Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The DC Circuit held that the members of the House of Representatives' Committee on Oversight and Reform who requested agency information under 5 U.S.C. 2954 have standing under Article III to enforce their statutorily conferred right to information. In this case, members requested information from the General Service Administration related to property owned by the government.The court explained that informational injuries have long satisfied the injury requirement of Article III where a rebuffed request for information to which the requester is statutorily entitled is a concrete, particularized, and individualized personal injury, within the meaning of Article III. The court distinguished that traditional form of injury from the non-cognizable, generalized injuries claimed by legislators that are tied broadly to the law-making process and that affect all legislators equally. Furthermore, nothing in Article III erects a categorical bar against legislators suing to enforce statutorily created informational rights against federal agencies, whether under the Freedom of Information Act or under Section 2954. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the case and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maloney v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit reversed the district court's denial of appellants' motions for reduced sentences under section 404 of the First Step Act. The court held that the district court erred in determining that if a defendant was convicted of a "covered offense" and is thus eligible for relief under section 404, "the final issues to address are whether relief is available and, if so, to what extent a sentence reduction is warranted as a matter of discretion." Rather, the court explained that there is no additional "availability" requirement in section 404 beyond the covered offense requirement in section 404(a) and the limitations set forth in section 404(c).The court also held that the district court, in reaching its alternative judgment, was unclear as to whether it properly weighed the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Furthermore, there is nothing indicating that the district court weighed the mitigating factors raised by appellants, including post-sentencing conduct. Finally, the district court relied on inaccurate information in weighing the claims raised by Appellant Hicks. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court may exercise its discretion under section 404. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

The FCC’s Lifeline program offers low-income consumers discounts on telephone and broadband Internet access services. Qualified consumers receive service from eligible telecommunications carriers (ETCs), which receive a monthly federal support payment for each Lifeline subscriber. The FCC allows wireless resellers to provide Lifeline services. Many subscribers pay the ETC a recurring, discounted monthly fee. Some reseller ETCs offer prepaid wireless plans for which ETCs receive monthly Lifeline payments. ETCs must initiate the de-enrollment of Lifeline subscribers on prepaid plans who have not used their Lifeline service within the preceding 30 days; such subscribers are notified and enter a 15-day “cure period,” during which, ETCs must continue to provide Lifeline service.A group composed primarily of Lifeline service providers filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling requesting that the FCC permit Lifeline ETCs to seek reimbursement for all Lifeline subscribers served on the first day of the month, including those receiving free-to-the-end-user Lifeline service who are in the 15-day cure period. The petition cited 47 C.F.R. 54.407(a), which states that ETCs will receive payments for each actual qualifying low-income customer the ETC serves directly as of the first of the month. The FCC denied the petition, citing section 54.407(c)(2), which states that for prepaid Lifeline plans, an ETC “shall only continue to receive [support payments] for . . . subscribers who have used the service within the last 30 days, or who have cured their nonusage.”The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s determination. A statutory argument – that the FCC’s interpretation of its rules violated 47 U.S.C. 214(e) – is foreclosed because it was not raised with the FCC. The FCC position is compelled by the unambiguous terms of the rules. View "National Lifeline Association v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit upheld the FCC's order significantly narrowing a frequency band dedicated to fixed satellite transmissions in order to make room for the emerging fifth generation of mobile cellular technology. At issue in this case is whether this change permissibly modified the existing station licenses of three small satellite operators (SSO) and PSSI, a company that broadcasts live events through satellites. The SSOs and PSSI each filed an appeal for review of the FCC's order under 47 U.S.C. 402(b) and a petition under 47 U.S.C. 402(a).In this case, the SSOs and PSSI principally argue that the order exceeds the FCC's statutory authority to modify existing station licenses. The court concluded that, although the governing statutes by their terms speak only of licenses, the FCC gives market access grants the same protection that it gives to full Commission licenses. The court rejected the SSO's claims that the change to their market access grants was too fundamental to qualify as a modification under section 316(a)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934; that the FCC arbitrarily restricted their future business opportunities and excluded them from receiving compensation from the future 5G providers; and that the FCC impermissibly sanctioned them without prior notice. The court also rejected PSSI's claim that its licenses to transmit within the C-band uplink have been fundamentally changed. Rather, substantial evidence supported the FCC's conclusion that earth stations—including PSSI's mobile ones—will be able to "provide the same services" to their customers after the license modification. Finally, the court concluded that the parties' remaining challenges to the order lack merit. View "PSSI Global Services, LLC v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Defendants Knight and Thorpe were convicted on a ten-count indictment for charges related to armed robbery and kidnapping. Knight was sentenced to more than 22 years' imprisonment and Thorpe was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. Defendants were originally given a plea offer with a lesser sentence of two to six years' imprisonment, but Knight's counsel erroneously advised him that the offer came with ten years' imprisonment. Because Knight rejected the offer, the plea was no longer available to both defendants. On appeal, defendants argued that they had been denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The DC Circuit concluded that defendants' claims were colorable and remanded the case. The district court then denied relief.The DC Circuit now reverses in part, holding that Knight satisfied his burden under both prongs of the standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court explained that the performance by Knight's counsel did not meet minimal professional standards, and the district court's determination that Knight suffered no prejudice rested on subsidiary factual findings that ignored the direct effect of his counsel's deficient performance on Knight's ability to intelligently assess his options and therefore were clearly erroneous. Viewed properly, the court explained that the contemporaneous evidence and Knight's testimony at the evidentiary hearing sufficed to establish a reasonable probability that Knight would have accepted the plea offer but for his counsel's ineffective assistance. However, the court agreed that Thorpe's counsel was not ineffective and there was no violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part. The court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law

E-cigarette manufacturers and retailers, as well as a nonprofit organization, challenged the FDA's Deeming Rule, which deemed e-cigarettes to be "tobacco products" subject to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act's requirements, under the Appointments Clause and the First Amendment of the Constitution.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FDA and held that appellants' Appointments Clause challenge lacks merit and their First Amendment challenge is foreclosed. In this case, even assuming for purposes of argument, that Associate Commissioner for Policy Kux's issuance of the Deeming Rule violated the Appointments Clause and that FDA Commissioner Califf's general ratification of prior actions by the FDA as part of an agency reorganization was invalid, FDA Commissioner Gottlieb's ratification cured any Appointments Clause defect. Furthermore, appellants' challenge to the Act's preclearance pathway for modified risk tobacco products as violative of the First Amendment is foreclosed by Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 944 F.3d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In Nicopure Labs, the court found unpersuasive the objection that appellants make now, namely that the Deeming Rule violates the First Amendment because it places the burden on manufacturers to show that certain of their marketing claims are truthful and not misleading before they make them. View "Moose Jooce v. Food & Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Appellant seeks damages from WMATA for an assault he suffered while working, unsatisfied with a workers' compensation order to which he previously stipulated. Another employee at WMATA pinned appellant to the ground and punched him until he was unconscious. After appellant gained consciousness, the employee attacked him again. Appellant sustained severe injuries and required hospitalization.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act barred appellant's claim because his assault arose out of his employment. In this case, the manner in which appellant carried out his duties -- trying to help a customer -- motivated the employee's assault and thus his assault arose out of his employment. View "Workagegnehu v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Bob's Tire petitioned for review of the Board's order concluding that Bob's violated the National Labor Relations Act. Bob's argued, among other things, that subcontracted work was not bargaining unit work and that, even if it was, the unit employees are owed no remedy because the subcontracting did not cause the loss of any jobs or hours of employment. The Board and the union cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order.The DC Circuit denied the petition for review, agreeing with the Board that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting its findings that petitioner failed to bargain with the union before subcontracting bargaining unit work. The court also agreed that an employer's duty to bargain over subcontracting "is not limited to situations in which employees are laid off or replaced." The court expressed no view as to whether the employees affected by Bob's unfair labor practices are due any backpay. The court also rejected petitioner's "joint-employer" argument as specious, and found that it was without jurisdiction to consider petitioner's arguments regarding the performance-based bonus program where petitioner failed to present the issue before the Board. The court granted the cross-motion for enforcement of the Board's order. View "Bob's Tire Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In July 2019, the Department of Justice announced a revised protocol for execution by lethal injection using a single drug, pentobarbital. Plaintiffs, federal death row inmates, sought expedited review of three of the district court's rulings, and two plaintiffs with upcoming execution dates moved for stays of execution pending appeal.The DC Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the government on plaintiffs' Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) claim. In this case, plaintiffs had pointed to several alleged discrepancies between the 2019 Protocol and state statutes dictating different methods of execution or aspects of the execution process. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no conflict, either because the government had committed to complying with the state statutes at issue or because no plaintiff had requested to be executed in accordance with them.However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenge for failure to state a claim. The court held that, by pleading that the federal government's execution protocol involves a "virtual medical certainty" of severe and torturous pain that is unnecessary to the death process and could readily be avoided by administering a widely available analgesic first, plaintiffs' complaint properly and plausibly states an Eighth Amendment claim. The court denied Plaintiffs Hall and Bernard's request for a stay of execution based on the Eighth Amendment claim. The court also held that the district court should have ordered the 2019 Protocol to be set aside to the extent that it permits the use of unprescribed pentobarbital in a manner that violates the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a permanent injunction to remedy the FDCA violation. View "Roane v. Barr" on Justia Law

Hospitals, in calculating their Medicaid fractions -- the proportion of treatment a hospital provided to Medicaid patients -- sought to include days of care funded by Florida's Low Income Pool, an approved Medicaid demonstration project. The Secretary refused to allow the Hospitals to include these patients in their Medicaid fraction, on the ground that the patients were treated out of charity rather than as designated beneficiaries of a demonstration project.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Hospitals, and agreed with the district court that the Secretary's own regulation states that, for the purposes of calculating the Medicaid fraction, "hospitals may include all days attributable to populations eligible for [Medicaid] matching payments through a [demonstration project]" so long as the services provided under the demonstration project include "inpatient hospital services." In this case, it was "obvious to the [c]ourt that uninsured and underinsured patients received inpatient hospital services" through the Low Income Pool, because (1) the Secretary authorized federal matching funds to reimburse hospitals for these services, and (2) the hospitals rigorously documented the services provided using funds from the Pool. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221 (2019), supported this conclusion. View "Bethesda Health, Inc. v. Azar" on Justia Law