Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Darian McKinney, a health and physical education teacher, was employed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for four years. During his tenure, he was investigated for sexual harassment, leading to a grievance he filed against DCPS. Both disputes were resolved through a Settlement Agreement, under which McKinney resigned but was allowed to reapply for teaching positions. However, when he reapplied, DCPS blocked his return, citing a failed background check.McKinney sued the District of Columbia, alleging that DCPS breached the Settlement Agreement by not fairly considering his employment applications and deprived him of property and liberty without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Settlement Agreement did not obligate DCPS to fairly consider McKinney’s applications, only to allow him to apply. The court found no basis in the contract’s language or law for McKinney’s demand for fair consideration. Additionally, the court ruled that McKinney did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his original job, the contingent job offers, or his eligibility for DCPS positions. The court also found that McKinney’s claim of deprivation of liberty without due process was forfeited as it was not raised in the lower court.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McKinney’s complaint. View "Darian McKinney v. DC" on Justia Law

Patrick Kennedy and Roy J. Meidinger, Sr. filed whistleblower claims with the IRS, alleging significant tax violations by various entities. Kennedy's claims involved three corporations, while Meidinger's claim was based on a theory that healthcare provider discounts to insurance companies constituted untaxed debt relief. Both claims were initially reviewed by the IRS Whistleblower Office (WBO) and forwarded to IRS operating divisions for further action.The IRS operating divisions did not take substantive action on Meidinger's claim or on two of Kennedy's claims. Meidinger's claim was deemed speculative, and Kennedy's first two claims were either outside the operating division's jurisdiction or involved a defunct entity. Kennedy's third claim led to an audit of the targeted taxpayer, but the IRS found no tax violations and collected no proceeds.The United States Tax Court dismissed Meidinger's case for lack of jurisdiction, as the IRS had not proceeded with any administrative or judicial action based on his information. The Tax Court also dismissed Kennedy's first two claims for the same reason but reviewed his third claim on the merits, ultimately denying it because the IRS collected no proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over Meidinger's claim and Kennedy's first two claims, as the IRS had not taken any substantive action against the taxpayers based on their information. However, the court affirmed the Tax Court's decision on Kennedy's third claim, agreeing that no proceeds were collected, and thus, no award was warranted. The court dismissed Meidinger's appeal and Kennedy's first two claims for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of Kennedy's third claim on the merits. View "Kennedy v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) interpretation of the term “solicit” under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC had begun regulating proxy advisory firms by treating their voting recommendations as “solicitations” of proxy votes. ISS argued that its recommendations did not constitute “solicitation” under the Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with ISS and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the SEC’s interpretation of “solicit” was overly broad and not supported by the statutory text. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an intervenor supporting the SEC’s position, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the ordinary meaning of “solicit” does not include providing proxy voting recommendations upon request. The court concluded that “solicit” refers to actively seeking to obtain proxy authority or votes, not merely influencing them through advice. The SEC’s definition, which included proxy advisory firms’ recommendations as solicitations, was found to be contrary to the statutory text of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. View "Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Thomas McLamb, a dissident union member, was involved in a heated confrontation with Tiyaka Boone, an incumbent union official, during a union election campaign. McLamb made inflammatory comments that Boone interpreted as personal attacks, leading to a physical altercation where Boone struck McLamb. Another union official, Alma Williams, allegedly suggested to a manager that if Boone were terminated, McLamb should be as well. McLamb filed unfair labor practice charges against the union, claiming Boone's actions were retaliatory and Williams violated the duty of fair representation.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) dismissed McLamb's charges. The Board found that Boone's actions were motivated by personal animosity rather than retaliation for McLamb's protected union activities. It also concluded that Williams' comment was intended to seek leniency for Boone, not to punish McLamb. McLamb petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The Court of Appeals denied McLamb's petition. It held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB's conclusions. The court found that a reasonable employee would understand Boone's actions as a reaction to personal insults rather than union activities. It also agreed with the NLRB that Williams' statement was conditional and aimed at discouraging Boone's discharge, not seeking McLamb's termination. The court concluded that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation, as Williams' actions were not egregious enough to constitute bad faith. View "Thomas McLamb v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Dr. John Doe, a federal public servant with a security clearance, was convicted of two felonies in Ohio in the early 1990s. He received a pardon from the Ohio governor in 2009, and his felony convictions were sealed by an Ohio court. In 2022, Dr. Doe applied for a position at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but his application was denied due to a statutory bar against hiring individuals with felony convictions. Dr. Doe then filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of this hiring prohibition and sought to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid public association with his sealed convictions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged Dr. Doe's privacy concerns and the lack of unfairness to the government but concluded that the privacy interest in felony convictions does not warrant pseudonymity. The court emphasized the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings, especially in cases involving constitutional challenges against the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Dr. Doe's privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions was insufficient to overcome the presumption against pseudonymous litigation. The court highlighted the public's significant interest in open judicial proceedings, particularly when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the relevant factors and denying Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. McKernan" on Justia Law

Michigan Electric Transmission Company (METC) owns a high-voltage transmission line with Michigan Public Power Agency (MPPA) and Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative. The case concerns the ownership of new transmission facilities, or "network upgrades," connecting a new solar generation park to the transmission line. METC claims exclusive ownership based on existing agreements, while MPPA and Wolverine disagree.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that no agreement conclusively determined ownership rights. FERC declined to decide the ownership question, leading METC to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with FERC's interpretation that the relevant agreements did not grant METC exclusive ownership of the network upgrades. The court found that the Styx-Murphy line qualifies as a "system" under the Transmission Owners Agreement (TOA), and since METC is not the sole owner, it cannot claim exclusive ownership. The court also found that the Styx-Murphy Agreements did not preclude MPPA and Wolverine from owning network upgrades.The court denied METC's petitions for review, upholding FERC's decision. View "Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Jazz) challenged the FDA's approval of Avadel CNS Pharmaceuticals Inc.'s (Avadel) drug Lumryz, which contains the same active ingredient, oxybate, as Jazz's drug Xywav. Jazz argued that the FDA's approval violated its seven-year marketing exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act (ODA). The key issue was whether Lumryz and Xywav are considered the "same drug" under the ODA, which would bar the FDA from approving Lumryz during Xywav's exclusivity period.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA and Avadel, concluding that the FDA's approval of Lumryz did not violate the ODA. The court reasoned that the statutory text, history, and purpose indicated that Congress intended to incorporate the FDA's regulatory definition of "same drug," which includes a clinical superiority requirement. The court found that Lumryz, being clinically superior to Xywav due to its once-nightly dosing regimen, was not the "same drug" as Xywav.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the FDA did not act beyond its statutory authority in approving Lumryz. The court concluded that Congress, by amending the ODA in 2017, intended to incorporate the FDA's longstanding regulatory definition of "same drug," which includes the concept of clinical superiority. Since Lumryz was found to be clinically superior to Xywav, it was not considered the "same drug," and thus, the FDA's approval of Lumryz during Xywav's exclusivity period was lawful. View "Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

A group of entities managing a university hospital and a union representing the hospital’s service workers have been negotiating a successor agreement since 2016. The hospital proposed three key changes: granting itself unilateral control over employment terms, imposing a no-strike clause, and eliminating binding arbitration. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these proposals collectively constituted bad faith bargaining, as they would leave union employees worse off than if no contract existed.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially sustained the complaint against the hospital, concluding that the hospital violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by bargaining in bad faith. The ALJ found that the hospital’s proposals, including a restrictive grievance-arbitration procedure and a broad management rights clause, indicated an intent to undermine the bargaining process. The hospital’s regressive bargaining tactics further supported this conclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, agreeing that the hospital’s conduct amounted to bad faith surface bargaining. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s conclusion that the hospital’s proposals, taken together, would strip the union of its representational role and leave employees with fewer rights than they would have without a contract. The court also upheld the NLRB’s procedural decisions, including vacating an earlier decision due to a board member’s financial conflict of interest and seating a new member for the final decision.The court denied the hospital’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement, affirming the NLRB’s order for the hospital to recognize and bargain with the union, rescind unilateral changes, compensate affected employees, and submit periodic reports on bargaining progress. View "District Hospital Partners, L.P. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Michael Solondz, a commercial airline pilot, was diagnosed with anxiety and prescribed mirtazapine after experiencing side effects from another medication. Mirtazapine effectively managed his anxiety without significant side effects. Solondz sought medical clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to resume flying, but the FAA categorically disallows pilots from flying while taking mirtazapine, despite allowing conditional approvals for other antidepressants.The FAA denied Solondz's request for a Special Issuance medical certificate multiple times, citing his use of mirtazapine, anxiety, sleep apnea, optic neuritis, and a history of atrial fibrillation. Solondz provided evidence that his conditions were well-managed and that mirtazapine did not cause significant side effects. The FAA's final denial letter reiterated these reasons and added a concern about a potential malignant melanoma diagnosis, which Solondz disputed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FAA failed to provide a reasonable explanation for categorically disallowing pilots taking mirtazapine from obtaining medical certification. The court noted that the FAA's process for conditionally approving other antidepressants involves a six-month waiting period and individualized medical assessments, which could also apply to mirtazapine.The court vacated the FAA's final denial letter and remanded the case for further explanation. The court emphasized that the FAA must articulate a clear rationale for its policy and avoid offering explanations that contradict the evidence. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Solondz v. FAA" on Justia Law

Radio Communications Corporation (RCC), a telecommunications and media company, petitioned for review of a final order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implementing the Low Power Protection Act (LPPA). The LPPA allows low power television (LPTV) stations to apply for an upgrade to a Class A license if they meet certain criteria, including operating in a Designated Market Area (DMA) with not more than 95,000 television households. The FCC's order adopted this limitation and used Nielsen’s Local TV Report to determine a station’s DMA.RCC operates an LPTV station, W24EZ-D, in Connecticut, which is licensed to serve Allingtown, a neighborhood of West Haven with fewer than 15,000 television households. However, the station is part of the Hartford-New Haven DMA, which has approximately one million television households. RCC challenged the FCC's order, arguing that the size limitation should apply to a station’s community of license, not its DMA. RCC also raised other statutory and constitutional arguments, including claims that the order contravenes section 307(b) of the Communications Act, violates the Commerce Clause, improperly delegates legislative authority to Nielsen, and restricts programming content in violation of the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's order adheres to the best reading of the LPPA, which clearly limits Class A license eligibility to LPTV stations operating in a DMA with not more than 95,000 television households. The court found that the FCC properly defined DMA according to Nielsen’s data, as authorized by Congress, and that the statute does not reference "community of license." The court also rejected RCC's constitutional arguments, finding that the FCC's interpretation did not violate the Commerce Clause or the nondelegation doctrine. Consequently, the court denied RCC's petition for review. View "Radio Communications Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law