Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, two former Liberian officials, allege that Global Witness, an international human rights organization, published a report falsely implying that they had accepted bribes in connection with the sale of an oil license for an offshore plot owned by Liberia. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failing to plausibly allege malice. The court concluded that the First Amendment provides broad protections for speech about public figures, and the former officials have failed to allege that Global Witness exceeded the bounds of those protections. In this case, plaintiffs advanced several interlocking theories to support the allegation of malice, but the court agreed with the district court that these theories fail to support a plausible claim that Global Witness acted with actual malice. View "Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc." on Justia Law

Ranchers in the Upper Klamath Basin region filed suit to prevent the exercise of water rights that interfere with the irrigation of their lands. The district court dismissed the complaint based on lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution.The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal and concluded that the Protocol Agreement executed by the United States and the Tribes does not delegate federal authority to the Tribes but recognizes the Tribes' preexisting authority to control their water rights under a Treaty in 1864 with the United States. The court explained that there is no concurrence requirement imposed by federal law on the Tribes' reserved instream water rights, whether by the 1864 Klamath Treaty or the federal government’s trust relationship; the McCarran Amendment subjects the Tribes' reserved water rights to state procedural rules in its quantification proceedings, but the substance and scope of the Tribes’ rights remain governed by federal law; Oregon law does not require federal government concurrence to enforce the Tribes' water rights; and thus invalidating the Protocol, and requiring the federal government to independently assess whether it would concur in the Tribes' calls, would not remedy the Ranchers' injuries. Because the Ranchers fail to show their alleged injuries are fairly traceable to federal government action or inaction, or would be redressed by striking the Protocol, they lack Article III standing. View "Hawkins v. Haaland" on Justia Law

The Kapurs invested $300,000 in KAXT-CD, a Bay Area TV station, for 42% ownership in the Seller. In 2013, over the Kapurs' objections, the Seller proceeded with a $10.1 million sale of assets to First Buyer, which applied for the station’s FCC license. The Kapurs opposed that application, arguing that arbitration concerning the sale was ongoing. The arbitrator found that the sale did not require unanimity. The Kapurs unsuccessfully appealed in California state court and pressed on at the FCC, attacking the First Buyer’s qualifications under the “public interest” standard. The FCC concluded that the Kapurs’ allegations did not warrant a hearing and approved the application. In 2017, First Buyer sold the station to TV-49, Inc. for $2 million. The Kapurs opposed TV-49’s FCC license assignment application, arguing that First Buyer lacked the qualifications to buy the “license in the first place.” They did not challenge TV-49’s qualifications. The FCC approved the application. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of standing. Even if the Kapurs prevailed on their claim of entitlement to a character hearing, they have not shown any likelihood that the FCC would find that First Buyer was of bad character or, even if it did, that it would order the unwinding of both sales and return of the station to the Seller. Nothing would stop the Seller from selling to someone else. View "Kapur v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Drill riser buoyancy modules (DRBMs) are the high-tech equivalent of water wings for the miles of steel pipe that extend from drillships to the ocean floor and carry oil from natural deposits tens of thousands of feet below the surface. In 2012, only four major companies in the world produced DRBMs. CBMF was sponsored by China to develop DRBM technology. CBMF partnered with Shi, a Ph.D. with 25 years of experience in offshore structural design. Shi visited factories where DRBM was being produced; the manufacturers took precautions to protect their information. Shi hired former employees of those companies, making clear that they were to provide their former employers’ nonpublic information. CBMF was successful in duplicating the technology. At a pitch meeting by Shi to representatives of a company Shi believed to be Lockheed Martin, FBI agents arrested Shi.Three coconspirators pled guilty to conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 1832; one absconded, and a CBMF employee remained in China. CBMF never appeared, leaving Shi as the only defendant at trial. The D.C. Circuit affirmed Shi's conviction as supported by substantial evidence. The information at issue was not publicly available; it came from a competitor. Shi joined an agreement to acquire and use trade secret information and believed the documents he received contained trade secrets. View "United States v. Shi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a law professor, filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking information regarding nine categories of information about each FOIA request received by the IRS in Fiscal Year 2015. The IRS granted most of plaintiff's request but denied it with respect to two categories of information. The district court granted each party's summary judgment motion in part, rejecting the IRS's blanket withholding of the two categories of information, but allowing for the possibility of limited redactions on a case-by-case basis. At issue in this appeal is under what circumstances a prevailing plaintiff in a FOIA case entitled to an award of attorney's fees.The DC Circuit concluded that, in evaluating a fee petition, the district court assesses whether the plaintiff "substantially prevailed" within the meaning of the statute, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E)(i). In this case, the district court found plaintiff had done so, a conclusion the IRS does not contest. However, the court reasoned that this is not enough. Because the statute provides that an eligible party "may" receive fees, the district court must also decide whether the plaintiff is "entitled" to a fee award. Applying a four-factor test to determine whether a plaintiff is "entitled" to fees, the court concluded that the second and third factors, commercial benefit and plaintiff's interest, support a fee award. The court remanded for the district court to evaluate the reasonableness of the IRS's burden argument in the first instance and then to rebalance the four-factors in light of the court's conclusion that factors two and three weigh in plaintiff's favor. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of plaintiff's fee motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kwoka v. IRS" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied the State of New Jersey's petition for review of an EPA rule promulgated in response to New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In New York, environmental organizations and industrial entities challenged the revision of the Clean Air Act's new source review (NSR) program for preconstruction permitting of stationary sources of air pollution.As a threshold matter, the court concluded that challenges to the State's Article III standing lack merit. In this case, petitioner has identified two injuries, either of which suffices to establish standing to challenge the rule. On the merits, the court concluded that the record confirms that EPA engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. The court explained that EPA's obligation was to analyze the trade-off between compliance improvement and the burdens of data collection and reporting and articulate a reasoned judgment as to why any proposed additional burden would not be justifiable in terms of the likely enhancement of compliance. By adequately considering NSR enforcement concerns raised during this rulemaking and offering a reasoned explanation for its 50 percent trigger, the court concluded that EPA satisfied this obligation. On this record, petitioner otherwise fails to show that EPA's action was arbitrary or capricious. View "New Jersey v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit dismissed the union's petition for review of the Board's decision dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint against Kroger Limited Partnership I. The union charged Kroger with violating section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by "selectively and disparately" enforcing the no-solicitation policy set forth in the lease and in the landlord's letter.The court concluded that 29 U.S.C. 160(e) bars the court from reviewing the union's objection. In this case, the court's jurisdiction is limited in the following respect: "No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances." The court explained that the critical inquiry is whether the objections made before the Board were adequate to put the Board on notice that the issue might be pursued on appeal. The court concluded that a dissenting member's discussion of an issue is not enough. In this case, even after the Board's decision and the member's discussion of a different theory, the union did not seek reconsideration. Rather, it raised the Board's dissenter theory for the first time in this court. The court concluded that this was not enough. Finally, the court concluded that the union forfeited its claim of extraordinary circumstances. View "United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved, as just and reasonable, cost allocations filed by PJM, the Mid–Atlantic’s regional transmission organization, for a project to improve the reliability of three New Jersey nuclear power plants. The Commission denied a complaint lodged by Delaware and Maryland alleging a large imbalance between the costs imposed on the Delmarva transmission zone and the benefits that zone would accrue from the project. On rehearing in 2018, the Commission reversed course, concluding that application of PJM’s cost–allocation method to the project violated cost–causation principles and was therefore unjust and unreasonable under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824e. The Commission’s replacement cost–allocation method shifted primary cost responsibility for the project from the Delmarva zone to utilities in New Jersey.The New Jersey Agencies argued that the Commission departed from precedent without adequate explanation, made findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence, and failed to respond meaningfully to objections raised during the proceedings. The D.C. Circuit denied their petitions for review. The Commission reasonably decided to adopt a different cost–allocation method for the type of project at issue here and adequately explained its departure from the cost allocations it had approved in 2016. View "Public Service Electric and Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

McNary worked as a “gland manager” and miners’ representative at Alcoa’s Point Comfort, Texas Bayer Alumina Plant. On January 8, 2014, while performing his daily safety rounds, McNary observed hot slurry spewing out of a valve, indicating a malfunction. Concerned about miner safety, McNary arranged for the plant’s environmental health and safety manager to be notified. His supervisor, Emig, had also asked for the manager’s assistance. This led to a heated exchange that ended with Emig threatening McNary with removal. Emig claimed that McNary spoke in a way that suggested he intended to challenge Emig’s authority rather than discharge his duties as a miners’ representative. McNary was neither disciplined nor terminated.Two weeks later, McNary filed a complaint against Alcoa with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), alleging discrimination under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, which declined to pursue charges, McNary filed a complaint, 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(3), seeking a posting at the plant of a notice of violation of the Act and an order requiring management training. Meanwhile, McNary was laid off when Alcoa temporarily stopped production of alumina at Point Comfort; Alcoa subsequently permanently closed the plant. The D.C. Circuit ordered the dismissal of McNary’s suit. McNary fails to show that a court can redress his injury; he does not have Article III standing. View "McNary v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

After appellant filed a breach of contract claim against the Government in D.C. Superior Court, the Government removed to district court and subsequently dismissed the claim. Appellant appealed, arguing that under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), which provides that "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded, " the district court should have remanded his claim.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) and the Tucker Act make clear that section 1447(c) does not require the district court to remand in this case. The court explained that to require the district court to remand appellant's claim here, where the government has waived sovereign immunity against appellant's claim only in the Court of Federal Claims, and where that court has already dismissed appellant's claim, would be to subject the government to lengthy and piecemeal litigation of the kind that Congress intended section 1442(a)(1) to allow it to avoid. Therefore, the court concluded that, in context, Congress did not intend the "shall be remanded" language in section 1447(c) to mean that the district court must force the Government to spend one more ounce of resources on the re-litigation of a case it has already won. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hammer v. United States" on Justia Law