Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appellants in this case were arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) during protests in August 2020. Upon arrest, their personal property, including cell phones, was seized. They were released without charges, but their property was not returned for months or even over a year, despite repeated requests. The appellants filed motions under D.C. Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) to recover their property, which led to the return of some items after significant delays. They then sued the District of Columbia in federal court, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and common-law conversion, and sought damages and injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaints. It held that the plaintiffs failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim because the initial seizure was reasonable and any challenge to continued retention was governed by the Fifth Amendment. The court also found that Rule 41(g) provided adequate process for the Fifth Amendment claim. Consequently, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the conversion claim and denied class certification as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Fourth Amendment requires that any continued retention of personal property seized incident to a lawful arrest must be reasonable. The court found that the prolonged retention of the appellants' property without a legitimate investigatory or protective purpose could constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims, vacated the dismissal of the D.C.-law claims and the denial of class certification, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oyoma Asinor v. DC" on Justia Law

In 2017, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III began investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, during which Giorgi Rtskhiladze testified before a grand jury. When the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a redacted version of Mueller’s report, it included information that Rtskhiladze claimed was inaccurate and damaging to his reputation. Rtskhiladze sued for both equitable and monetary relief and sought a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Rtskhiladze lacked standing for his equitable claims, failed to state a claim for damages, and was not entitled to obtain a copy of the transcript. The court found that Rtskhiladze had abandoned his separate damages claim against DOJ and Mueller personally and forfeited arguments about this claim on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Rtskhiladze has standing to bring all his claims and remanded the equitable claims for further consideration. The court agreed with the district court that Rtskhiladze failed to state a claim for damages under the Privacy Act, as he did not allege "intentional or willful" conduct by DOJ. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Rtskhiladze’s request to obtain a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript, emphasizing the government’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy and preventing witness intimidation.In summary, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Rtskhiladze’s equitable claims for lack of standing, affirmed the dismissal of his damages claim for failure to state a claim, and upheld the denial of his request to obtain a copy of his grand jury transcript. View "Rtskhiladze v. Mueller" on Justia Law

Ghulam Ali, an economist at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), suffers from severe allergies. For years, the EPA accommodated his condition by providing a suitable workspace. However, in 2011, the EPA placed a heavily perfumed colleague next to Ali, exacerbating his allergies. Ali requested a private office or a small conference room as an accommodation. Instead, the EPA offered him 100% telework, which Ali rejected, citing concerns about his home setup and the need for in-person collaboration. Ali then filed a lawsuit under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming the EPA failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA. The court concluded that Ali caused a breakdown in the interactive process by rejecting the telework offer without providing sufficient explanation. The court held that Ali bore sole responsibility for the failure to settle on an appropriate accommodation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Ali had provided all requested information and had proposed alternative accommodations, which the EPA either ignored or rejected. The court determined that whether the EPA's offer of 100% telework was a reasonable accommodation involved disputed material facts that should be resolved by a jury. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of an accommodation is often a fact-intensive question and that Ali's concerns about telework, including the need for in-person interaction and the unsuitability of his home for permanent work, were valid issues for a jury to consider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ali v. Regan" on Justia Law

Eva Mae Givens applied for Medicaid assistance in Washington, D.C., but the District miscalculated her copay, requiring her to pay an extra $2,000 per month. Givens requested an administrative hearing to contest the miscalculation, but D.C. did not provide a timely hearing as required by federal law. Givens then filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for a fair hearing and monetary damages for the overpayments. While the case was pending, D.C. held a hearing, corrected the miscalculation, and sent back-payments to the nursing homes, but not to Givens. Givens passed away shortly after the hearing.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case with prejudice, ruling that the claims were moot because D.C. had provided the hearing and corrected the miscalculation. The court also held that Givens failed to state a claim for relief. Givens' children, who sought to be substituted as plaintiffs, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the fair-hearing claims as moot but noted that the dismissal should have been without prejudice. The court found that the calculation claim was not moot because Givens had not received compensation for the overpayments she made. However, the court held that the calculation claim failed to plausibly allege a violation of federal rights under § 1983, as Givens did not identify a specific municipal policy or custom that caused the miscalculation.The appellate court vacated the district court's order dismissing the case with prejudice and remanded the case. The district court was instructed to dismiss the moot fair-hearing claims without prejudice and to either dismiss the calculation claim without prejudice or provide a detailed explanation for a dismissal with prejudice. View "Givens v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States (Chabad) sought to reclaim religious property expropriated by the Russian Federation. Chabad obtained a default judgment against the Russian Federation and its agencies, which ignored the order to return the property. Consequently, the district court imposed monetary sanctions, accruing to over $175 million. Chabad attempted to collect these sanctions by attaching the property of three companies it claimed were controlled by the Russian Federation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted Chabad’s motion to dismiss the Russian Federation’s claim of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court held that it had jurisdiction under the FSIA’s expropriation exception. However, the court later denied Chabad’s motion to attach the property of Tenex-USA, Tenex JSC, and VEB without prejudice, citing a lack of proper notice of the sanctions judgments to the Russian Federation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation under the FSIA’s expropriation exception. The court determined that the expropriated property was not present in the United States, a requirement for jurisdiction under the FSIA. Consequently, the default judgment and sanctions judgments against the Russian Federation were void. The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, effectively dismissing the Russian Federation from the case. View "Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a report mentioning the CIA’s “operational control” over fourteen detainees transferred to Guantanamo Bay in September 2006. Based on this, a lawyer representing one of the detainees requested records from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) about the CIA’s “operational control” at Guantanamo from September 2006 to January 2007. The CIA identified three documents but stated it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of other records, citing the need to protect classified intelligence sources and methods.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA. The court concluded that the CIA had adequately justified its Glomar response, which allows an agency to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records if doing so would reveal classified information. The court found that the CIA had not waived its right to issue a Glomar response despite the release of some documents and references in the Senate report.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the CIA did not waive its Glomar response through official acknowledgment, as the Senate report and the released documents did not constitute an official acknowledgment by the CIA. The court also found that the CIA’s justification for its Glomar response was logical and plausible, as confirming or denying the existence of additional records could reveal protected intelligence sources and methods. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the CIA. View "Connell v. CIA" on Justia Law

Henry Searcy, Jr. sought certification as an agent under the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations Governing Contract Advisors but failed the required exam twice. After an arbitrator sided with the NFLPA, Searcy sued the NFLPA, its Executive Director, Prometric LLC, and Prometric’s Vice President and General Counsel. He alleged breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and sought vacatur of the arbitration award under the FAA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Prometric Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and against the NFLPA Defendants for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Prometric Defendants and instructed the District Court to reconsider its dismissal of claims against the NFLPA Defendants, specifically examining whether Section 301 of the LMRA preempted Searcy’s state law claims.Upon further review, the District Court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Searcy appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA Defendants. The court determined that Section 301 of the LMRA does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims, as these claims do not require interpretation of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). View "Searcy v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2021, petitioners challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authorization of two liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals in Cameron County, Texas, and a related pipeline. The court partially granted the petitions and remanded the case to FERC without vacating the orders. On remand, FERC reauthorized the projects, prompting petitioners to challenge the reauthorization, arguing non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA).Previously, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found FERC’s environmental justice analysis inadequate and required FERC to either justify its chosen analysis radius or use a different one. FERC was also directed to reconsider its public interest determinations under the NGA. On remand, FERC expanded its environmental justice analysis but did not issue a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which petitioners argued was necessary. FERC also did not consider a new carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) proposal as part of its environmental review.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found FERC’s failure to issue a supplemental EIS for its updated environmental justice analysis arbitrary and capricious, as the new analysis provided a significantly different environmental picture. The court also held that FERC should have considered the CCS proposal as a connected action or a reasonable alternative. Additionally, the court found FERC’s rejection of air quality data from a nearby monitor arbitrary and capricious. The court vacated FERC’s reauthorization orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, requiring FERC to issue a supplemental EIS and consider the CCS proposal. View "City of Port Isabel v. FERC" on Justia Law

Five police officers from the Crime Suppression Team were patrolling Southeast Washington, D.C., when they encountered Antonio Malachi Bryant. Upon searching him, they found a firearm. Bryant, a previously convicted felon, was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the gun, arguing it was obtained through an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Bryant’s motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Bryant when they observed a bulge in his waistband, which they believed to be a weapon. The court concluded that the seizure was constitutional and did not need to determine the exact moment the encounter turned into a seizure, as the reasonable suspicion was established by the time the bulge was observed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain and search Bryant when they saw the bulge in his waistband. The court found that Bryant was not seized until after the officers observed the bulge, and thus the seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The court also noted that the officers’ approach and initial questioning did not constitute a seizure, as police officers are permitted to approach individuals in public places without it being considered a seizure. The court concluded that the District Court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Bryant" on Justia Law

A computer science professor and a tech inventor challenged the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), arguing that its provisions against circumventing technological protections on copyrighted works and distributing circumvention tools violate the First Amendment. They claimed these provisions unduly stifle fair use of copyrighted works, which they argued is protected speech. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate these provisions as facially overbroad and a prior restraint on speech.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiffs' facial First Amendment challenges and their Administrative Procedure Act claims but allowed their as-applied First Amendment claims to proceed. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the DMCA's impact on third-party free speech interests was different from its impact on their own. The court also held that the triennial rulemaking process for exemptions did not constitute content-based censorship. The plaintiffs' as-applied claims were later dismissed after the Librarian of Congress granted an exemption for the professor's security research, and the court found that the tech inventor's proposed device would likely lead to widespread piracy.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the facial challenges. The court held that the DMCA's anticircumvention and antitrafficking provisions are not facially overbroad because they regulate conduct, not speech, and their legitimate applications, such as preventing digital piracy, far outweigh any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also rejected the argument that the triennial rulemaking process constitutes a prior restraint on speech, noting that the DMCA does not target expression and that alternative avenues for lawful access to copyrighted works remain available. View "Matthew Green v. DOJ" on Justia Law