was a sham. The tax court found the adjustments timely and upheld the Commissioner's adjustments.The DC Circuit concluded that the tax court applied correct legal precedent and committed no clear error in its findings upholding the Commissioner's tax adjustments. The court explained that the tax court outlined various events that occurred before the taxpayers' individual extensions or the partnership extension were signed, all of which would have put the taxpayers on notice that they should not rely on E&Y's advice any longer. The court also concluded that there was no error in the tax court's determination that BCP was a "sham" partnership. The court explained that the tax court correctly applied Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964), to determine whether the parties intended to, and did in fact, join together for the present conduct of an undertaking or enterprise. In this case, the tax court correctly concluded that BCP failed the Luna analysis. Finally, the court concluded that the tax court did not abuse its discretion in denying a non-participating party's intervention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the tax court's judgment. View "BCP Trading and Investments, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two former Liberian officials, allege that Global Witness, an international human rights organization, published a report falsely implying that they had accepted bribes in connection with the sale of an oil license for an offshore plot owned by Liberia. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failing to plausibly allege malice. The court concluded that the First Amendment provides broad protections for speech about public figures, and the former officials have failed to allege that Global Witness exceeded the bounds of those protections. In this case, plaintiffs advanced several interlocking theories to support the allegation of malice, but the court agreed with the district court that these theories fail to support a plausible claim that Global Witness acted with actual malice. View "Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc." on Justia Law

Ranchers in the Upper Klamath Basin region filed suit to prevent the exercise of water rights that interfere with the irrigation of their lands. The district court dismissed the complaint based on lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution.The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal and concluded that the Protocol Agreement executed by the United States and the Tribes does not delegate federal authority to the Tribes but recognizes the Tribes' preexisting authority to control their water rights under a Treaty in 1864 with the United States. The court explained that there is no concurrence requirement imposed by federal law on the Tribes' reserved instream water rights, whether by the 1864 Klamath Treaty or the federal government’s trust relationship; the McCarran Amendment subjects the Tribes' reserved water rights to state procedural rules in its quantification proceedings, but the substance and scope of the Tribes’ rights remain governed by federal law; Oregon law does not require federal government concurrence to enforce the Tribes' water rights; and thus invalidating the Protocol, and requiring the federal government to independently assess whether it would concur in the Tribes' calls, would not remedy the Ranchers' injuries. Because the Ranchers fail to show their alleged injuries are fairly traceable to federal government action or inaction, or would be redressed by striking the Protocol, they lack Article III standing. View "Hawkins v. Haaland" on Justia Law

The Kapurs invested $300,000 in KAXT-CD, a Bay Area TV station, for 42% ownership in the Seller. In 2013, over the Kapurs' objections, the Seller proceeded with a $10.1 million sale of assets to First Buyer, which applied for the station’s FCC license. The Kapurs opposed that application, arguing that arbitration concerning the sale was ongoing. The arbitrator found that the sale did not require unanimity. The Kapurs unsuccessfully appealed in California state court and pressed on at the FCC, attacking the First Buyer’s qualifications under the “public interest” standard. The FCC concluded that the Kapurs’ allegations did not warrant a hearing and approved the application. In 2017, First Buyer sold the station to TV-49, Inc. for $2 million. The Kapurs opposed TV-49’s FCC license assignment application, arguing that First Buyer lacked the qualifications to buy the “license in the first place.” They did not challenge TV-49’s qualifications. The FCC approved the application. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of standing. Even if the Kapurs prevailed on their claim of entitlement to a character hearing, they have not shown any likelihood that the FCC would find that First Buyer was of bad character or, even if it did, that it would order the unwinding of both sales and return of the station to the Seller. Nothing would stop the Seller from selling to someone else. View "Kapur v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law