Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is responsible for ensuring that rates charged by interstate oil pipelines are just and reasonable. Every five years, FERC reviews the methodology, known as the Index, used to set maximum annual rate increases. In 2020, FERC conducted its five-year review and set a new Index level, which was later modified on rehearing without adhering to notice-and-comment procedures.Initially, FERC invited comments on the proposed Index, receiving input from both pipeline operators (Carriers) and customers (Shippers). FERC issued an Initial Order in December 2020, establishing an Index level higher than proposed, effective July 1, 2021. Both Carriers and Shippers sought rehearing, with Carriers requesting minor changes and Shippers challenging the Index level. FERC issued a Rehearing Order in January 2022, adopting Shippers' suggestions and setting a new, lower Index effective March 1, 2022. Shippers sought clarification on the retroactive application of the Rehearing Order, which FERC denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. Carriers argued that FERC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by modifying the Index without notice-and-comment procedures. The court agreed, noting that once the Initial Order's Index became effective on July 1, 2021, any substantive changes required adherence to APA procedures. The court found that FERC's modification of the Index in the Rehearing Order without such procedures was improper.The court granted Carriers' petitions for review, vacated the Rehearing Order, and ordered FERC to reinstate the Initial Order. Shippers' petitions for review were dismissed as moot due to the vacatur of the Rehearing Order. View "Liquid Energy Pipeline Association v. FERC" on Justia Law

Aly Abdellatif, an Egyptian citizen, suspected he was placed on government watchlists after experiencing unwarranted airport security screenings. He sought correction through the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) redress program, which responded without confirming or denying his watchlist status. Abdellatif and his wife, Nina Araujo, petitioned for review, challenging the administration of the traveler redress program and their treatment during travel.The petitioners initially filed their case in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They named multiple federal agencies and officials as respondents, alleging that Abdellatif's inclusion on the Selectee List and TSA watchlists led to enhanced security screenings and secondary inspections. They argued that TSA's redress process failed to correct erroneous information, violating statutory obligations and due process rights. The court dismissed the petition against all respondents except TSA, citing jurisdictional limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition in part for lack of standing, as TSA cannot remove names from the Selectee List, which is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The court found that petitioners' injuries related to the Selectee List were not redressable in this lawsuit. However, the court denied the remaining claims on the merits, concluding that TSA's redress process complies with statutory requirements and does not violate due process. The court also rejected the Fourth Amendment claims, finding that the enhanced security screenings and secondary inspections described were reasonable and did not constitute unreasonable searches or seizures. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Abdellatif v. DHS" on Justia Law

Hudson Transmission Partners, a merchant transmission facility, previously held firm rights to draw electricity from the PJM grid and was assessed costs for certain grid improvements. In 2017, Hudson relinquished its firm rights, leading to a dispute over whether it must continue paying for previously assessed costs for lower voltage facility upgrades and economic projects under the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) found that Hudson must continue to pay these costs. FERC determined that the PJM Tariff dictates that prior assessments for lower voltage facility upgrades are fixed and unaffected by a change in firm rights. Additionally, the costs of economic projects are validly allocated to entities like Hudson that benefit from the energy savings, regardless of their firm rights status.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld FERC's decision, agreeing that Hudson remains responsible for the previously assessed costs. The court noted that the PJM Tariff includes a saving clause that fixes the cost responsibility for lower voltage facilities unless explicitly changed, which was not the case here. The court also found that Hudson continues to benefit from the economic projects, justifying the continued cost responsibility.The court concluded that FERC's interpretation of the PJM Tariff was consistent with its prior orders and the cost-causation principle, which assigns costs based on the burdens imposed or benefits received by a party. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review, affirming that Hudson must continue to pay the previously assessed costs for the lower voltage facility upgrades and economic projects. View "New York Power Authority v. FERC" on Justia Law

Jo Spence, a licensed attorney, was terminated from her position at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) after eleven years. She claimed her termination was retaliatory, following her filing of internal discrimination complaints and whistleblower disclosures. Spence alleged discrimination based on race, sex, and age, and also claimed the VA engaged in illegal preferential hiring practices. She filed a complaint in the district court after the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) upheld her termination, citing her poor performance.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed most of Spence’s claims for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment on her remaining claim. The court found that Spence, despite being pro se, was not entitled to the leniency typically afforded to pro se litigants due to her legal training and experience. The court dismissed her initial lengthy complaints and allowed her to amend them multiple times, but ultimately dismissed her claims with prejudice for failing to comply with the court’s page limits and pleading requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants does not apply to licensed attorneys. It found that Spence failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claims of retaliation and discrimination, and that her termination was supported by substantial evidence of poor performance. The court also upheld the district court’s dismissal of her claims with prejudice, noting Spence’s repeated failure to comply with court rules and orders. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Spence v. DVA" on Justia Law

In 2008, Indu Rawat, a nonresident alien, sold her 29.2% partnership interest in Innovation Ventures, LLC, a U.S. company, for $438 million. Of this amount, $6.5 million was attributable to a gain on the company's inventory. The key issue was whether this inventory gain constituted U.S.-source income subject to U.S. taxes.The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the $6.5 million inventory gain was U.S.-source income and thus taxable, notifying Rawat that she owed approximately $2.3 million in taxes. Rawat paid the amount but petitioned the Tax Court for a refund, arguing that the inventory gain was foreign-source income and therefore not subject to U.S. taxes. The Tax Court sided with the Commissioner, holding that under § 751(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, Rawat must be taxed as though she had sold the inventory directly, making the gain U.S.-source income.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that § 751(a) does not treat inventory gain as income from the sale of inventory but merely subjects it to ordinary income taxation if it is otherwise taxable. Therefore, the inventory gain Rawat realized from selling her partnership interest is foreign-source income, not subject to U.S. taxes. The court reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding that Rawat's inventory gain was not U.S.-source income and thus not taxable. View "Rawat v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Joseph Smith was convicted of child sexual abuse and related offenses after sexually abusing his stepdaughter, A.S., starting when she was twelve years old. Smith forced A.S. to engage in sexual acts, sent her explicit messages, and coerced her into sending him nude photos. The abuse was reported to the police in April 2017, leading to a search of Smith’s residence, where incriminating evidence was found on a personal computer and two cell phones.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Smith’s pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged underrepresentation of Black residents in the jury pool, a motion to suppress evidence found on the seized devices, and motions related to the government’s case agent’s presence and testimony. Smith was convicted on multiple counts, including child sexual abuse, production and possession of child pornography, and enticement of a minor, and was sentenced to two concurrent life terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Smith’s appeal and rejected all four of his challenges. The court held that Smith failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion of Black residents in the jury-selection process, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court also found that the search warrant for Smith’s residence was sufficiently particular and that the good-faith exception precluded suppression of the evidence. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not plainly err in allowing the case agent to remain in the courtroom and testify based on her knowledge of Cellebrite, as any error did not affect the trial’s outcome given the overwhelming evidence against Smith. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed Smith’s convictions. View "U.S. v. Smith" on Justia Law

A group of hospitals challenged a rule by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that adjusted Medicare reimbursement rates. HHS had increased reimbursements for hospitals in the lowest wage quartile and decreased them for others to maintain budget neutrality. The hospitals argued that this adjustment exceeded HHS's statutory authority under the Medicare Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the hospitals, finding that HHS lacked the authority to make such adjustments. However, the court did not vacate the rule but remanded it to HHS with instructions to recalculate the reimbursements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court that HHS exceeded its authority. The court held that the Medicare Act's wage-index provision did not allow HHS to deviate from the congressionally prescribed formula. The adjustments provision also did not grant HHS the power to override the specific statutory formula. The court concluded that HHS's action must be vacated, not just remanded. Additionally, the court directed that the hospitals should receive an award of interest on the recalculated reimbursements as required by the Medicare statute.The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bridgeport Hospital v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In 2016, Chance Barrow was employed as a digital forensic examiner by the Army Criminal Investigation Division (Army-CID) in Irvine, California. By 2018, he was a special agent. In March 2018, Barrow's ex-wife reported him to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) for alleged sexual assault. Consequently, Army-CID placed Barrow on administrative duty. After a meeting in April 2018, where officials suggested he resign, Barrow resigned. In May 2018, Barrow applied for a position with the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), providing false information about his employment status and history. TIGTA hired him, but later discovered the allegations and initiated a criminal investigation, leading to Barrow's suspension and eventual termination.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried Barrow, who was indicted on two counts of wire fraud and one count of concealment of material facts. The district court excluded evidence related to Barrow's job performance and the NCIS investigation details. The jury found Barrow guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to seventeen months in prison and ordered him to pay $77,057.00 in restitution. Barrow appealed, arguing insufficient evidence and errors in the district court's rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the wire fraud convictions, as the government failed to prove that Barrow's lies deprived TIGTA of money or property. The court vacated the wire fraud convictions and remanded for a judgment of acquittal. Additionally, the court reversed Barrow's conviction for concealment of material facts due to the exclusion of critical evidence and remanded for further proceedings. The restitution order was also vacated. View "USA v. Barrow" on Justia Law

Tenaska Clear Creek Wind, LLC ("Clear Creek") sought to generate wind energy for sale in parts of Missouri, southeast Iowa, and northeast Oklahoma. Clear Creek challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) decision to allow Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) to assign over $100 million in upgrade costs to Clear Creek for its wind turbine project. Clear Creek argued that FERC's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to precedent.Initially, Clear Creek submitted an interconnection request to Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AECI) and requested Network Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS). AECI identified SPP and Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) as potentially affected systems. SPP conducted several studies, initially estimating upgrade costs at $31.2 million, which later fluctuated significantly. Clear Creek began construction based on initial studies but faced a restudy by SPP, which increased the estimated costs to $763 million, later adjusted to $102 million. Clear Creek filed a complaint with FERC, which partially granted and partially denied the complaint, requiring SPP to restudy the project using updated models. The restudy resulted in $88 million in upgrade costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld FERC's orders, finding that SPP's methodology for assigning upgrade costs was consistent with the "but for" cost allocation principle and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also found that Clear Creek's downgrade to Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS) did not moot the case, as Clear Creek retained the right to re-open the matter if it prevailed. The court concluded that FERC's decision was based on reasoned decision-making and substantial evidence, denying Clear Creek's petitions for review. View "Tenaska Clear Creek Wind, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) updated its regulations to ensure that the transportation fuel mix in the United States contains the required amounts of renewable fuel. The new regulations specifically address biogas-derived renewable fuel, implementing a more structured process to prevent fraud and error. The Coalition for Renewable Natural Gas, representing industry stakeholders, petitioned to overturn these changes, arguing that the new rules were too rigid and burdensome.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Coalition argued that the EPA lacked authority to regulate biogas producers and that the new requirements were arbitrary and capricious. They also claimed procedural violations in the rulemaking process. The EPA defended its regulations, stating that they were necessary to ensure compliance with renewable fuel standards and to prevent fraud and double counting.The Court of Appeals found that the EPA acted within its authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate biogas producers and that the new rules were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court also held that the EPA had followed proper procedures in adopting the rule. The court denied the Coalition's petition for review, upholding the EPA's updated regulations. The main holding was that the EPA's modifications to the biogas-derived renewable fuel regulations were reasonable and necessary to ensure compliance with renewable fuel standards and to prevent fraud. View "Coalition for Renewable Natural Gas v. EPA" on Justia Law