Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Porup submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for “documents relating to CIA use of poison for covert assassination.” The CIA refused to process Porup’s request because Executive Order 12,333 makes it unlawful for federal employees to engage in assassination or conspiracy to assassinate, making the subject matter arguably beyond its mission. Porup filed suit, citing his specific request and a CIA “pattern or practice” of violating FOIA by categorically refusing to process requests seeking information related to conduct in which the CIA believes it cannot lawfully engage.The CIA then adopted a new policy: Agency personnel are prohibited from “declin[ing] to process [FOIA] requests solely because they pertain to activities or issues that are beyond the scope of the Agency’s primary mission.” They are now “required to engage in a context-dependent inquiry as to whether a search may be possible, and whether the Agency’s records are likely to contain responsive materials.” The CIA subsequently released some documents that were responsive to Porup’s request.The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the CIA. The Agency adopted a new policy that adequately addresses any pattern or practice of violating FOIA in the manner alleged by Porup, rendering that claim moot. Porup’s specific challenges to the Agency’s search methodology, withholdings, or redactions have no merit. Porup has not overcome CIA’s unrebutted attestation that it disclosed all reasonably segregable non-exempt material. View "Porup v. Central Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

Until 2016, the FAA maintained a formal “slot control” system at Newark International Airport, requiring each airline to request a “slot” for each takeoff or landing. The FAA currently announces caps on takeoffs and landings for a given scheduling season. Each airline tells the FAA what flights it wants to operate during the upcoming season. The FAA may either approve an airline’s plan or request that it make changes in order to reduce congestion. An airline is not legally barred from operating unapproved flights/In 2010, the Department of Justice (DoJ) conditioned a merger on United’s transferring 36 slots to Southwest Airlines, a low-fare carrier, new to Newark. For five years, the DoJ resisted United’s attempts to acquire more slots. In 2015 the DoJ sued United for attempted monopolization but United remained Newark's dominant carrier. In 2019 Southwest announced it would pull out of Newark; 16 of its slots were in “peak hours.” Spirit Airlines requested five. The DoJ and the Port Authority cautioned the FAA against retiring Southwest’s slots, to preserve competition.The D.C. Circuit vacated the FAA’s decision to retire the slots. The decision was final because it prevented Spirit from operating as many peak-period flights as it would otherwise have done in Summer 2020 and was arbitrary and capricious because the agency disregarded warnings about the effect of its decision on competition at Newark. View "Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Long is serving a 29-year sentence at a federal medical penitentiary for violent racketeering offenses committed over the course of three decades. A double amputee, he suffers from other disabling medical conditions. As the COVID-19 pandemic raged through the federal prison system, Long sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that his distinct medical susceptibility to COVID-19 and the failure of prison officials to curb the disease’s rapid spread constituted “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release. The district court denied his motion, believing itself bound by a policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission that bars courts from releasing any incarcerated defendant unless the court first finds that he “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community,” U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(2).The D.C. Circuit vacated, joining seven other circuits in holding that this policy statement is not applicable to compassionate release motions filed by defendants. The policy statement applies only to motions for compassionate release filed by the Bureau of Prisons. Because it is not clear what the district court might have done had it considered the correct factors, its reliance on an incorrect Guidelines policy establishes an effect on Long’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Preeminent took over a security services contract but refused to hire two guards who had previously worked at the D.C. site. According to the Union, SEIU, the refusal violated a collective-bargaining agreement. In May 2018, the district court ordered the parties to arbitrate. Preeminent stalled for over a year, first refusing to commit to paying its share of the arbitration fees and then accusing an arbitrator of bias for seeking assurance of payment. SEIU moved for contempt. In November 2018, the court ordered Preeminent to pay half the cost. In January 2019, the court found that Preeminent had acted in bad faith and awarded SEIU attorneys’ fees. In June 2019, the court found Preeminent in civil contempt, imposed a $20,000 fine if Preeminent failed to arbitrate within 30 days, and awarded further costs and attorneys’ fees. A third arbitrator completed the arbitration. In November 2019, the court fixed the total amount of costs and attorneys’ fees at $51,000. Days later, Preeminent filed a notice of appeal, challenging the order compelling arbitration, the June 2019 contempt order, and the November 2019 fee order.The D.C. Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitration and contempt orders, which were final decisions not timely appealed, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a), but affirmed the fee award. The 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional. View "Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ v. Preeminent Protective Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Four years after his release from prison, and after completing three years of supervised release, plaintiff was told he would have to serve another 27 months in jail based on an erroneous release from prison because he had a consecutive misdemeanor to serve. Plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court ruled that he must serve the remainder of his sentence. Plaintiff appealed, but the district court failed to act on the appeal until December 2013, at which point it dismissed the petition as moot because plaintiff had been released from jail upon completion of his sentence.Plaintiff then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that his spontaneous incarceration deprived him of due process under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case based on claim preclusion in light of plaintiff's prior unsuccessful habeas corpus action. The DC Circuit reversed and, on remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the District.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that plaintiff failed to establish a pattern of constitutional violations or to demonstrate deliberate indifference. The court explained that plaintiff's evidence fails to show either that the District had a relevant custom of unconstitutional actions or that the District acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court vacated the entry of summary judgment for the District on the claim of unconstitutional policy because the nature and contours of the alleged policy present a number of disputed issues of material fact. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hurd v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed with the Board alleging that the Company had violated sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by discharging one employee, laying off another employee, and closing RAV because employees engaged in union activity. The Board reviewed the case after a hearing before an ALJ and issued a decision and order finding that petitioner had committed the unfair labor practices as alleged.The DC Circuit denied a petition for review with respect to the Board's determination that petitioner committed unfair labor practices by terminating one employee and laying off another, concluding that substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion. Therefore, the court enforced the Board's proposed remedies, other than the restoration order and the bargaining order. The court remanded the issues of RAV's closure and the restoration order so that the Board may address the matters raised in this opinion regarding those issues. Furthermore, the Board must determine whether a unit of mechanics formerly employed by Petitioner at 3773 Merritt Avenue still exists, apart from Concrete Express, in a form that makes a bargaining order under the NLRA feasible. View "RAV Truck and Trailer Repairs, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

PCTC filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking release of USGS records relating to the agency's coal tar sealant studies. USGS produced 52,000 pages of records, but withheld the modeling data and personally identifiable information relevant to this appeal. USGS withheld the model runs under Exemption Five on the ground that the release of the exploratory analysis would inhibit the ability to freely explore and analyze data without concern for external criticism. USGS withheld the house dust study participants' personal information under Exemption Six because release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and would not serve a public interest because the pertinent scientific data associated in this category of records is already released. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the district court granted USGS's motion.The DC Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court PCTC's claims regarding the urban lakes model runs withheld under Exemption Five, concluding that USGS failed to carry its burden to show that the model runs are pre-decisional. Furthermore, USGS failed to prove beyond dispute that the model runs are deliberative. Therefore, the absence of evidence establishing that the requested model runs are protected from disclosure amounts to the agency's failure to establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision to withhold the house dust study location information under Exemption Six. The court explained that the study participants have a greater than de minimis privacy interest in their addresses, household compositions, smoking and cooking habits, and the extensive personal details included in the questionnaires. The court further explained that releasing their addresses serves no cognizable public interest. View "Pavement Coatings Technology Council v. United States Geological Survey" on Justia Law

This case involves four subgroups of the Drone Advisory Committee (DAC), which provided advice to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The subgroups—one subcommittee and three task groups—provided advice to the DAC, but never directly to the FAA. At issue is whether section 10(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applies to records that these subgroups created but never provided to the DAC.The DC Circuit held that the DAC subgroups were not themselves advisory committees and that section 10(b) of FACA does not extend to documents that the subgroups created but never gave to the DAC. The court found unpersuasive EPIC's contentions that the subcommittee and task groups satisfy FACA's definition of an advisory committee. Rather, the court concluded that the subgroups here provided no advice to the FAA directly, and the DAC functioned as more than a rubber-stamp for the subgroups' work product. As to section 10(b), the court concluded that the present dispute involves only records created by the subgroups and never given to the DAC; such records were neither "made available to" nor "prepared for or by" the DAC; and, instead, the records were "prepared for or by" the subgroups themselves. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Drone Advisory Committee" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly transporting an individual to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2421(a), the district court sentenced him to 22 months in prison and six years of supervised release.The DC Circuit vacated the supervised release portion of defendant's sentence, agreeing with defendant that his attorney provided ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object when the district court relied on the wrong provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In this case, USSG 5D1.2(c) was the incorrect provision to apply, and the proper Guidelines provision was USSG 5D1.2(c). The court explained that the record of defendant's sentencing shows a reasonable probability that the district court would have chosen a five-year sentence but for his counsel's failure to object to the incorrect Guidelines provision. Therefore, defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea on the understanding that the government would not argue that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction because of his alleged supervisory or managerial role in a drug-smuggling conspiracy. Doing so would eliminate a statutory barrier to defendant seeking relief under the Safety Valve provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(4), from his mandatory minimum sentence. However, the government understood its promise differently, arguing that it retained the ability to oppose any Safety Valve relief and characterizing the relevant language in the plea agreement as inelegant and unnecessary.The DC Circuit held that the plea agreement is ambiguous as to the government's ability to oppose Safety Valve relief on the ground that defendant was a supervisor or manager in a drug conspiracy. The court explained that controlling precedent requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding, untainted and uninfluenced by the government's breach of the plea agreement and the evidence it introduced in the process. View "United States v. Moreno-Membache" on Justia Law