Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When Medicare overpays hospitals, it offsets that mistake by reducing future payments. By 2013, Medicare was out $11 billion because of new diagnostic codes and bookkeeping that did not keep up. Congress required that the Secretary of Health and Human Services recoup that amount by the end of fiscal year 2017 by reducing the base rate (standardized amount) paid for inpatient care and directed the Secretary to adjust the base rate by 0.5% each year through 2023, 129 Stat. 87, 163 (2015). Subsequently, while reviewing the 2017 budget, the Secretary realized that a -3.2% adjustment would leave the agency short of its $11 billion goal and announced a -3.9% adjustment. Congress then told the Secretary to increase the base rate by 0.4588% (not 0.5%) in 2018, 130 Stat. 1033, 1320 (2016). In 2017, the Secretary adjusted the base rate -3.9%. The agency met its goal. In 2018, the Secretary adjusted the base rate -3.4412%.Medicare providers sued, arguing that the Secretary should have reversed that expedient at the end of 2017 rather than carry it over into 2018, costing the hospitals $840 million in lost payments. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. While the hospitals felt a “significant financial impact” from the -0.7% adjustment, Section 7(b)(5) bars judicial review of adjustments made under the Act. View "Fresno Community Hospital and Medical Center v. Cochran" on Justia Law

Participants in Georgetown University retirement plans sued the University and individual plan fiduciaries, seeking to bring individual and representative class action claims for breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461. They alleged that the plans paid excessive fees for record-keeping services and included investment options that consistently underperformed their benchmarks. In January 2019, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, citing Article III standing as to some aspects of plan management, such as the inclusion of investment options neither plaintiff had selected. Regarding the duty of prudence, the court found that the excessive recordkeeping fees allegations provided no factual support for the assertion that the plans should pay only $35/year per participant. In May, the court denied as untimely their motion for leave to file an amended complaint.The D.C. Circuit vacated. Dismissal of a complaint without prejudice is generally not a final appealable order. Exceptions that apply where the record clearly indicates that the district court has separated itself from the case do not apply to this case. The January Order did not enter a final, appealable judgment; the district court erred when considering the motion to amend the complaint in refusing to apply the Rule 15(a)(2) standard, rather than the more restrictive standards under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). View "Wilcox v. Georgetown University" on Justia Law

A 2017 “tweet” by @realDonaldTrump stated: “The Amazon Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending massive, dangerous, and wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad.” BuzzFeed requested CIA records about Agency payments to Syrian rebels, citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A). The Agency invoked Exemptions 1 and 3. The district court granted the Agency summary judgment, explaining that the “tweet did not mention the [Agency] or create any inference that such a program would be linked to or run by the [Agency].”BuzzFeed sent another, more broadly stated, request. The Agency asserted that a response would reveal whether it had an intelligence interest in, intelligence sources about, and connection to programs related to Syrian rebels — information exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 1 and 3. Exemption 1 covers “matters”2 that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Exemption 3 covers matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” the National Security Act qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3, 50 U.S.C. 3024(i)(1).The district court granted BuzzFeed summary judgment, holding that the tweet officially acknowledged “the government’s intelligence interest in the broader categories of records that BuzzFeed has requested.” The D.C. Circuit reversed. The tweet was not an official acknowledgment of the existence (or not) of Agency records. View "Leopold v. Central Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the President of the American Postal Workers Union, filed suit against two union members, Jerry Stidman and Jonathan Kelley, for defamation. Plaintiff is a District of Columbia resident, Stidman is an Indiana resident, and Kelley is a Wisconsin resident. Stidman and Kelley moved to transfer the case to the Southern District of Indiana or, in the alternative, dismiss it under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (b)(3). The district court dismissed the case for improper venue.The DC Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing the case and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court failed to provide a "sound prudential justification" for addressing venue before personal jurisdiction, nor is one easily ascertainable. In this case, the venue analysis involves issues that the court has yet to consider, including where publication occurs when allegedly defamatory material is published on both a public website and a limited access online social media page, as well as the significance of where the harm caused by defamation is felt. The court reasoned that dealing first with the venue question would neither provide "an easier resolution of the case," nor prevent the court from having to "decide a question of . . . law that it has not heretofore decided." The court stated that diving into the venue analysis required the district court to address previously undecided questions that it, and the court, might otherwise never have to face. View "Dimondstein v. Stidman" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, petitioners challenge four provisions of the EPA's 2015 and 2018 rules implementing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. Petitioners challenge four features of the 2018 Rule: (1) the interprecursor trading program, as well as provisions (2) allowing states to demonstrate compliance with the Act’s reasonable further progress milestone requirements through an implementation-based method, (3) allowing states to choose between two options for the reasonable further progress baseline year, and (4) allowing nonattainment areas to use already-implemented measures to satisfy the Act's contingency measures requirements.The DC Circuit vacated two provisions—the interprecursor trading program and the interpretation of the Clean Air Act's contingency measures requirements—because they contravene the statute's unambiguous language. The court vacated another provision—the implementation of the milestone compliance demonstration requirement—because it rests on an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. Finally, the court denied the petition for review with respect to the alternative baseline years provision. Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in part the petitions for review. View "Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a defense attorney with no client, petitioned to reverse a procedural ruling excluding the public from a classified hearing in an appeal filed by other attorneys who, like plaintiff, have no client. Because most proceedings for Guantanamo Bay detainees are open to the public, the attorney's desire to watch the hearing would not normally have been a problem. However, because this particular hearing concerned classified information, the military judge closed it.The DC Circuit noted that the attorney may or may not have prudential standing, but the court need not address the issue because the court can dismiss the case based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, the attorney ultimately appeals the military judge's decision to close the hearing. The court explained that the attorney does not appeal a conviction, an actual final judgment, but rather a decision. Finally, the court rejected the attorney's argument under the collateral order doctrine. View "Sundel v. United States" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit held that the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act (EPA) by issuing an easement allowing the Dakota Access Pipeline to transport crude oil through federally owned land at the Lake Oahe crossing site without preparing an environmental impact statement despite substantial criticisms from the Tribes.The court rejected the Corps' and Dakota Access' contention that the district court applied the wrong standard by relying on National Parks Conservation Association v. Semonite, 916 F.3d at 1083, which emphasized the important role played by entities other than the federal government. The court explained that the Tribes' unique role and their government-to-government relationship with the United States demand that their criticisms be treated with appropriate solicitude. The court concluded that several serious scientific disputes in this case means that the effects of the Corps' easement decision are likely to be "highly controversial." The court also noted that, although the risk of a pipeline leak may be low, that risk is sufficient that a person of ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision to approve the pipeline's placement, and its potential consequences are therefore properly considered. The court affirmed the district court's order vacating the easement while the Corps prepares an environmental impact statement. However, the court reversed the district court's order to the extent it directed that the pipeline be shut down and emptied of oil. View "Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review challenging FERC's determination that fuel transported by pipeline to Orlando's airport—after being delivered to the Port of Tampa—moves intrastate. The court upheld the ALJ's finding, under the three Northville factors, that the stop in Tampa broke the continuity of interstate transportation, and so the jet fuel moved intrastate through the Central Florida Pipeline. Therefore, FERC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the pipeline rates. The court rejected petitioners' claims that FERC misapplied the Northville factors; the Northville factors are inadequate to make the determination; the Commission misinterpreted the teachings of old Supreme Court cases: Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111 (1913); Carson Petrol. Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929); United States v. Erie R.R. Co., 280 U.S. 98 (1929); and the Airlines' overarching intent to transport the fuel from ships through Tampa to Orlando means the pipeline movement is interstate in nature. View "Aircraft Service International, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Baan Rao Thai Restaurant and plaintiffs seek review of a consular officer's decision to deny visas for plaintiffs, asserting their claims fall within one of the consular nonreviewability doctrine's narrow exceptions.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the merits, rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States and Thailand expressly provides that judicial review is available. The court concluded that access provisions were longstanding and well understood at the time the U.S.-Thailand Treaty was entered into—and that understanding was that the provisions relate to procedural rights. In this case, plaintiffs' argument seeks to fashion a longstanding, common and well understood treaty provision into something it is not. The court also explained, as recently clarified by the United States Supreme Court, that a dismissal pursuant to the consular nonreviewability doctrine is a dismissal on the merits. View "Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v. Pompeo" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted the 2019 Affordable Clean Energy Rule (ACE Rule), 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, repealing and replacing the Clean Power Plan as a means of regulating power plants’ emissions of greenhouse gases. The Clean Power Plan was an Obama-era standard that set the first limits for climate change pollution from existing power plants. The EPA considered its authority under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, 7411 to be confined to physical changes to the power plants themselves. The ACE Rule determined a new system of emission reduction for coal-fired power plants only and left unaddressed greenhouse gas emissions from other types of fossil-fuel-fired power plants, such as those fired by natural gas or oil. Several groups challenged the action.The D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule, which expressly rests on the incorrect conclusion that the plain statutory text foreclosed the Clean Power Plan so that complete repeal was “the only permissible interpretation of the scope of the EPA’s authority” under section 7411. The error prevented full consideration of the statutory question and of measures other than those that apply at and to the individual source. The ACE Rule’s amendment of the regulatory framework to slow the process for the reduction of emissions is arbitrary and capricious. View "American Lung Association v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law